The EU-Japan Security Dialogue: Invisible but Comprehensive examines security dialogue between Japan and the EU from the establishment of the official European Community-Japan cooperation in the late 1950s until 2006. While most of scholarly works dealing with Europe-Japan relations focus on economic and trade issues, this book provides a basis for advanced discussion on security matters. It argues that the EU-Japan security dialogue takes place – and what is more, it is expanding. Olena Mykal investigates how international events – particularly the terrorist attacks in New York on 9/11 and the EU’s proposal to lift its arms embargo on China – have strengthened the dialogue over the past decade.

Olena Mykal is Head of Sector of Asian Studies of the Department of Foreign Policy at the National Institute of Strategic Studies of Ukraine and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. She received her PhD from the Waseda University in Japan.
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The EU-Japan Security Dialogue

Invisible but Comprehensive

Olena Mykal
To my dear parents
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Abbreviations

ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASDF Air Self-Defence Forces
ASEM Asia-Europe Meetings
ATA Afghanistan Transitional Administration
ATSML Antiterrorism Special Measures Law
AU African Union
BWC Biological Weapons Convention
CEE Central and Eastern Europe
CERN European Council for Nuclear Research
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
DDA Doha Development Agenda
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
DIAG Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC European Community
ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Office
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
ECU European Currency Unit
EDA European Defence Agency
EDC European Defence Community
EEC European Economic Community
EPC European Political Cooperation
ES Embryonic Stem
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EU European Union
EUMC European Union Military Committee
EUMS European Union Military Staff
EUSRA European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan
Euratom European Atomic Energy Community
FAFA Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
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<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self-Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICOC</td>
<td>International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICORC</td>
<td>International Committee on Reconstruction of Cambodia</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
<td>Intelligent Manufacturing System</td>
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<tr>
<td>IODP</td>
<td>Integrated Ocean Drilling Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISTC</td>
<td>International Science and Technology Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITER</td>
<td>International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAERI</td>
<td>Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEDO</td>
<td>Korean Energy Development Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCSMHRA</td>
<td>Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most Favoured Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MITI</td>
<td>Ministry of International Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self-Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>Newly Independent States</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Special Administrative region of China (Hong Kong)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TICAD</td>
<td>Tokyo International Conference on African Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCED</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Environment and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<td>UNHSF</td>
<td>United Nations Human Security Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSSD</td>
<td>World Summit on Sustainable Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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Acknowledgements

I began this study of EU-Japan relations a little less than 10 years ago while I was an undergraduate student at the Department of International Relations. It was born out of my long-time interest in Japan and my specialisation in European Policy. That was during the period of transformation occasioned by the end of the Cold War and I was curious to examine the ways in which Japan and the EU were working together.

In 1999-2000, during a year of study at the Free University of Brussels, I was an eyewitness to the fact that not much was going on between the EU and Japan, specifically in the security field, in terms of traditional ‘hard power’ thinking. Later, upon being awarded the Monbukagakusho scholarship, I went to study in Japan, where I saw both sides of the story. While in the 1990s I had been frustrated because I felt that Europe and Japan could have done a lot together for the benefit of not only their societies but for humankind, the 2000s shift in the notions and paradigms of security lent new appreciation to an EU-Japan dialogue. I believe more strongly than ever that Europe and Japan are true partners that share each other’s security concerns and those of the world. This book is a counterargument to the widely held view that EU-Japanese relations are insignificant and not as strategically important as, for instance, Chinese-European or Japanese-US relationships. Here I intend to illustrate that the Japanese-European agenda includes many important issues in terms of advanced discourse on current security concerns.

I would like to express my thanks to Professor Eric Remacle who supervised my work during my study in the Master program at the Free University of Brussels in Belgium. I am very grateful to Professor Hatsue Shinohara of the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies at Waseda University for her advice, support, and thoughtful and objective comments. I have learnt a lot from her seminars, which are a place for open discussions, the free flow of ideas and also a source of inspiration for my writing. I am also very indebted to Professor Koji Fukuda of the School of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University for his encouragement and support of my endeavours as well as for his invaluable insights and suggestions. They greatly enriched my work.
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away from his own research to help me with the notes and bibliography, and also for his support and optimism. Last but not least, I want to express my deepest gratitude to my parents for their overall support, understanding, care and encouragement. All this help made it possible to write this book, although I am solely responsible for its contents.
The significance of this study stems from the argument that the security dialogue between the EU and Japan is healthy and ongoing, and, moreover, is expanding into new areas of dialogue. This book thus provides an advanced discussion on the issue of security. Inasmuch as most studies dealing with European-Japanese relations focus to a great extent on economic and trade issues rather than on political and security issues, this study is innovative. Employing both historical and problematic approaches, it provides a basis for further discussion on Japanese-European Union cooperation on the issue of security.

This book examines the security dialogue between Japan and the EU from the establishment of relations between the European Community and Japan in 1959 until 2006. ‘Security dialogue,’ in this context, refers to the discourse and joint activity between the EU and Japan, and the concept of security is treated in a broad context. This study argues that it is reasonable to enlarge the notion of security to include and consider as security issues those which have been enunciated in various EU-Japan bilateral documents and those that flow from their individual security conceptualisations.

The second argument is that security means different things for different actors, and I, therefore, trace what security has meant for both actors over different historical time spans, and on this basis, I approach the EU-Japan joint agenda of those given periods.

The third assumption is that due to historical changes in the world and the development of the EU-Japan security dialogue itself, the latter tends to expand. To support this thesis, I examine the EU-Japan security discourse and their joint activity in certain areas of security dialogue that are cited in joint documents, and in which the parties have a common interest in further development.

The aim of this study is fivefold:
1. to analyse the EU and Japan’s individual and joint security agendas;
2. to trace the expansion of security cooperation between the EU and Japan;
3. to expose and analyse the problems hampering the dialogue;
4. to demonstrate that EU-Japan joint activities have been in line with their security conceptualisations; and
5. to propose some suggestions for forwarding their dialogue.
To examine their joint security agendas, I describe and analyse a considerable number of primary documents, interview materials and secondary sources, the study of which reveals the policy practices, relationship and activities between the EU and Japan. This research is a study of international relations and its history. It applies a constructivist approach (‘systemic school’) to International Relations (IR).

The book gives an overview of the Japan-EU security dialogue, reveals the problems, ponders the commonalities that can be developed in the future and offers some suggestions. Moreover, based on the analysis of primary sources and interviews, this study adds objectivity and provides an opportunity to examine the actual state of the EU-Japan security dialogue.

The book consists of an introduction, seven main chapters, and a conclusion. The chapters are divided into two parts. Part One (chapters 1-3) traces the overall historical evolution of the EU-Japan security dialogue in terms of discourse analysis. Part Two (chapters 4-7) focuses on examining the parties’ joint performance in concrete areas of security dialogue.

To sum up the major findings, I conclude that at the discourse level, the EU and Japan pursue a quiet, but consistent diplomacy of mutual engagement, which, in turn, fosters gradual progress in their joint activities and sows the seeds for a solid foundation of further common actions. Moreover, an analysis of both discourse and joint activity demonstrates that the EU-Japan security dialogue has evolved and been strengthened. A significant feature of the dialogue is its tendency to be implemented within multilateral structures, which makes it largely invisible. However, this study concludes that even despite its non-eye-catching peculiarity, the dialogue is sound and comprehensive. In this respect, however, unless it is properly nurtured, it will continue to remain invisible and thus unable to build upon the increasingly interconnected interests that in fact bind the partners together more and more. Based on a thorough analysis, this study suggests that invisibility can be tackled through the development of the dialogue in the areas of common interest, such as a strategic dialogue on security in East and Central Asia as well as missile defence and energy security.

Furthermore, this book demonstrates that the EU-Japan security dialogue has been gradually strengthening and deepening throughout its development due to international developments as well as through the consequent modifications in European and Japanese security conceptualisations. Finally, the study establishes that the EU-Japan security dialogue is characterised as a safety net of ‘civilian powers’ governance in security affairs. It is undoubtedly an important layer within the global security net, one that, although not visible, is sound and comprehensive and will continue to expand and strengthen.
Introduction

The Notion of Security and the General Background of the Research

The generally accepted view is that EU-Japanese relations lack a strategic security dimension, especially when compared to the Japanese-US alliance or European-US relations. This seems to be true when one analyses EU-Japanese relations using the traditional Realism interpretation of security. Thus, since the end of World War Two the study of ‘security’ has focused on an examination of the reasons why states use force as an instrument of policy. This meant that interpretations and explanations of the strategic dimension of the US-USSR confrontation dominated security studies of the Cold War era, with all other issues automatically relegated to the status of ‘low’ security issues. However, a broader concept of security started emerging during détente and the Helsinki process in the 1970s. It went beyond traditional military concerns and also included human rights and environmental issues. The Brandt, Palme, and Brundtland Commissions also brought new concepts and interpretations of international problems and their settlement (Thakur, Cooper and English 2005; Independent Commission on International Development Issues (Brandt Commission) 1983; Independent Commission on Security and Disarmament (Palme Commission) 1982; World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission) 1987.

Besides this new concept of security, the concept of ‘civilian power’ also arose in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s in recognition of the absence of the European Community in various military affairs due to the failure of the EDC (European Defence Community) in 1954 and NATO’s consequent dominance over Western European security, among other factors. Japan, as a consequence of the oil and dollar crises of the 1970s, embarked on a parallel reformulation of its approach to security. The Japanese establishment adopted a broader doctrine of comprehensive security. Therefore, deviations were already occurring during the Cold War period, especially with regards to Japan and the EU, from the traditional view on security.
However, a true ‘parade’ of new security conceptualisations appeared after the end of the Cold War. Thus, in the early- to mid 1990s, the voices of proponents in favour of the concepts of non-traditional, non-state-centered security and non-military (i.e., non-hard) power became louder. In 1990 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. coined a term ‘soft power,’ which refers to the ability of an international actor to indirectly influence the interests and corresponding behaviour of other actors through cultural and/or ideological means (Nye 1994; 2004). Later, in 1994 the United Nations Development Program adopted a Human Development Report that introduced a new concept of human security, one which, by examining both the national and the global concerns of human security, equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms (United Nations Development Program 1994). In other words, human security is centred on the human being, not the state. The concept involves an emphasis on non-military security issues, e.g. poverty, hunger, human rights, the environment, etc., and has achieved great popularity (Inada 2005: 147). There are also critics of human security who argue that this term opens up the field to many concerns but at the same time admit the opportunity to hold research where ‘human security may serve as a label for a broad category of research in the field of security studies that is primarily concerned with non-military threats to the safety of societies, groups, and individuals, in contrast to more traditional approaches to security studies that focus on protecting states from external threats’ (Paris 2001: 96).

Moreover, looking at the contemporary trends of globalisation, global problems and threats to society, we can clearly see that they do not lie primarily along the military dimension. Air pollution, the energy crisis and the bird flu pandemic cannot be addressed using military tactics. Therefore, the states and non-state actors need to adapt to new conditions, in which the question is not who the enemy is and what to do about him, but how to cope with the domino-effect of problems in the modern world. In practice, security considerations almost always expand to include other areas, especially when the states do not face immediate military threats. Even when tanks are not massing along the borders, a state has to develop its own security concept. Reflecting these changes in international relations and what constitutes security in the modern world, Japan in 1998 and the EU in 2003 adopted human security concepts whereby human security refers to the freedom of individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations.

In keeping with the European and Japanese adherence to the human security conceptualisation, such scholars as Hanns W. Maull, Stephan Keukeliere, Yoichi Funabashi, Julie Gilson and Eric Remacle have thus far regarded the EU and Japan as two ‘civilian powers’ that share a practice of using non-military means to address security interests. This
approach does not preclude the possible use of military force, and ‘civi-
lian’ is not meant to be mutually exclusive from a ‘military’ component
(Maull 1990-1991; Funabashi 1991-1992; Funabashi 1993; Gilson 2000:
50-52; Keukeleire 2001; Remacle 2005: 35). Treating Japan and Europe as
‘civilian powers’ seems logical and does not seem contradictory to an
approach based on a vision of human security. Moreover, it represents a
natural evolution consistent with the history of EU-Japan relations.
Thus, it can be said that, officially, relations between Japan and the EU
(still the European Economic Community back then) were established
in 1959 when Japan’s Ambassador to the Benelux countries was accre-
dited to the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1974, the EEC es-
lished its Diplomatic Mission in Japan (European Commission
1999b). Since then, Japan and the EU have developed an extensive co-
operation effort mainly in the economic sphere. During the Cold War,
both the European Community and Japan kept a low profile as far as
military security was concerned, but their cooperation paved the way for
alternative security studies. Moreover, it should be noted that, as will be
clearly articulated below in the section ‘Objective of the Study,’ inasm-
much as the aim of the study is not to find differences and similarities
between the notions of ‘civilian power,’ ‘human security,’ as well as the
widely used definition of ‘soft power,’ for the purpose of the present
study, it is sufficient to note that they do not contradict, but rather com-
plement and overlap one another.
Furthermore, it implies that the EU and Japan are eager to exert their
power in a broad sphere that includes the challenges on globalisation and
other contemporary problems. It draws the EU and Japan much
closer together, as can be seen from the insight that, in the people’s
minds, security remains closely identified with military supremacy and
national borders. It is quite the contrary, however, as Japan and Europe,
are inseparably linked as global partners, with regard to security. Both
sides have the will and the capacity to engage in mutual assistance in
the face of challenges to the security of either party (Kono 2000a). In
this respect, it is worth noting that when responding to questions from
the audience during his visit to Japan in April 2006, President of the
European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, admitted that EU-Japan
relations were different from the US-Japan military security partner-
ship. That is because the EU is not a state and thus does not have an ac-
tual military component, which makes it inappropriate to talk about
military security relations between the EU and Japan (Barroso 2006).

On the basis of the considerations discussed above with regard to the
general background of the study and development of the security con-
cept in international relations, we will now proceed directly to a discus-
sion of the objective of this study.
Objective of the Study

As we mentioned above, EU-Japanese cooperation is commonly considered weak compared to US-Japan links, especially in the security sphere (Seidelmann 2001; Gilson 2000). Indeed, although neither the EU nor Japan is a great power capable of projecting significant military influence, neither has the will or the constitutional authority to do so. As a group of scholars have pointed out, ‘both are introverted, absorbed in their own problems, and extremely hesitant to resort to military means’ (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998: 65). However, in my opinion, it is not appropriate to compare EU-Japan cooperation on security issues with the US-Japan alliance, inasmuch as these partnerships are intrinsically different in nature. In contrast, I argue that it is more appropriate to do an in-depth study of the origin and evolution of the EU-Japan security dialogue as a thing in itself.

Therefore, the focus of this study examines the security dialogue between Japan and the European Union, from the establishment of EC-Japanese cooperation in 1959 to 2006. In this respect, the security dialogue refers to the discourse and joint cooperation between the EU and Japan in the security sphere, where security means the security conceptualisations from European and Japanese perspectives. More specifically, I explore the EU-Japan discourse on security in the context of their cooperation from the late 1950s until 2006, proceeding from their own interpretations of security. At the same time, I analyse the EU and Japanese joint activities in the areas that are frequently cited in their joint documents as important and showing promise regarding a bilateral security dialogue. In other words, the central question of the research is, what are the principal characteristics of the development of the EU-Japan security dialogue?

I should clarify the usage of the term ‘security dialogue’. First, I would like to explain what I mean by the ‘dialogue’. There are several definitions for ‘dialogue’. To cite the most pertinent: the Oxford English Dictionary defines dialogue as ‘a formal discussion between two groups or countries, especially when they are trying to solve a problem, end a dispute, etc.’ In other words, the dialogue is a discussion, and at this point, with regards to the ‘discussion’, we can say that within the domain of International Relations, it is more appropriate to use the term ‘discourse,’ defined as ‘a long and serious treatment or discussion of a subject in speech or writing’ (Oxford English Dictionary). Other definitions of ‘dialogue’ refer to:

- an exchange of ideas or opinions on a particular issue, especially a political or religious issue, with the idea of reaching an amicable agreement or settlement;
discussion of areas of disagreement frankly in order to come up with a resolution.

These points are especially important, and we can thus say that there has been a dialogue between the EU and Japan, especially one that is consistent with the definition of dialogue as the attainment of a solution in an amicable fashion, and so we can say that amicability is a true feature of the EU-Japan dialogue.

However, there is another component of ‘dialogue’. Thus, during a dialogue or discourse, the actors interact with each other ‘so as to have a reciprocal effect’ (Oxford English Dictionary). In this way, we can say that the discussion or discourse during a dialogue may result in a certain action or activity that can be undertaken by either of the actors individually or jointly. Therefore, we can say that dialogue is not confined to just a discourse, but also involves a certain activity (as a result of the discourse). Proceeding from the above, ‘dialogue’ thus has a twofold meaning, which covers both the discourse and the resulting joint activity between the EU and Japan in the security sphere.

This work treats security in a broad context, which is not limited solely to the military sector, and allows me to study and examine the EU-Japanese activities in environment, energy, development aid and other areas from a security perspective. Some would argue that this breadth and inclusiveness deprives the term ‘security’ of meaningful objectivity and focus. I argue that, on the contrary, it is reasonable to enlarge the notion of security to include and regard as security issues at least those which have been stated by the actors themselves in the EU-Japan bilateral documents, which flow from the various security conceptualisations of the European Union and Japan correspondingly.

Hence, my second argument is that security means different things to different actors, and I am, therefore, not going to offer a binding definition of security in the introduction. Instead, I trace what security meant for Japan and the EU over the course of history, in various eras, and, on this basis, I approach the EU-Japan joint agenda to define their common interests in certain historical periods. In other words, in this research, security is what the European Union and Japan individually consider to be security, and what both of them include from this perspective in their bilateral dialogue. This approach seems reasonable in so far as it allows me to avoid ambiguity and to pursue the main theme of the research. Hence, by looking at how both sides define their own security, as neither is limited to a purely military reading of their security interests, and what they choose to include in their bilateral agendas, this study derives from each party’s own definition. The first finding in this respect is that their respective conceptualisations of security have evolved since 1945. The second finding is that their conceptualisations
of security have often evolved in parallel, giving them increasing areas of overlap, in which they share the same security interests. In areas such as energy, science and technology, development aid, and crisis management they have found increasingly more to discuss and cooperate on.

The third argument is that, due to the development of EU-Japan cooperation itself, the security dialogue has tended to expand and include more and more issues. Therefore, I examine both the EU-Japan security discourse and certain spheres that are cited in joint documents as being in their common interest to develop further. Moreover, taking into account that in a long-term perspective both Japan and the European Union are interested in strengthening a full scale dialogue ‘with [a] greater focus on concrete measures and concerted actions’ (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a; emphasis added), it creates a need to explore in depth the practical realisation of certain issues frequently mentioned in joint bilateral documents. Consequently, the aim of my research is fivefold: 1. to analyse the EU and Japan’s individual and joint security agendas; 2. to trace the expansion of security cooperation between the EU and Japan; 3. to identify and analyse the problems hampering the dialogue; 4. to demonstrate that their joint activities have been in line with their security conceptualisations; 5. to offer some suggestions for improving their dialogue.

To examine this research question, I describe and analyse a considerable number of primary documents, interview materials and secondary sources that reveal the policy practices, relationship and activities between the EU and Japan, and their individual and joint policy practices. In this way, I expose the initial problems and limitations confronting them, and the benefits, though not necessarily material ones, which they derived from cooperation.

The significance of this study stems from the argument that a security dialogue between the EU and Japan is taking place, and what is more, it is expanding, continually adding new topic to the dialogue. This monograph gives an overview of the EU-Japan security dialogue, reveals the problems, focuses on commonalities that can be developed in the future and offers some suggestions. It is based on an analysis of primary sources and interviews, which lend the study objectivity and the opportunity to examine the actual condition of the EU-Japan security dialogue. Moreover, I trace the development of the security dialogue in certain areas of cooperation, which are defined as areas of common interest in accordance with the EU and Japanese security conceptualisations, as well as the discourse analysis of the EU-Japan joint documents. Through this research the author hopes to make her modest
contribution to the promotion of EU-Japan relations, specifically in the security area. Inasmuch as most studies dealing with EU-Japan relations focus on economic and trade rather than political and security issues, this study is innovative and based both on a historical and problem-oriented approach, which provides a base for further discussion in the sphere of EU-Japanese cooperation on security. It also shows that in building upon their common interest, there are certain activities whose development will allow one to conclude that the security dialogue between the EU and Japan is expanding and deepening.

Framework of Analysis

I made an analysis of the available international relations theories, which proceeds from several factors.

The primary difficulty that I confronted from the very beginning and throughout is that the research concerns the relations between the European Union, partly a supranational organisation and partly an intergovernmental organisation, and Japan, which is a state. Europe and its component nations are both ‘imagined communities’, (Anderson 1991) and people may feel that they are part of both communities without having to choose either as their primary place of identification.

The analysis of the survey data suggests – and social psychological experiments confirm – that many who strongly identify with their nation-state also feel that they belong to Europe (Risse 2004: 166). People may express a feeling of belonging to Europe in general, while feeling no attachment to the EU at all – and vice versa. However, the EU as an active identity builder has successfully achieved identity hegemony in terms of increasingly clarifying the definition of what it means to belong to ‘Europe’ (Risse 2004: 169) both inside Europe and outside it. The EU has significant constitutive effects on European state identities. States are increasingly identified as EU members, non-members, or would-be members. Their status in Europe and, to some degree, in the world depends on these categories. Moreover, the EU has achieved identity hegemony in the sense that ‘Europe’ increasingly denotes the political and social space occupied by the EU (Risse 2004: 169). Thus, while looking for the International Relations (IR) theory to apply herein, I had to keep in mind that the selected theory had to meet agent criteria that would make it a useful tool in the study of the relations between the agents of IR, notwithstanding their origin and internal structure since, unlike Japan (state), the EU (supranational organisation) is not a common agent for analysis. Therefore, the first criterion search was an agential one. The second criterion was relational, i.e., the theory has to be useful for the analysis of the state of cooperation between the agents. The third
criterion was the *process*. The selected IR theory would help answer the questions connected with a given interaction in the process, but not as a given factor at a given point in time. The fourth criterion was the *change during the process*. These four – agential, relational, process, and change during the process – were the principal criteria used in the selection of the most appropriate theory.

Within IR theory, Neorealism/Realism defines power and interest as the research variables (Morgenthau 1950; Waltz 1959). However, whilst Neorealism/Realism denies the importance of non-state actors, process and consequent changes in interests due to the actors’ interaction, Neoliberalism has come to acknowledge this. Thus, Realism/Neorealism is conservative regarding its vision of IR, and Liberalism/Neoliberalism is more flexible because it admits the existence of other, non-state agents (organisations) (Keohane and Nye 1971; Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 2001). The latter considers the process of interaction as one of the important prerequisites for changing states’ interests and consequently for possible cooperation between them within the cooperation process due to changing interests.

However, because the objective of my research deals with the respective security conceptualisations of the EU and Japan, I also had to take into account the issue of identity formation, which is not addressed by Liberalism/Neoliberalism, and thus, Social Constructivism became a useful theory.

The post-Cold War environment required new approaches to interpreting security, and by applying those, the efforts of the EU and Japan, specifically in the non-military sphere, have become more observable and noticeable. Due to the selection criteria, it would be appropriate to apply a Constructivist approach to my research. Constructivism enables us to analyse the EU-Japan security dialogue from the perspective of agential, relational, process and change during the process criteria, and also allows us to interpret security more broadly as an area associated not solely with military and power performance. Besides, it also makes it possible to point out and analyse the problems in the security dialogue, and to offer prescriptions, keeping in mind that the benefits of cooperation are often as tangible in providing trade benefits as intangible with regards to strengthening international ties and mutual understanding.

Constructivism suggests that, as a process, the development of EU-Japan relations has a transformative impact on the relations themselves (as well as the EU and Japan). The relations have changed over the years, and it is reasonable to assume that, in the process, the agents’ identities and subsequently their interests and behaviour have also changed. While this aspect of change may be further developed by applying Constructivism, it remains largely invisible when we apply other
IR theories that overlook the processes of identity formation. Constructivists believe that the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place (Ruggie 1998: 33). It follows that there is such a thing as a socially constructed reality. Therefore, we can claim that there is as much that has to do with socially constructed reality as with material reality in EU-Japan relations. In this respect, we can suppose that the historical period in which agents act shapes their respective identities and interests, and that once these have been defined, the role of language and discourse becomes crucial. Agreements, communiqués, and joint declarations constitute an area ripe for further constructivist research, and through analysing them we can chronicle the establishment and development of the EU-Japan security dialogue.

There are many classifications of constructivist studies in IR, depending on the object of the research. In our case, we follow the classification suggested by Ernst B. Hass, in which he distinguishes three schools of thought within constructivism in relation to how the actors construct their own interests (Haas 2001: 26, emphasis in the original).

The first is the ‘systemic school’, which proposes that interests result from the definition of actor identities, which, in turn, result from the role played by the actor in the global system. State actors are constituted by this system, and they take their roles from their perceived positions in it. Its leading theorists include Alex Wendt and David Dessler, who, however, acknowledge a kinship to world-society British theorists such as Hedley Bull, Anthony Giddens, and Barry Buzan (Haas 2001: 26).

The second is ‘norms and culture’ school, which maintains that interests derive from the cultural matrix in which actors live. This setting generates the norms that underlie collective choices. Prominent theorists include John Meyer, Friedrich Kratochwil, Christian Reus-Smit, Keith Krause, and Bill McSweeney. Much empirical work on the role of norms in shaping foreign policy derives from this school. International society is the preferred site for finding embedded norms (Haas 2001: 26).

The third is the ‘soft rationalist’ school, which proposes that actors derive their interests from their notions of political causality. Their ontological understanding of what makes ‘their’ world tick informs their definition of interests. This school includes scholars who look for the origins of interest in consensual knowledge and in epistemic communities of knowledge-purveyors. Soft rationalists find the origins of their interests within nation-states, but also regard translational movements as sources. Its prominent theorists include Peter Katzenstein, Emanuel Adler, Peter Haas, Harvey Starr and Andrew Farkas (Haas 2001: 26).
In this research, we analyse the interaction, discourse and concrete activity between the EU and Japan, and from this viewpoint the application of the ‘systemic school’ seems most appropriate to our case. It enables us to approach our subject (the EU-Japan security dialogue) from the perspective of the EU and Japanese formations of security identity and, moreover, to suggest that those identities have been shaped as a result of the external developments.

Within the ‘systemic school’ we rely upon Wendt and Buzan’s works (Wendt 1999; Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1998). Wendt’s works would allow us to analyse the EU-Japan concrete activity through concrete steps. It is widely held that constructivist ontology is incompatible with the positivist epistemology of natural science, and requires instead a special post-positivist epistemology. Drawing on a realist philosophy of science, Wendt argues that there is nothing in the intellectual activity required to explain the processes of social construction that is epistemologically different from the intellectual activity employed by the natural sciences (Wendt 1999: 372-373). Therefore, positivist methods are applicable to the study. At the same time as Thomas Diez (2001: 88) notes, Wendt focuses on actor’s ‘interaction through “gestures,” not speech’. In other words, Wendt focuses on concrete activity, the behaviour of an agent rather than agent’s speech, words. Since this research deals with security dialogue, which refers to both discourse and concrete cooperation, we will also apply Buzan’s concept to our discourse analysis. Moreover, that Buzan’s research dealt with security studies is of special importance (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1998).

To put it roughly, within one ‘systemic school’ I will apply Wendt’s elaborations to address the concrete and actual activity of the EU and Japan in their security dialogue, whilst the Buzan et al. (1998: 23-26) work provides the ground for discourse analysis, especially in the security area. It is important to admit that while we proceed with the discourse analysis in the book, we regard the EU – Japan security agenda as a derivative of the European and Japanese individual security agendas. Therefore, we do not approach the EU-Japan security agenda directly, but through the analysis of the actors’ respective security visions. Moreover, we also take into account the influence of historical transformations on the security dialogue. Such an approach differs somewhat from the elaborations of Buzan et al., but we find it more appropriate for our topic.

Moreover, as a response to Andrew Moravcsik’s (2001: 176-186) criticism of Constructivism, that often the argument is not testable and that too much theorisation results in ‘empirical disconfirmation’, we intentionally made arguments that are testable by empirical analysis.

In general, the research studies IR. It applies Constructivist theory (‘systemic school’) of IR. The analytical assumption is that once the EU
and Japan have started to cooperate, they will opt to develop and continue their dialogue due to the mutual, not necessarily material, benefits that would be lost if the dialogue were to suddenly stop, or fail to expand. Moreover, the cooperation not only continues to develop, but it continues to broaden and embrace more areas. Hence, a framework claims that a given historical event (an independent variable) influences both the formation of the EU-Japan security dialogue and their individual security conceptualisations (intervening variables) and it also furthers the security dialogue’s expansion, adding new spheres of cooperation (dependent variable). Second, in their turn, the security conceptualisations also influence the security dialogue (intervening variable), which itself evolves and thereby includes more and more areas (dependent variable). In this way, we prove our main argument that since its inception, the security dialogue has been continually deepening and strengthening.

**Documentation and Literature Overview**

Sources can be conditionally divided into three main groups:
1. documents, official speeches and sources;
2. interviews;
3. scholarly and analytical works.

The documentation consists of official documents, speeches, statements, declarations, agreements and other documents that could be conditionally divided into several groups. The first group is comprised of Japan’s foreign policy documents, namely, the official statements of prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs, bulletins issued by the Cabinet of Ministers of Japan, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. In contrast with the EU, which elaborates and officially disseminates reports and memoranda on the development of its relations with Japan, the latter, if it does produce them, still does not disseminate them. Kazuki Iwanaga also concedes that the analysis of Europe’s role in Japanese foreign policy relies, to a great extent, on the statements of prime ministers and foreign ministers, the official reports of the foreign ministry, and parliamentary proceedings (Iwanaga 2000: 211). In this view, the editions titled ‘Diplomatic Bluebook’, ‘White Paper’, and ‘Defence of Japan’ should be mentioned, in particular, inasmuch as they were the principal Japanese materials where the analysis of the cooperation, its evaluation and the Japanese vision of further development of relations could be found. It should be noted that the Japanese sources appear primarily in both English and Japanese. A few appear only in
Japanese, such as the laws of Japan on Peacekeeping Operations (1992), Antiterrorism Special Measures (2001), the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance (2003). In cases where there is a discrepancy between the English and Japanese texts, the Japanese version prevails.

The second group of documents consists of materials regarding the EU’s evolution that began with the 1957 Rome Agreement, which established the European Economic Community, and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which established the EU, and its consequent modifications. This analysis provided the opportunity to study the evolution of the EU itself as well as the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy). Primary emphasis was placed on studying the analytical European Commission reports on EU-Japan relations. Apart from these, considerable attention was paid to the speeches of the European Commission representatives.

A third group of sources is the joint EU-Japan documents. The key document that established the background for the formation of the general relations, which was officially included in the dialogue security field and stated mechanisms of cooperation, was The Hague Political Declaration (Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Community and its Member States and Japan 1991). On the basis of this declaration and proceeding from the evolution of their cooperation, the two parties signed ‘An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation’ in 2001, which considerably enlarged and deepened the spheres of their cooperation (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a more extensive database on EU-Japan relations in English than in Japanese. For example, some of the early 1990s joint documents are not even included in Japanese on their website.

My interviews and discussions proved highly productive, lending insights concerning the manner in which EU-Japan cooperation has taken place. Moreover, it is worth emphasising that, for good reasons, not all the facts and views are represented in these official documents. Therefore, my interviews were an important source of information, and to respect their anonymity, the interviewees are quoted anonymously. The interviews were held with the representatives of the EU Institute of Strategic Studies (Paris), the European Commission (Brussels), the European Defence Agency (Brussels), the European Parliament (Brussels), the European Policy Centre (Brussels), the Diplomatic Mission of Japan to the European Commission (Brussels), the European University Institute (Florence) for consultation on European Security, the European Commission Delegation to Japan, the National Institute of Defence Studies of Japan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and various research centres in Japan from April 2004 to January 2007. Moreover, the interviews provided an opportunity not
only to look at the study from theoretical and academic viewpoints, but also to evaluate its applicability in future EU-Japan relations, i.e., from the practical side, how can this research and its results be applied in practice.

Apart from official sources and interview materials, monographs, and articles devoted to EU-Japan relations were widely used in the research. The first group of literature is devoted to the EU, its structure and functioning, as well as to the CFSP pillar of the EU.\(^{13}\) Thus, Neil Winn and Christopher Lord (2001) in the co-authored work ‘EU Foreign Policy beyond the Nation State: Joint Actions and Institutional Analysis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ analyse joint action (established under the Treaty on European Union) and examine the establishment of structural pillars within the EU and, specifically, the CFSP pillar. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (2006) gave a very detailed description and analysis of EU activities in spheres such as economics and trade, environmental policy, humanitarian and development assistance, and the military and security spheres.

The second group of literature consists of works about the foreign policy and security of Japan.\(^{14}\) Christopher W. Hughes (2004) monograph ‘Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions’ explores the country’s diplomatic, political, military, and economic concerns and policies within this new context. Hughes looked closely at the security issues facing Japanese policymakers: among them, remnants of Cold War conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational terrorism, organised crime, piracy, economic dislocation, financial crises, and environmental disasters. He then examines Japan’s response to these problems in the military, economic, and environmental spheres, as well as its key security relationships.

Finally, publications in the third group address the issues of bilateral cooperation.\(^{15}\) The works by Julie Gilson, Atsuko Abe, Kazuki Iwanaga, Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Simon Nuttall, Takako Ueta, Eric Remacle, Hisashi Owada, Kazuo Ogura, Takeo Kuwabara, Glenn D. Hook, Emil Kirchner and others were especially valuable.\(^{16}\) While all of them examine EU-Japan relations, their focus, approaches, and aims of their studies varied greatly, e.g., culture, aspects of civilisation (Kuwabara, Ogura), Europe in Japanese foreign policy (Abe, Iwanaga), the perception of Japan in Europe (Lehmann), and so on.

In this regard, the most far-reaching research thus far published is ‘Japan and the European Union: A partnership for the Twenty-First Century?’ by Julie Gilson (2000). Applying an institutional approach, her main focus was to show both internal and external driving forces that have promoted change and development within this bilateral relationship over the past few decades. In her conclusion, she emphasised
three main points that, in her opinion, are the driving forces of cooperation. These are:
1. the emphasis on a multilateral rather than a bilateral dialogue in today’s international situation;
2. the institutionalisation of the EU-Japan dialogue;
3. the reassessment of the potential the EU and Japan to become global civilian partners (Gilson 2000: 166).

The second conclusion is particularly important because, according to the constructivist theory, actors in the institutionalised body share common knowledge and make adaptations that may logically lead to a change in their ideas, values and interests.

Gilson’s work offers valuable research, which helped facilitate the present research. Applying the institutional approach, her main focus was on identifying both the internal and external driving forces that have promoted change and development within EU-Japan cooperation. This research explores the EU-Japan security dialogue from historical and problematic perspectives and investigates how it evolved and what issues were on the joint security agenda. Thus, the originality of the present research lies in its focus on the examination of the security dialogue. In other words, it can be said that, while Gilson’s study provides this research with a broad and extensive analysis of overall EU-Japanese relations, this book is an in-depth examination of one aspect of relations, namely security.

Atsuko Abe’s monograph ‘Japan and European Union: Domestic Politics and Transnational Relations’ (1999) also sheds light on EU-Japan relations. It was especially helpful in the analysis of what significance The Hague Declaration had for the EU-Japan security dialogue. However, her main focus was on the analysis of activity of the internal domestic actors within Japan who make policy towards Europe.

In their research articles, Takako Ueta and Eric Remacle analyse Europe-Japan security relations. However, Ueta mainly examines the role of Japan and its relations with European security institutions (OSCE, NATO, EU), while Remacle focuses on the significance of the European security strategy for EU-Japan relations. Therefore, while their works are valuable sources of information and analysis, their approaches greatly differ from the one pursued in this book.

In addition to the above, I should mention my internship at the EC Delegation in Tokyo in March-June 2006, which gave me a chance to see first hand how relations between Japan and the EU develop on a day-to-day basis. Actually, this experience greatly influenced my thinking on the EU-Japan dialogue, and reoriented my view from theoretical issues to more practical ones. Up to that point, my impression had been that, notwithstanding the established dialogue, many more joint
activities could be undertaken but did not happen because the two sides, however absurd it may sound, did not know much about each other.
Part One

Developing Conceptions of Security and Joint Agenda of The EU-Japan Security Dialogue
This chapter focuses on the examination of the establishment and evolution of the security dialogue between the EU and Japan during the Cold War. This chapter presents a twofold argument. Firstly, it argues that it was during the Cold War period that the European Community and Japan initiated their security dialogue, one that started to encompass several areas of cooperation that had traditionally been considered ‘low politics’ issues, such as the environment. The second argument is that, because the aforementioned ‘low politics’ issues were the core items of European and Japanese security conceptualisations, they were naturally introduced into the EC-Japan security dialogue.

To support these contentions, this chapter is organised in three parts. The first part examines the conceptualisation of security in Japan during the Cold War. The second part deals with the conceptualisation of security in Europe during the same period. The third, and central part of the study is subdivided into five sections. The first section describes the mutual images and perceptions of Europe and Japan and their policies towards each other in the 1950s; the second section discusses Japanese initiatives with regard to EC-Japan cooperation and the European response in the early 1960s; the third section demonstrates how internal conflicts within the EC undermined Japanese eagerness to establish a security dialogue in the mid-late 1960s; the fourth section examines the reasons for, and the environment in which, the security dialogue had been established by the 1970s; the fifth section describes and analyses the evolution of the security dialogue in the 1980s. It should be emphasised that the first three sections, which describe the state of EC-Japan relations prior to the establishment of a security dialogue, are essential and integral parts of the analysis as the mutual images and perceptions discussed in them affect the state of the ensuing security dialogue.

This chapter will also demonstrate that historical events influenced the initiation and the further development of the security dialogue, which corresponds to the framework of analysis.
1.1 The Conceptualisation of Security in Japan During the Cold War

The end of the Second World War brought significant changes to Japan. For seven years (1945-1952) it was under the American occupation regime, at which time all of the primary state institutions were reshaped and their ideology reformulated. Japan was not sovereign. It had to democratise, and the Emperor was forced to renounce his Divine origin. Further, Japan had to adopt a peaceful Constitution, change its education system, and carry out many other reforms. It was time for introducing new political beliefs and ideas society. In 1949, Mao Zedong’s rise to power in China made the US change its plans to completely demilitarise Japan, and Japan became a Western bastion against Communism in Asia. Japan was recovering step by step from the post-war destruction era. It was in these conditions that Japan began searching for a new security vision.

During the 1950s, Japanese security policymakers were unusually sensitive to the various forces – domestic and international – present in the policy-making environment. In the course of the policy-making process, however, new institutional structures were created, such as the Self-Defence Forces and Defence Agency, that insulated defence policy from the domestic and international pressures. Once installed, these formal institutions could not be so easily discarded, and thus they locked the further evolution of policy into fixed paths of development (Berger 1996: 321). Moreover, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida provided the country with a vision of Japan as a ‘merchant nation’ (shomin kokka), a country that concentrated on economic development while avoiding military development. With this slogan, Yoshida subverted the left’s own vision of Japan as a ‘peaceful nation’ a nation dedicated to the pacifist ideals of the Japanese constitution, by linking anti-militarism to the decidedly non-leftist desire for commercial gain. Also, unlike the left, Yoshida and other centrists looked to the capitalist West rather than the socialist East for the model of development that Japan would emulate. They argued that an alliance with the US was the price that Japan had to pay for entering the global community of prosperous modern powers (Pyle cited in Berger 1996: 337). Yoshida supported this alliance with the US based on his belief, dating from the pre-war period, that in order to advance its cause in Asia, Japan needed to form an alliance with the dominant Western power (Dower 1979: 36). Yoshida was the most prominent figure in Japanese politics in the post-war period, leading five cabinets between 1946 and 1954, and his legacy influenced subsequent Japanese politics and foreign policy, especially through his disciples, such as Prime Ministers Hayato Ikeda (1960-1964) and Eisaku Sato (1964-1972).
Due to Constitutional restrictions and the 1952 Japan-US security treaty, security issues were under direct US control and were actually not part of Japan’s agenda. The US was directly involved in military security, which left no room for Japanese decision making in this area. Moreover, the country had to oversee to its economic recovery, which was the top political issue at the time. This is why Japan concentrated its efforts on issues that seemed less politicised and securitised: the economy, trade, and finance. This is how post-war Japanese identity began to be shaped. Once created, it would have been hard to change it except as the result of drastic events (e.g., war, natural disaster), strong enough to shake the fundamental images (ideas, values, beliefs) of its identity. The basis of Japanese identity was the Yoshida doctrine aimed at economic prosperity and peace in Japan and beyond its borders. All subsequent behaviour fell within this ‘merchant identity.’ At this time, it suited both Japan’s internal needs and external environment, i.e., Japan wanted to become economically developed and to live in peace with its neighbours. Thus, it concentrated its efforts on the economy and trade. However, the economy can often be securitised, especially in the case of Japan. For example, energy dependence is a question of security for Japan even more so than military issues. Food shortages and considerable dependence on imports also involve security issues for Japan.

In the 1960-70s, a doctrine emerged regarding comprehensive security in Japan (Nakanishi 1998). The concept can be traced back to Japan’s thinking on security during the 1950s. Its meaning goes far beyond the requirements of military defence issues against a particular ‘enemy,’ and instead emphasises the need to take into account other factors vital to national stability: food, energy, the environment, communications, social security, and sustainable development. While it did not deny the importance of military security, it explicitly encompassed a wide range of other considerations: the search for environmental security, for instance, which requires cooperation with other countries (including hypothetical ‘enemies’). The concept stresses the need for confidence-building methods as a requirement for its attainment, and embraces issues such as preventive diplomacy, energy security, and greater transparency of international financial markets as a means to enhance overall stability. It is a notion that goes beyond simplifications such as ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ (for details see Radtke and Feddema 2000). The value and appropriateness of the ‘comprehensive security’ concept became obvious when the first oil crisis in 1973 revealed the significance of issues regarding energy and stable economy for national security.

In the end, the threats to and security notion of Japan did not lie in the military arena. As George Sansom notes, the geographic remoteness of the Japanese islands and their lack of ‘strategic advantages, or
tempting prizes’ have historically allowed Japan to deliberately ‘accept or reject foreign influence at choice’ (Sansom 2000, vol. 1: 39). So, security, in the case of Japan, is better explained from economic, societal and environmental viewpoints.

Moreover, being conscious of the constitutional limitations and peaceful norms embedded in the society, and recognising the necessity of coping with international developments (the Vietnam War, the oil crisis, etc.), Japan preferred not to use its resources on defence spending as its major international contribution. A report to the prime minister by the Foreign Economic Policy Study Group in April 1980 suggested that Japan needed to focus on economics, diplomacy, culture, science, and technology rather than a ‘hasty expansion of direct military cooperation’ to meet expectations of the international community (Foreign Economic Policy Study Group of the Policy Research Council 1980: 54).

Thus, within the framework of the Cold War, with the traditional definition of security being to maintain a balance between the two superpowers, Japan’s security notion deviated from what was commonly accepted by the international community at that moment. Japan’s focus was on comprehensive security, especially energy stability, economic security and contributing to world stability by economic means via development aid (see chapter 6). According to its ‘merchant nation’ identity, Japan had also elaborated as a strategic objective to maintaining a stable international environment wherein the country could survive and prosper, and that it should focus on acquisition of wealth. This identity united it with Europe, as we will see below. Besides, in order to compete in the military sphere within the limits of its constitutional restrictions, Japan put emphasis on the development of science and technology, and that is its contribution to its own security. As Ming Wan notes, science and technology are central to Japan’s national interests (Wan 2001: 196). We can use Wan’s viewpoint to examine the cooperation of Japan with the EU in science and technology, which will be discussed later as a strategic issue (see below in this chapter and chapter 5).

To summarise, after the end of the Second World War and during the Cold War, Japan developed two significant conceptualisations that have shaped its involvement in security issues ever since. These are the ‘merchant nation’ identity and a comprehensive security doctrine, which supplement each other and, while not fully rejecting military involvement, emphasise non-military tools to maintain a balanced security. Looking back toward the past, we can say that this approach was seen as a ‘civilian power’ policy, which was coined in the 1970s by François Duchene to explain the EC’s role in international relations. Below we will briefly discuss security developments in Europe during the same period.
1.2 The Conceptualisation of Security in Europe During the Cold War

It can be said without exaggeration that European unification for the sake of security is not a new concept. Thus, the 14th century witnessed a project of European unification. It is credited to French King Philip IV’s lawyer Pierre Dubois, who, in 1304-1308, wrote a treatise ‘De recuperatione Terrae Sancta’ (‘Reconquering the Holy Land’), in which he proposed expanding trade with the Orient to financially benefit European countries. In organising the fourth crusade, Dubois proposed stopping feudal wars between European rulers so they could re-conquer the Holy Land. This was a peculiar plan of Eastern colonisation according to which each European country was given rights to a certain geographic area while Jerusalem was to fall under the Catholic Church (Chubaryan 1987: 18; Catholic Encyclopaedia).

Many centuries later, in 1922, the Austrian Count Coudenhove-Kalergy made the observation that Europe in the future had to ‘either... overcome all national hostilities and consolidate in a federal union, or sooner or later succumb to Russian conquest’ (Feld and Jordan 1986: 80). A strong trend towards the first option became apparent in the post-World War Two period.

After World War Two, the deep-seated hostility between the US and the Soviet Union became the touchstone of European international politics and the basis for a bipolar international political system. The end of World War Two and the emergence of the two superpowers definitely meant that Europe lost much of its influence in international politics and, instead of being the subject it, became the object, or instrument of international relations during the Cold War era. Moreover, World War Two triggered a decolonisation process. These problems as well as a post-war economic crisis caused deep frustration and stimulated the search for new roles for Europe in the world. Moreover, there was also a more general concern in Europe for the future of Germany. Being conscious of their pre-war mistakes, the European leaders were united in their view that Germany must be controlled via the establishment of cooperation and the creation of supranational institutions. As William Wallace notes, ‘issues of national security and foreign policy were fundamental to the development of the West European integration’ (Wallace W. 2005: 430).

Moreover, regarding the above-mentioned post-war realities, there were several unique aspects of European international politics in the post-World War Two period. One was the emergence of the nuclear dimension in warfare, which placed the US and the Soviet Union in the category of global superpowers and gave them the dominant voice in the international politics of Europe. There was also a trend towards
economic integration among European states through the European Community. Robert S. Jordan and Werner J. Feld, in this regard, admitted that the direct presence of the US allowed Europe’s nations to have ‘the benefit of being able to concentrate their attention on economic matters, which despite all the bickering and political manoeuvring that has gone on as the European Communities (EC) had been formed, fulfilled one of the major aims of the United States policy toward Western Europe’ (Feld and Jordan 1986: 43). In economic affairs, the US followed a ‘European’ approach, which had been used for political and security reasons, such as controlling West Germany, something that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) managed for a time. The US encouraged the movement toward the creation of multinational, leading to supranational, economic arrangements that would bind the nations of Western Europe in an indissoluble political union. As Jordan and Feld argued, ‘even the prospect that this would create a strong political and economic “Third Force,” bringing with it trade friction, seemed an acceptable price to pay for the elimination of the devastating warfare which has plagued first Europe and then the world in modern times’ (Feld and Jordan 1986: 42).

The initial step towards ensuring peace in Europe seemed to be the signing of the 1947 Dunkirk Pact between France and Great Britain that, in 1948, formed the basis of the Brussels Treaty Organisation, a purely European military structure that did not include the US, which later became the WEU in 1954. However, the coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 increased European concerns regarding the Soviet Union’s aggressive politics, and, in 1949, the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), with the participation of the US and Canada. While NATO’s focus was on deterring the Soviet Union, the WEU was preoccupied with Germany and cooperation within Europe as such.

Similarly, the establishment of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in April 1948, in conjunction with the implementation of the Marshall Plan, which meant that the US would provide extensive financial assistance (US$ 13 billion) to Western Europe during the period 1947 to 1951 was also a step toward European unification (Feld and Jordan 1986: 80). Later, in 1951, in order to prevent a recurrence of Franco-German conflicts that had already produced three European wars (1870-71; 1914-18; 1939-45), it was considered necessary to pool together the iron and steel industries of the two states within the framework of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The establishment of the ECSC is a case in which a security issue was resolved by using economic leverage through the creation of a supranational structure, wherein a supranational level of integration was
considered the most efficient way to prevent further wars and maintain security arrangements. Thus, the ECSC that was established for security reasons was already considered a success by 1955. It was one of the main inspirations among the six member-states to create a broader European market. Another reason for pursuing a more extensive integration scheme was France’s failure to ratify the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty. Thus, in 1957, the Rome Treaty that established the European Economic Community was signed. Along with economic considerations such as increasing living standards, enlarging and unifying markets, political considerations also played a role in the establishment of the EEC. First, it was hoped that, through the establishment of the Common Market, member states might become sufficiently united to be able to compete economically with the US and the Soviet Union. Second, it was felt that increased economic strength would eventually give Europe the political leverage equal to that of the two superpowers. Third, as far as the transatlantic relationship was concerned, Europe would become an equal partner with the US in the defence of the non-Communist West. The problem of a divided Germany was also given careful thought, and the plan was to tie West Germany closely to the integration process to reduce or eliminate any German military threat. In other words, by establishing the EEC, Europe was addressing several strategic tasks:

- achieving an economic prosperity that would lead to parity with the US;
- an equal position in the political arena with the US;
- settlement of the German issue.

It was a strategic vision of how to solve problems by applying economic tools. Moreover, the European countries, most of which had colonies at that time, had been re-examining their colonial policies. However, along with the decolonisation process, it signified the initiation of development aid policies. The European Community has been involved in this foreign aid process from its inception (see chapter 6).

At the same time that the EEC was being established, the member states established the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The main reasons for the creation of Euratom were worries concerning their energy sources, mainly coal, that soon would be exhausted. They were also concerned about nuclear energy as a replacement for traditional energy sources. Another reason was they needed to contain Germany, which, at that time, was holding an internal debate about whether to acquire nuclear weapons for its newly reconstituted army. Euratom, therefore, was to coordinate research and technological development for the construction of nuclear power plants, ensure the
availability of nuclear fuel, and avoid costly duplication among member-states.

Through economic cooperation, pooling coal and steel resources, and harmonising nuclear research, Europe started creating its identity and implementing policies that aimed to restore its image as a global power. Within this context, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) between EEC member-states came into existence in 1969. US security leadership and NATO’s dominance in West European Security reduced the security competence of the EPC to its ‘political and economic aspects’ according to Title III of the Single European Act (SEA), adopted in 1986 (Wallace W. 2005: 434). Although it had not had any significant influence in world affairs, it was an institution in which cooperation between member states led to an increased sharing of interests and views, spawning a new generation of diplomats who felt more connected to European institutions than to any national government. Moreover, the EPC gave rise to a policy coordination reflex in the foreign ministries of the EC member states. Consequently, despite the limited functions of the EPC, the EC member states were able to adopt a joint resolution on Iran in the late 1970s, and tellingly, Japan cooperated closely with the EC on that issue (see below).

It should be noted that, notwithstanding the economic nature of the European Communities (ECSC, EEC, Euratom), there were some voices in favour of a military component within their structure. In order to reflect the absence of the EC in military affairs after the failure of the EDC in 1954, and the presence of NATO with strong US leadership, the concept of ‘civilian power Europe’ was introduced in the 1970s by François Duchene. This concept has frequently been discussed and elaborated upon since. We will return to this issue in the next chapter, but suffice it to say here that ‘civilian power Europe’ implied cooperation and the development of international structures in seeking international objectives and the application of non-military, mainly economic, means of providing security. Moreover, within this context, the environment and, to some extent, the development of science and technology could be classified as issues that needed to be addressed by ‘civilian power’ to cope with security threats.

The 1986 Single European Act (SEA) formally merged the EPC with the EC under the framework of the European Council. In other words, the EPC was institutionalised within the EEC structure. These initiatives would ultimately result in the establishment of the European Union with the signing of the Maastricht treaty.

In general, the European integration process contributed to bringing about a political revival of Europe, which had, in turn, enabled the European states, both collectively and individually, to resume some of the international political behaviour patterns which had been typical for
them in the pre-World War Two period. These achievements had even reached back, in some respect, to the period before World War One, when global politics was exclusively defined and implemented by European states (Feld and Jordan 1986: 46). In many ways, European integration contributed to its resurgence.

To conclude, during the Cold War, Europe underwent a complex process of institutionalisation in economic, political, and security affairs, in which European institutions proved to be indispensable for European security. Economic development within integrated structures meant that European states were able to provide their own security and stability. In this way, they also prevented Germany from repeating its history of undermining the international order. These developments corresponded to the ‘civilian power’ concept of Europe within the European Community, with its emphasis on non-military means to secure the common good. In the next section, we will discuss the origin and development of the Japan-European Community security dialogue.

1.3 European Community-Japan Security Dialogue During the Cold War

Approaching Each Other in the Post-War Period: Environment, Mutual Images and Perceptions (the 1950s)

Having examined the EU and Japanese security conceptualisations in the Cold War period, we were able to demonstrate the provision of security with ‘civilian,’ and ‘comprehensive’ tools, while in this section we will examine their security dialogue.

Following Japan’s defeat in 1945, and in the course of the post-war readjustment, the historical legacy of Europe’s relations and involvement with Japan was essentially negative. Anti-Japanese feelings were particularly strong in Great Britain and the Netherlands. They considered Japan to be the perpetrator of wartime atrocities. During World War Two, Japanese soldiers had treated Dutch colonialists in Indonesia and the British in Malaysia and Singapore particularly brutally. The European allies, including Great Britain, were only minimally involved in the occupation and post-war reconstruction of Japan. The general feeling was that this was essentially an American affair. Europeans had other priorities (Lehmann 1992: 128). Consequently, throughout the 1950s it was the United States that encouraged the development of Japanese-European relations for particular purposes, especially trade. For the US, Japan’s resurgence was vital for the political and strategic stability of both Japan and Asia. US officials encouraged Europeans to follow Washington’s policies vis-à-vis Japan, and to provide Japan with a new market through which it could regain its pre-war living standards.
and promote Western-style democracy (Gilson 2000: 14). The Europeans, however, feared a recurrence of Japan’s global dumping activities of the 1930s.

European business interests focused on the potential Japanese threat to their textile industries, especially in the UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany, and their governments thus strongly resisted Japanese membership in the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), while the US promoted its application to GATT and encouraged its European partners to open their markets to Japanese goods. In this atmosphere of European distrust of Japanese trading practices, the US offered tariff concessions to countries that would accord Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status on Japan, and acted as a mediator for European-Japanese relations. The US had to do this in order to provide some economic impetus to replace the boom created by the Korean War and to respond to the problem of further development of the Japanese economy.

Japan witnessed the formation of the EEC in 1957 as an expression of European distrust with uneasiness and anxiety. While Europeans feared a Japanese economic invasion, Tokyo was wary of the possible effects that the Common External Tariff (a measure based on the mathematical average of existing tariffs) would have on Japan’s trade with Europe. As we noted earlier, Japan was on its way to becoming a ‘merchant nation’ according to the Yoshida doctrine, and naturally, Japan’s concerns precipitated a new drive to find schemes for lending assistance to underdeveloped territories and brought forth calls for a review of Japanese economic diplomacy in response to European economic integration (Gilson 2000: 16). In 1959, the Japanese Ambassador to Belgium became Japan’s first Representative to the three European Communities, thus demonstrating how important Europe was for Japan (Delegation of the European Commission to Japan).

Julie Gilson notes that, at that time, issues of an explicitly ‘political’ nature dominated the Japanese and European agendas and provided a point of reference for a diplomatic visit by Prime Minister Kishi in 1959, since consensus regarding specific political issues (such as Soviet threats) was easier to achieve than for more contentious trade disputes (Gilson 2000: 16). We can add that this was also an attempt to ease the tension in the trade sphere by enlarging the agenda with non-conflictual issues. However, this emphasis on political issues in the early post-war dialogue was overshadowed by trade disputes and remained at a low level until its reintroduction in the early 1980s (see below). Gilson also argues that ‘while market access for Japanese goods became a key issue for Washington in the 1950s and 1960s, the US did not actively assert the need to deepen relations between Europe and Japan. And as long as Europe and Japan had no desire to develop their mutual ties
independently of the US, relations between them would remain mini-
mal’ (Gilson 2000: 16). The failure to establish a political dialogue can
be explained by the fact that, as shown above, both Japan and Europe
had been concentrating on issues of economic reconstruction after
World War Two, which consequently became their primary security is-
issue, and they perceived each other as rivals.

Thus, in an atmosphere of distrust and under some pressure from
the US, Japan and Europe began to construct their relationship. It de-
monstrates that, along with the negative images they had of each other
and an unwillingness to cooperate in general and on the issue of secur-
ity in particular, there were actual reasons to establish a dialogue.
Firstly, during this period, the main focus of security was on the two
superpowers, and issues that went beyond their confrontation were con-
sidered ‘low level’ political issues. Secondly, Japan and Europe could act
within the limits of their constrained opportunities, which was in the
economic and trade sectors. The Japanese ‘merchant’ identity and reli-
ance on the US-Japan Security Treaty in the political and security
sphere, and the European focus on economic integration and the func-
tioning of the NATO structure left an insignificant amount of room for
‘high politics’ on the EU-Japanese agenda. Hence, both of them were
managing their security arrangements using economic tools. Moreover,
one can’t overlook the fact that economic concerns inevitably rendered
the development of rather frequent contacts between Japanese and
European government representatives, and these bilateral contacts had
been intensified during the 1960s when Japan increased its participa-
tion in several international forums which included Europe, such as
GATT, the UN, and the OECD.

The ‘Three Pillar’ Proposal of Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda and the
European Reaction (the early 1960s)

An increased Japanese focus on Europe during the 1960s derived in
part from growing public resentment towards the US over its revision of
the Security Treaty and the rise to power of Prime Minister Ikeda, who
was more open to Europe in his foreign policies than his predecessors.
On the European side, Great Britain, adjusting to its post-imperial sta-
tus and as the closest ally of the US, remained a key European nation
for the Japanese. Therefore, when, in July 1961, Great Britain an-
nounced its intention to join the EEC, Japan had to address broader
European issues. Hence, relations with Europe thereafter were influ-
enced by Ikeda’s ‘three pillar’ theory of Japan-EC-US relations, which
he outlined in London in 1962. According to this view, Western
Europe, North America and Japan would provide the supportive pillars
for the free world, and, in this way, improved economic and political
links with Europe would not develop at the cost of jeopardising relations with the US. At that time, however, this was not a sentiment echoed by European and American statesmen, who did not begin to employ the triangular imagery until the mid-1970s with the creation of the Trilateral Commission. The US did not want to encourage Japanese ‘freedom’ and deviations from a strictly pro-American policy. It seems that Japanese politicians were more interested in improved cooperation with Europe, but they were the only ones interested.

The failure to commence with trilateral cooperation was also due to Europe’s preoccupation with its own affairs, mainly the French opposition to the UK’s membership in the EEC and an EEC decision-making crisis. Besides, as Jean-Pierre Lehmann notes, ‘at that time Europeans did not take [the] Japanese seriously’ (Lehmann 1992: 128). To illustrate this, President Charles de Gaulle referred to Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda as ‘ce petit marchand de transistors’ (Lehmann 1992: 128). In the face of enduring European hostility, Prime Minister Ikeda went to Brussels to meet Walter Hallstein, then President of the EEC Commission. At that time, Japan was particularly interested in European affairs, but the EEC made no reciprocal advances. Despite issuing a joint communiqué in which the EC and Japanese government representatives agreed in 1962 to hold regular meetings, the first meeting never took place (Gilson 2000: 19). But the EEC still did not have enough competence to conduct external activities, which remained within the member states’ competence. However, this data shows that Japan was eager to initiate cooperation, even if it meant on a tripartite basis, but its proposal fell on deaf ears in Europe. The situation changed dramatically in the 1970s-1980s, and, to some extent, in the 1990s, when the Europeans would seek a dialogue with Japan.

**Crisis in the EEC and Japan’s Reaction (the mid to late 1960s)**

In 1963, the EU-Japanese dialogue was officially established through the bilateral foreign ministerial meetings held between Japan and the UK, Japan and France, Japan and West Germany. Two years later, a similar dialogue was initiated between Japan and Italy. By that time, the EEC member states had granted MFN status to Japan and the European Commission declared that there were no obstacles to starting negotiations of a mutual EEC-Japan agreement which would provide a common safeguards clause and abolish all other bilateral accords. Decision-making complications meant that the European Commission repeatedly failed to secure a mandate to coordinate trade negotiations with Japan by means of prior consultation until the 1970s (European Commission 1970: 34). The failure was due largely to the non-Japanese issues, which dominated the Council of Ministers agenda (GATT’s Kennedy Round
negotiations, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) expenses). Japan, on the other hand, was also opposed to collective talks because it would have to extend the provisions of the safeguards clause to Italy and Germany. Naturally, Japan found it much easier to negotiate with each country individually than with a Commission representing the interests of all of the EEC member states. Besides, Japan was unsure of the Community’s future as a coherent entity, especially because of the Luxembourg Crisis that paralysed EEC activity for some time. Yet, from 1965 MITI (Japan’s powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry) and the ECSC senior officials held semi-annual talks on the issue-specific topics.

In 1969 at The Hague Summit, the European Council authorised the Commission to ‘make contact with the Japanese government with a view to exploring the possibilities of entering into negotiation for the purpose of concluding a trade agreement between the Community and Japan’ (European Commission 1969 (12), 1970 (1) cited in Gilson 2000). Community members finally realised that, given Japan’s continued economic and trade growth, a coordinated approach to Japan and Japanese trade practices would be beneficial. However, this was only the beginning of a long road. As a result of internal conflicts within the EEC, French opposition to the UK’s entry into the EEC, the absence of a mechanism for political cooperation not only at the European and Japanese levels, but also within the EEC, Japan began to doubt the EEC’s future. Moreover, distrust and a lack of mutual understanding between Europe and Japan in the 1960s did not show any visible signs of evolving towards cooperation, and no dialogue was observed as such. Each of them was preoccupied with their own vision of security and there remained little room for security talks. Thus, the EEC and Japan, as economically focused entities, were preoccupied with economic issues, and, due to the aforementioned considerations, not much had been going on at the EEC-Japan bilateral level. Nevertheless, then steady interactions and discussions between Japanese and European Community officials were a prerequisite necessary to establish cooperative, reciprocal relations, and a dialogue between Japan and the EEC.

The Initiation of the Security Dialogue: Growing Trade Imbalances, Europe Turns to Japan (the 1970s)

Prime Minister Tanaka’s Visit to Europe and the Initiation of the Security Dialogue (the early 1970s)

As Japan was aggressively increasing its exports to Europe, the EC was forced to begin coordinating its policies. On 1 January 1970, the EEC’s Common Commercial Policy was enacted; it envisaged the conclusion of all trade agreements with third countries pursuant to Article 113 of
the Treaty of Rome as an activity empowered to the European Commission. Correspondingly, the Commission acquired more authority and powers in its dealings with Japan. As a result of the Nixon administration’s decisions to unilaterally suspend the convertibility of the dollar into gold and to place a surcharge on all foreign imports, Japan pursued its ‘international currency diplomacy’, and Japanese exports to the EEC began to increase rapidly, particularly in the electronic appliance, ship and automobile sectors.

Unlike the 1960s, when Europeans were not yet taking Japan seriously, by the early 1970s, the situation had changed dramatically with Japanese exports to Europe increasing rapidly from US$ 1.4 to US$ 3.3 billion in the period 1969-1972 (Lehmann 1992: 128). It still represented only a small percentage of Europe’s total imports, but Japan was attacking Europe in especially sensitive sectors (steel, motor vehicles, shipbuilding, electronics, ball-bearings) (European Community 1976: item 1104). In September 1972, then Vice-President of the Commission, Sir Christopher Soames, visited Japan to discuss the trade imbalance, but this failed to improve the situation. Japanese exports to the EC continued to grow steadily after 1972.

The EC member states (including the UK, Denmark, Ireland after 1973) became increasingly united in their criticism of Japanese trade practices. With unemployment and inflation rising dramatically in the era of ‘Euro-sclerosis,’ Europe’s defensive trade position vis-à-vis Japan intensified. While European countries were promoting a model of a social welfare state, the perception of Japan as a land of exploitative labour conditions implied the necessity of protecting the European workforce from ‘unfair’ Japanese competition. Moreover, as the EC continued developing, in the 1970s, Japan began to see the European Commission as a coherent unit. Hence, at Paris Summit of 1972, the Commission established semi-annual high-level consultations with the Japanese government, which were to be similar to those already in place with the US.

After the US unilateral decisions to suspend convertibility of the dollar into gold and recognise the People’s Republic of China (i.e. Nixon shocks), there was also a shift in the mood on the Japanese side, and, as Gilson notes, ‘Japanese officials became less inclined to follow the American lead as a matter of course, and one indirect result of this was that the Community became a potential alternative as a negotiating partner’ (Gilson 2000: 25). In this regard, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Europe in the autumn of 1973 for the first time since Prime Minister Ikeda in 1962. Unlike the earlier encounter, however, this time Europe attached great significance to the Prime Minister’s visit and, as the *Diplomatic Bluebook* admits, ‘showed unusually great enthusiasm in receiving him [the Prime Minister]’, which was interpreted ‘as showing
the West European countries’ understanding of the importance of their relations with Japan’ (MOFA 1973). It was believed that ‘the Prime Minister’s direct dialogue with the leaders of these countries promoted mutual understanding between Japan and Europe and served as an opportunity to promote cooperative relations between Japan and Europe within the global framework and contributed to the expansion of Japan’s diplomatic base from the standpoint of promoting Japan’s diplomacy in a multipolarised age’ (MOFA 1973). Moreover, concrete ways to promote cooperative relations in such fields as trade, currency, capital movements, energy, culture, science and technology, environment, and development cooperation with third countries were also underway. Prime Minister Tanaka went to Brussels, where it was agreed that Japan should hold consultative talks ‘on the major issues of common interest at both ministerial level and level of experts’ with the EC (Masamichi 1979: 7 cited in Gilson 2000: 26). As the 1973 Bulletin of the EC remarked, ‘the two parties agreed that constructive discussions should take place permanently on the principal problems of common interest. Such talks could be held at ministerial as well as administrative level’ (European Commission 1973: 57; emphasis added). Joint Japan-EC communiqué recapped the results of the visit, which included trade issues and possible cooperation over East-West issues and the future of an enlarged EEC, as well as the financial and energy sectors (European Commission 1973: 57).

Ten days later, after Prime Minister Tanaka had returned to Japan, the first oil shortage news was reported on 17 October 1973. Thereafter, energy-dependent Europe and Japan became increasingly aware of their vulnerability to a lack of energy resources. An analysis of official documents leads us to conclude that there were no consultations between the EC and Japan regarding the crisis. Atsuko Abe noted that ‘proposed in 1973 by Prime Minister Tanaka, closer cooperation through a joint energy program failed to attract attention from European leaders’ (Abe 1999: 133). It can thus be argued that, despite the failure of any concrete joint activity or initiatives, Tanaka’s visit did initiate a dialogue. Afterwards, the issues of energy would frequently appear on the Europe-Japan agenda.

Tanaka’s trip sparked visits by high officials from various European countries to Japan to engage in regular consultations and, on other occasions, exchange views not only on bilateral relations with Japan but also on a wide range of important international problems. In this respect, it is worth mentioning Japan’s evaluation of its relations with Europe:

In the political field, the West European countries are important members of the free world, and it is expected that they will
endeavour to increase their international influence through promoting the strengthening of regional political cooperation aimed at eventual political integration of the European Community. They are indeed making efforts, while going through various twists and turns to coordinate their views, on important international political problems, such as their policies toward the Middle East, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Cyprus problem. Considering these facts, it is necessary for Japan to increase interchange with them at all levels and to hold close consultations (MOFA 1974; emphasis added).

The above facts suggest that Japan and Europe had established communications based on mutual interests. Moreover, according to the key terms list in the introduction, we can conclude that discussion and mutual interest, i.e. dialogue, in EU-Japan relations was a result of Tanaka’s trip to Europe in 1973. Furthermore, establishing that Europe and Japan were now guided by ‘civilian power’ and comprehensive security concepts, respectively, it can be argued that the dialogue had a security component as part of their overall cooperation. In other words, Tanaka’s trip catalysed the establishment of the security dialogue between Europe and Japan. Moreover, a channel for interactions and permanent institutions had been established. In 1974, the EC Delegation was established in Tokyo, and later, in 1979, Japan established a second mission in Brussels to deal specifically with the EC. In 1977, regular reciprocal visits to Japan by the heads of EC member states were established. Also in 1977, the first regular contacts between the Japanese Parliament and the European Parliament occurred, which subsequently increased in frequency (Gilson 2000: 27; European Commission 1999a).

Moreover, shortly after its establishment, the security dialogue started to incorporate traditionally ‘low politics’ issues. Thus, despite the concentration of common interests on trade imbalances, consultations were initiated between the EC and Japan on environmental matters. In 1977, there was an exchange of official letters urging further meetings on environmental issues (see chapter 4) (European Commission 1995a: 29). Therefore, taking into account that Japan was pursuing a comprehensive security doctrine and the EC was regarded as a ‘civilian power’, where in both cases the environment was paid significant attention and treated as a security issue, we can conclude that the security dialogue in the environmental area was initiated in 1977. Over time, this security dialogue would develop through both bilateral and multilateral channels.
The Mounting Trade Deficit: European and Japanese Attempts to Improve the Situation (the mid to late 1970s)

Over time, the Community’s mounting trade deficit with Japan grew from ‘an economic problem into a major political one; similarly, the particularly serious difficulties affecting certain industries had political implications because of their impact on the economic situation and employment’ (European Commission 1976: item 1102, emphasis added). Conversely, Japan showed that it clearly appreciated the social and political as well as the economic aspects of the issues raised by the Community and indicated that it would urgently consider what else could be done to improve bilateral trade relations (European Commission 1976: item 1113). To settle the issue, Europe also asked Japan to consider increasing EEC imports to Japan (European Commission 1976: item 1110).

Old Europhile Prime Minister, Takeo Fukuda, visited Brussels in 1978 to try to improve relations by broadening the agenda and including more issues for cooperation. In his speech, he observed that it was a somewhat lopsided and superficial approach to Japanese-European relations to focus solely on their economic context (Owada 2001: 14). As Hisashi Owada noted, it was clear that the days were past when Japan and Europe could be content with an indirect relationship with the US serving as intermediary (Owada 2001: 14). Fukuda asserted that Japan and Europe were seeking to develop a ‘relationship of true solidarity and cooperation by aiming at common goals based upon the shared recognition of common interests and the sense of common values’ (Owada 2001: 14).

Nevertheless, the subsequent years did not produce any positive changes in relations. They actually worsened when it became known that the EC working paper in 1979 included an infamous phrase calling the Japanese ‘workaholics living in rabbit hutches’ (Wilkinson 1981: 213), a phrase that was uttered by the former Director General for External Relations of the European Commission, Sir Roy Denman (Lehmann 1992: 128). The Commission’s tone was also affected by the 1979-80 oil price increases and a world economy in recession. Despite some concessions on the part of the Japanese, relations with Japan became doubly troublesome because the Japanese industry seemed to be doing so well despite worldwide economic difficulties (Gilson 2000: 24).

To summarise, the 1970s saw the establishment of the Europe-Japan security dialogue and, within its framework, launch of cooperation on environmental issues.
The Security Dialogue at Work (the 1980s)

Joint EC-Japan Position on the Iranian Crisis and Its Consequences (the early 1980s)

In the 1980s, despite their increasing trade imbalance, Europe and Japan began to cooperate on security issues. The expansion of the security dialogue was a result of external events: the second oil crisis in 1979 and the Iranian hostage crisis (1979-1981). When the US broke off diplomatic relations with Tehran in April 1980, it put its allies under pressure to coordinate efforts in their response to the crisis (Nuttall 1992: 168-171). This pressure led the Italian ambassador in Tokyo to voice the possibility of EC cooperation with Japan on the matter (Tanaka 1984: 86). In April 1980, the Ambassadors of Japan and the EC countries in Tehran filed a joint protest to the Iranian president. While the EC Foreign Ministers met in Luxembourg, Japanese Foreign Minister Okita was visiting Iran. In December Foreign Minister Ito visited Europe and conferred with the leaders of five EC countries, namely, France, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany, as well as the European Commission, on various problems of mutual concern, thus, further solidifying the ties between Japan and Europe. As the Diplomatic Bluebook noted, ‘Japan-Europe cooperative ties have become stronger following the hostage incident at the American Embassy in Iran, the Afghanistan problem and the situation in Poland’ (MOFA 1982, chapter 3, section 1). Under these circumstances, Japan and the EC have become ‘increasingly aware of the necessity to intensify their dialogue and further develop their cooperative relations’ (MOFA 1981, chapter 3, section 1).

As a result of this close cooperation between Japan and the EC during a major international crisis, German Foreign Minister Genscher reiterated his 1979 suggestion that a permanent consultation mechanism should be established to coordinate efforts between Japan and the EC. This mechanism did not materialise immediately, but as Commission official Simon Nuttall noted, the success of these ad hoc consultations gave Japan and the EC the sense that they could be useful dialogue partners, each of which was becoming more independent in their foreign policy making vis-à-vis the position of the United States (Nuttall 1992: 171).

From a Japanese perspective, this went so far as to provoke interest in developing a political coalition with Europe ‘born out of a desire to counterbalance US claims of Western solidarity’ (Bull 1983 cited in Gilson 2000: 32). In November 1980, the Japanese government issued a statement in which it noted that it:
welcomes the increasingly close relations between Japan and European Communities... recently witnessed in both political and economic fields. It is the intention of the Government of Japan to further promote such close relations from the perspective of consolidating the cooperation between industrialized countries sharing the common basic philosophy of respect for freedom and democracy (JIIA 1982: 27).

This paper provided the first official mention of a political dialogue with Europe in Japanese White Papers (Gilson 2000: 32). Thus, both sides were already aware of the existence of and the need to further intensify their mutual dialogue.

Shortly after the end of the crisis in June 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki went to Europe and visited various EC institutions to encourage increased political ties. He exchanged frank views on the issue of how Japan and Europe should cooperate and contribute to peace, stability, prosperity, and development in the world under the then prevailing international circumstances. This trip was ‘a big step toward promoting cooperation between Japan and Europe’ (MOFA 1982) and showed that Japan could sometimes find itself closer to the EC and its member states than to the US (Gilson 2000: 32).

Hence, it confirms the argument that the ‘merchant nation’ identity of Japan and ‘civilian power’ Europe and their respective security visions have been akin. Moreover, applying our analytical framework, we observe that mutually agreed-upon Japanese and European efforts regarding the Iranian crisis were one more factor that helped launch the EU-Japanese security dialogue. Later, the EU and Japanese positions would become increasingly coordinated in reaction to the Iranian situation and the Middle East Peace process. A substantial dependence on the oil from the Middle East made Japan and Europe (unlike the US) more inclined to be less confrontational towards the countries of this region. Hence, we can argue that the oil crisis primarily affected the further development of the Europe-Japan security dialogue and, within its framework, launched cooperation in the area of energy.

_After the Iranian Crisis: Introducing Areas into the Security Dialogue Framework (the mid-1980s)_

Despite the parties’ continuing economic tensions, high-level talks in Tokyo in January 1983 included the discussion of the Third World relations, science, the environment, energy and international issues. Proceeding from EU and Japanese security conceptualisations, these topics could be considered as areas of security dialogue, particularly energy, environment, science and technology.
Conduct of *ad hoc* meetings resulted in the March 1983 Council of EC Foreign Ministers decision to hold the consultations between the Japanese Foreign Minister and the rotating EC Presidency semi-annually, that is, once per presidency (Gilson 2000: 34-35; Abe 1999: 133). As a result, the first meeting of the Japanese foreign minister and EC presidency foreign ministers took place in Brussels in June 1983. The 1984 *Diplomatic Bluebook* noted that ‘the institutionalisation of these consultations was drawing considerable attention as a major step forward in the political dialogue between Japan and Western Europe’ (MOFA 1984). At the same time, annual ministerial conferences were instituted in 1984 and involved the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Abe 1999: 133). The area of cultural relations was added later (Andriessen 1990). Yet, in the area of hard security, by the Nakasone government proposal in 1983 to establish a permanent forum between Europe (through NATO) and Japan to discuss strategic and political issues of mutual concern was rebuffed by France (Buckley 1990: 77 cited in Abe 1999: 133). Nakasone also called for ‘unity and cooperation with the United States and the free nations of Europe’ concerning security issues (Keddell 1993: 78-124), a proposal that contained elements of the Prime Minister Ikeda’s 1962 ‘three pillar’ concept, which also did not find supporters outside Japan.

European Commission President Thorn visited Japan in May 1984 and used this meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone to encourage broader cooperation on a bilateral level and to promote the image of Europe in Japan of becoming as important international actor as the US. While the substance of the meetings was never ground-breaking, it was clear that both sides recognised an attachment to common values in international politics, and, more importantly, the mutual exchange of information gradually began here (Gilson 2000: 35). The EC also began informing the Japanese of its internal decisions (Gilson 2000: 35).

Gilson demonstrated that, in the mid-1980s, the EC became more politically interested in Japan (Gilson 2000: 34-36). Abe noted that official statements by the Council of Ministers in the 1980s clearly indicated that the EC concentrated on economic matters with Japan, especially the trade imbalance (Abe 1999: 133). In our turn we would argue that because Japan and the EC shared a common goal of developing as economic actors, their security agendas reflected that desire. Japanese trade practices were threatening not only national economies, but also the social order in the EC member states. In such circumstances, the EC was eager to resolve threats to its security. Simultaneously, Japan was more eager to broaden its cooperation thereby easing trade
frictions, while the EC was less optimistic about it and focused, as Abe notes, more on trade. At the same time, initiation of a productive US-USSR dialogue necessitated reconsiderations of EC-Japan relations on both sides.

In 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone visited the EC to discuss cooperation in the areas of science and technology and development aid. An ‘exchange of letters existed to provide the framework for joint action’ in the science and technology sector (European Commission 1985). In the field of development aid the dialogue between the EC and Japan had been initiated in the 1980s ‘in the form of joint financing of a number of development projects’ (European Commission 1985). Moreover, development aid issues also frequently appeared on the agenda (European Commission 1986b; European Commission 1987). European and Japanese security conceptualisations, two oil crises, and the necessary extension of the dialogue to address the trade imbalance contributed to the initiation of the security dialogue in two areas – science and technology and development aid – beyond already existing dialogue on environmental issues.

The Beginning of the End of the Cold War: Implications for the Security Dialogue (the late 1980s)

The EC-Japan trade imbalance was so overwhelming that the European Commission proposed, in addition to then existing frameworks of cooperation (annual ministerial conference, high-level consultations, technical meetings), setting up a monitoring group made up of personal representatives of the President of the Commission and of the Prime Minister of Japan. This group would be responsible for monitoring the development of relations and making appropriate recommendations (European Commission 1986b). However, this proposal was enacted only in 2002 in the form of the Steering Committee (see chapter 3).

In the late 1980s, the EC began to initiate a broader dialogue with Japan by modifying its aggressive insistence on Japanese trade liberalisation, initiating a new approach that attempted to situate economic tensions within a wider framework. The Japanese, too, were willing to broaden the dialogue and encouraged more meetings, which had become fairly commonplace by the second half of the 1980s (Gilson 2000: 36). In 1989 European exports to Japan increased that had an immediate influence on the course of the negotiations, and as was acknowledged, ‘in spite of the remaining difficulties to enter the Japanese market, there now are brighter prospects for European exporters than in the past’ (European Commission 1989c). At that time the Community’s policy towards Japan focused on building balanced relations ‘while safeguarding the Community’s interests’ (European
Commission 1989b). The high-level EC-Japan talks showed that ‘the relationship between the EC and Japan had broadened and was increasingly developing into the multi-faceted relationship that both the EC and Japan had been aiming at’ (European Commission 1989c).

In general, even despite the growing imbalance in trade and Europe’s cumulative negative attitude toward Japanese trade practices, the Community and Japan tried to depart from ‘the constant climate of confrontation which previously characterised their bilateral relations’ and it led to positive results (European Commission 1989a). In 1990, ministerial meetings, which had not taken place since 1986, were resumed. During these three years much had changed in the world as had the relative positions of Japan and the EC, demonstrating that the international environment had had its influence on European and Japanese identities. Consequently, these altered identities also altered the actors’ perceptions of their own interests. The first and most obvious sign was the ministerial meeting in 1990 where it was admitted that ‘both sides share values of freedom and democracy as fundamental values of their societies. This has furthered the need to strengthen their relationship’ (European Commission 1990b). At the same time, it is interesting to note that the Diplomatic Bluebook in 1970 had already pointed out that ‘both Japan and Western Europe share the same political ideals of democracy and liberalism’ (MOFA 1970a: chapter 2, section 2). Moreover, the reference to shared values was followed by the acknowledgement that while the ‘trade imbalance remained an important aspect of the EC-Japan relationship, there was still enough room and will to enhance and deepen cooperation in G24, science and technology, environment, communication and information, development assistance, labour and social affairs and cultural exchange’ (European Commission 1990b). As the Vice-President of the European Commission conceded, a mere three years ago ‘such an agenda would have been considered impossible – not to say irrelevant’ (Andriessen 1990). The EC and Japan were now convinced that their relations should reflect the increasing international importance of both actors and include more issues in the agenda.

Furthermore, the potential for increased cooperation was underlined in 1990 when an agreement on Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development was signed between the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and Euratom (see chapter 5). This agreement meant that Japan and the Community began working together to secure the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to conduct research activities jointly. The conclusion of this agreement also implied three points: first, it was in line with Prime Minister Tanaka’s proposal in 1973 on joint energy projects; second, cooperation on energy development was necessitated by the oil crises and the need to develop one’s own energy production capacities;
third, the energy issue is a unique topic in the security dialogue, but it can be incorporated into the science and technology discussions due to its innovative nature and the need for more research. The above considerations allow us to include energy issues in the security dialogue framework and subsume them under the realm of science and technology (see chapter 5).

Notwithstanding the ever-increasing trade imbalance and negative image of Japan’s trade practices in the EC member states, the two actors could develop their security dialogue further. Moreover, cooperation had been initiated regarding the energy issues. At that point the existing framework of their relationship could no longer respond to new developments, and thus a new structure was necessary. In this regard the next chapter will demonstrate that EC-Japan relations and especially the security dialogue were modified further.
In the previous chapter we explored the formation of the security dialogue between the EC and Japan during the Cold War period. This chapter will focus on a discourse analysis of the EU and Japan security dialogue and its development in the 1990s. It argues that during the 1990s the EU-Japan security dialogue continued to develop and expand into new areas. The second argument is that the end of the Cold War led to modifications in the security conceptualisations of the EU and Japan and to the expansion of their security dialogue. Our point can be demonstrated by examining security conceptualisation in Japan in the 1990s. Second, we will study the EU security agenda during the same period. Third, we will establish how the EU-Japan security dialogue evolved throughout this period.

Their bilateral security agenda will be analysed in four sections. The first section traces the origin, significance and implications of The Hague Declaration for the security dialogue. The second section examines the developments in the early 1990s with a special focus on arms register of conventional arms transfers, and the launch of the security dialogue in the area of crisis management. The third section deals with common interests and challenges, and their consequences for the security dialogue. The final section will examine the state of the security dialogue in the late 1990s. It will mostly concentrate on interregional links, arms control and non-proliferation issues as well as the significance of the role of the EU and Japan as ‘equal and respected partners’ in their pursuit of common global interests. Moreover, this section will analyse later developments during the period around the millennium, which have had a direct impact on the evolution of the EU-Japan security dialogue in the first decade of the 21st century.

Issues discussed earlier such as science and technology, the environment, energy, development aid are only touched upon in this chapter, and the concrete development of a security dialogue in those areas will be covered in part two. This structure was used to avoid ambiguity and to keep the focus on the examination of the security dialogue discourse.
It should be also mentioned that we use the definition of ‘security dialogue’ established in the introductory chapter.

The literature cited is comprised predominantly of official joint statements and communiqués. These include EU documents on the subject of Japan, speeches, and statements by European Commission officials and the various presidents of the European Council. On the Japanese side, the documents include *Diplomatic Bluebook* entries, and statements and speeches made by various prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs.

### 2.1 The Conceptualisation of Security in Japan in the 1990s

In the 1990s, Japan extensively reformulated its approach to security in order to accommodate the changes brought on by the end of the Cold War. The basics of Japan’s foreign policy, comprehensive security doctrine and ‘merchant nation’ identity were shaken by the Persian Gulf War and the criticism leading countries had of Japan’s ‘checkbook diplomacy’. In June 1992 this resulted in the Japanese Diet adopting the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (‘the International Peace Cooperation Law’), which permitted the dispatching of Self-Defence Forces (SDF) abroad under the auspices of the UN. The law mandated that Japan’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) be limited to logistical and rear area support. It also mandated that Japanese peacekeepers were to immediately retreat if exposed to ‘excessive danger’. Nonetheless, the International Peace Cooperation Law established a legal framework for the first time in Japanese post-war history allowing it to participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) and international humanitarian relief activities.

In other words, the Persian Gulf War shattered the ‘taboo’ on Japan’s military security and led to the overseas dispatching of the SDF, allowing Maritime SDF minesweepers to embark on operations in the Persian Gulf after the cessation of hostilities. The International Peace Cooperation Law enabled the SDF to undertake UNPKO in Cambodia (1992-3), Mozambique (1993-1995), the Golan Heights (1996 to present), and East Timor (2002-2004) (JDA 2006a: 300; MOFA 1997b). In other words, Japan initiated participation of its SDF in crisis-management operations.

The 1990s were also characterised by Japan’s ‘return’ to Asia. Shinichi Kitaoka posits that the traditional pattern in Japanese diplomacy indicated a rise in interest in Asia (Kitaoka 1995: 510). First of all, the European and US markets had been saturated. Therefore, in order to remain competitive, Japan had to find new markets. Second, the
1990s also saw a trend toward increased regionalisation, which implied a need to focus on intensifying its relations with its neighbours. Third, China was on the rise in the 1990s, and there needed to be a greater focus on Sino-Japanese relations. Therefore, ‘coming back’ to Asia meant counter-balancing China by cooperating with other Asian countries. Fourth, in Japan, the North Korean missile confrontations provoked an urgent rethinking of its defence capabilities. According to Kent Calder, a special assistant to the US ambassador in Japan, ‘North Korea has been a catalyst for a lot of deep thinking in Japan about security’ (cited in Dawson 1999). Hence, security for Japan upon its ‘return’ to Asia became a key strategic point, and Japan could not be left out of the regional processes and regional security initiatives.

Despite changes in the post-Cold War international environment, the US presence and US-Japanese security arrangements formed a kind of security guarantee for Japan against North Korea and China, and for other Asian countries against any Japanese expansionist efforts. The 1996 Japan’s Basic Defence Force Concept ‘presupposed no major changes in the international situation’ and therefore it was deemed that rather than preparing to directly counter a military threat, Japan, as an independent state, should ‘possess [a] minimum required basic capability’ and closely cooperate with the US on security matters (JDA 1996). Two major aspects of the strategy were:
1. Japan’s own minimal defence forces;
2. alliance with the US.

This doctrine remained unchanged until 2004 despite North Korea’s launch of the Taepodong-1 missile on 31 August 1998, which flew into Japan’s air space. The Japanese government responded by suspending diplomatic relations with North Korea and US$ 1 billion in aid for two civilian light-water reactors. It also increased cooperation with the US in developing a regional missile defence system and launched its own reconnaissance satellites to avoid reliance on other countries for intelligence data. Japan’s reaction to the missile incident was thus perceived as being in line with its comprehensive security doctrine and ‘merchant nation’ identity.

Moreover, Japan was aware of its delicate position in the region and world and thus decided not to reconsider its post-war peace stance. Instead, it decided to increase its role by non-military means in crisis management situations. As William Grimes (2003: 368) notes, in terms of crisis management, Japan is – perhaps more than any other state – organised in a way that allows it to move money abroad rapidly and strategically. Thus, in the 1990s Japan’s role in post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building efforts has been increasingly expressed in terms of financial assistance, its involvement in the UNPKO, diplomatic
efforts, the deployment of personnel, etc. Japan participated in the UNPKO and assisted in the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Moreover, regarding its comprehensive security vision and ‘merchant nation’ identity, the key factor for its participation in these processes was a ‘human security’ doctrine. The Japanese government’s stance has been favourable to the human security concept since 1998, when Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi promoted it by stating: ‘environmental problems... transnational crimes such as illicit drugs and trafficking... problems such as the exodus of refugees, violations of human rights, infectious diseases like AIDS, terrorism, anti-personnel landmines and so on pose significant threats to all of us’ (Obuchi 1998a).

Paul Evans believes that Japan adopted a human security concept in order to open up a more assertive and independent international role without undermining its alliance with the US (Evans 2004: 263-284). At the same time, Juichi Inada argues that the human security concept is:
- consistent with Japanese liberal and pacifist public opinion which makes it easy to win public support for a Japanese contribution to the world human security agenda;
- a logical concept to justify active Japanese support for refugee issues;
- viewed as a UN-initiated concept, and their citizens’ attitude towards funds such as Human Security Fund is favourable, even in the context of the perceived need for UN reforms (Inada 2005: 147-148).

Moreover, it can be argued that a human security concept is a reasonable and logical continuation of the ‘comprehensive security’ doctrine developed by Japanese politicians and scholars in the 1960s and 1970s.

The characteristics of its soft diplomatic approach made Japan’s foreign policy relevant to ‘civilian power’ analysis. As we demonstrated in chapter 1, the concept of civilian power was first introduced by Duchene in the 1970s to explain the absence of the EC in security matters during that era. In the 1990s, Hanns Maull and Yoichi Funabashi developed this concept in relationship to Japan (Maull 1990-1991: 91-106; Funabashi 1991-1992: 58-74; Funabashi 1993: 75-85). Maull’s definition of ‘civilian power’ includes a close alignment with the West, domestic support for security and foreign policy postures, an emphasis on foreign economic policy, and support for security communities. This approach does not preclude the use of military force (and the term ‘civilian’ is not mutually exclusive from a ‘military’ component), so long as it is employed explicitly to achieve civilian goals, as understood within the context of the rules within which it functions. Maull’s contribution suggests that Japan could become a new type of power in the post-Cold
War environment. Funabashi argues that, as the concept of security itself becomes more comprehensive, Japan’s foreign policy stance can be viewed as one of ‘civilian power’. On the basis of Maull and Funabashi’s contributions, we see a parallel between the European Community and Japan’s foreign policy considerations, namely ‘civilian power’. For the purpose of the present research, we will not compare the ‘civilian powers’ of Europe and Japan; it is sufficient to note the similarities between them in order to proceed with an examination of their bilateral security dialogue.

To conclude, the developments of the 1990s, while significant, did not represent a fundamental deviation from Japanese Cold War practices and its comprehensive vision of security. Thus, Japan continued to insist on non-military contributions to the international order. While the US remained at the core of Japan’s military security, Japan developed and pursued its own policy with regard to ‘human security’. Except for the adoption of the International Peace Cooperation Law, which allowed the Japanese SDF to participate in the UNPKO, Japan pursued its comprehensive security doctrine that was augmented in 1998 by the introduction of the human security doctrine and emphasised the use of non-military tools to deal with conflict resolution and prevention. Moreover, for our research we established that Japan and Europe have been characterised as ‘civilian powers,’ which has important implications for the further analysis of the EU-Japan security dialogue in the 1990s. However, before proceeding, we should examine the development of security conceptualisations in Europe.

2.2 The Conceptualisation of Security in the European Union in the 1990s

In Europe, adoption of the European Single Act in 1986 and the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) in 1992 were separated in time by the end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany, the retreat of the Soviet bloc from Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the USSR, and two major international crises in the Persian Gulf and the former Yugoslavia. These changes required the EC countries to rethink the entire architecture of their external relations. Although the US would probably remain involved in the defence of Europe, the terms of its engagement were unlikely to remain the same, and any adjustments certainly required Western European countries to assume expanded responsibilities in foreign and security policy.

There were at least two difficulties with leaving it to the EC member states to respond individually to such changes: first, it would undermine the aforementioned benefits of collective action; and, second,
German reunification had upset the post-1949 equilibrium in the West European states system. A further problem was that Eastern Europe had become a zone of instability as it moved out of the Soviet bloc. On the assumption that some of its counties would soon become part of the Community, the EC faced the prospect of having to find the foreign instruments necessary to manage its troubled borders (Janning 1996: 232).

Moreover, there was a sense that the original model for EPC (European Political Cooperation) was reaching its limits in being able to produce effective collective action. On the one hand, it had taken ministry-to-ministry cooperation to the levels of sophistication that probably exhausted what could be achieved with the minimum of shared institutions then in existence. On the other hand, it was already beginning to develop, under pressure from constant improvisation, into a mixed intergovernmental-supranational system, without these changes ever being formally authorised or systematised. A second pressure for reform was that the success of the European Community’s Single Market program showed a mismatch between the EC’s status as an economic giant and a political dwarf. This gulf was so extreme that the Community urgently needed to concentrate more on its capacity to make effective foreign policy if it was ever going to protect itself from threats to its collective economic interests. The third factor was the emergence of new threats and challenges, such as intrastate national conflicts, global warming, infectious diseases, etc., that could not be handled by one country alone. Over time, these global challenges began to transform into more and more obvious threats to security and the stability of the world. Therefore, as we will demonstrate below, these post-Cold War threats were to influence the security agenda of EU-Japan relations.

The 1990s was a decade in which the EU developed from an economic to a political actor in international relations. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was a continuation of the 1986 Single European Act, one with very broad definitions, while Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 attempted to clarify the definitions of the instruments available for the implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). One can observe a comprehensive approach to security in the key treaty articles and EU declarations within the framework of the CFSP (European Union 2002).

After the Maastricht Treaty formally established the EU, the provisions for common foreign and security policy have since been repeatedly revised in its aim to find a more balanced and comprehensive approach. In Article 11 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, the EU’s CFSP, the stated objectives include:
to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;

– to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;

– to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;

– to promote international cooperation;

– to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (European Union 2002).

In other words, the EU has been concerned with how to increase the security of individual beings within the EU and outside it in accordance with international law. The EU has thus recognised that it has obligations concerning the human security of people beyond its borders. Moreover, the EU and its member states have been cooperating to tackle their security priorities in a framework that emphasises multilateral institutions and the rule of law.

The Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU) in June of 1992 established the Petersberg tasks in reaction to the war in Yugoslavia. On that occasion, the WEU member states declared their readiness to make military units available from all branches of their conventional armed forces to the WEU, NATO, and EU. Those tasks had already been incorporated into the Treaty on the European Union, signed on 7 February 1992 and ratified on 1 November 1993. The Petersberg tasks covered:

– humanitarian and rescue tasks;

– peacekeeping tasks;

– tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.

These tasks were also integrated into the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999.7

In the spring of 1999, the US started NATO-led bombing operations in Kosovo, and the EU again could not contribute in a military conflict on its own continent. This fact resulted in the formal launch of the EU’s military structure at the Cologne Council in June 1999. In December 1999, the European Council meeting in Helsinki announced its goal to cooperate voluntarily in EU-led operations, with member states being mandated to be able to deploy military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 troops capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks within 60 days, and sustain this for at least 1 year by 2003 (European
Council 1999b). With regard to NATO, EU leaders agreed that ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO’ (European Council 1999a). These decisions comprised the core of the ESDP.

At the Helsinki Council of 1999, the Union decided to improve use of resources in the area of civilian crisis management in order to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises (European Council 1999b; emphasis added). Civilian measures were supposed to support the CFSP, in effect reinforcing and extending the EU’s ‘soft power’ role. The Union may resort to military operations in cases where the civilian crisis management tools have been fully exhausted and the conflict has not been settled. Consequently, the Union can effectively employ an entire range of instruments from diplomatic activity, humanitarian assistance and economic measures through civilian policing and military crisis management operations only in conjunction with the enhancement and coordination of military and civilian crisis response tools.

To summarise, in the 1990s, the EU developed out of the EC, which dealt with economic issues, into a supranational structure that was acting in and influencing all spheres of its citizens’ lives by the early 2000s. Apart from this development, within this decade, the EU was able to further develop the EPC into the ESDP structure that has been dealing with modern conflicts and threats primarily by non-military means. Japan has been pursuing an analogous strategy in foreign policy. Now that we have established the similarities between the EU and Japan, we will analyse the EU-Japan security dialogue in the early years of the 21st century.

### 2.3 European Union-Japan Security Dialogue in the 1990s


**Background and Reasons: European and Japanese Visions upon Signing the Declaration at the Preparatory Stage**

Beginning in the mid-1980s, increasingly dynamic and rapid changes in world politics forced people to change their perception of the world. This was especially true for Japanese and Europeans, for whom the reliance on the US military power had changed meaning, and as a result, they had to reconsider their policies in line with their new status as
economic superpowers that have a mutual responsibility to provide both economic leadership and locomotive power to ensure that the rest of the world does not slide into recession...’ (Andriessen 1990). By the early 1990s, it had become clear that the framework of EC-Japan relations had not been fully realised and that cooperation was still hindered by the trade imbalance. The trade deficit with Japan was so huge that the EC was totally preoccupied with searching for strategies to cope effectively with it. However, despite this obstacle, the end of the Cold War signalled the importance of broader thinking and a broader vision of world events. In this respect, in September 1990, Vice-President of the European Commission Frans Andriessen acknowledged that,

The Commission is convinced that our relationship with Japan should change from one dominated by trade issues to become wider and better balanced. For this to be achieved we need to develop cooperation in all the fields where both sides can benefit including the area normally politically called political cooperation. Serious discussion has already started in the preparation of a ‘transatlantic declaration,’ i.e., a significant political expression of intention for the elaboration of intensive future cooperation between the US and the European Communities. It is obvious that the implications of such an initiative for the development of the future relationship between Tokyo and Brussels cannot be ignored. Europe does perceive Japan as part of “Far East,” but geographical distance should not be a motive for not also spelling out in clear political terms how future partnership between these parties should evolve (Andriessen 1990; emphasis added).

This statement demonstrates that the European Commission was seriously considering strengthening its relations with Japan. In its turn, Japan had already for a long time been attempting to initiate comprehensive cooperation with the EC. In December 1990, the European Commission received initiatives (known as the ‘Owada proposals’) from the Japanese delegation aimed at strengthening EC-Japan relations. These initiatives were proposed to improve the mechanisms for cooperation, to renew efforts for intensification of bilateral cooperation, and to sign a joint declaration that would include:

– a statement on basic values shared by both sides;
– a list of objectives shared by both sides;
– the principles of consultation;
– the institutional framework for this consultation (European Commission 1991a).
A Japanese diplomat involved in the Joint Declaration project explained Japan’s motives for signing a joint declaration by saying that ‘the more general and worldwide change[s] around 1989 and 1990 caused the necessity for revision of the entire Japanese diplomacy, part of which was reflected in the attempt to reinforce political relations with the EC’ (Abe 1999: 123). As Abe (1999: 123) notes, in this case ‘the increase of economic interdependence was not sufficient to let Japan revise its policy towards the EC, but had to wait until the 1989 revolutions’. Besides, Japan followed the US’s lead and was eager to enter into relations with Europe on a level similar to US-EU relations.8 As the author of the Japanese initiative, Hisashi Owada, observed, the reasons for constructing a new framework called ‘the total partnership’ were the desire firstly, to attain the same level of relationship as the US and the EU, which had signed the 1991 Transatlantic Declaration on Partnership, and secondly, to reduce tensions with the EEC with regard to bilateral trade by extensively enlarging the agenda (Owada 2001: 17 and 19).

Furthermore, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in describing the reason for the EEC integration, pointed out that ‘the philosophy behind the integrated market was to strengthen the EC’s influence upon the building of the international order in the 21st century through revitalising Europe and reducing technical and industrial gaps with Japan and the United States’ (MOFA 1991: chapter 4, section 3). In this view and also taking into consideration that the EC was moving towards monetary and political union, ‘Japan considered that strengthening bilateral relations with the EC member countries as well as with the EC itself was important’ (MOFA 1991: chapter 4, section 3). Furthermore, it continued to state that Japan-EC relations ‘tended to excessively concentrate on the confrontational dimension in the economic sphere… In order to break this situation, the EC and Japan should recognise that they share political and economic values, bear great responsibilities towards the international community both politically and economically and share a common interest in terms of security’ (MOFA 1991: chapter 4, section 3; emphasis added). Therefore, in order to construct more comprehensive relations, Japan proposed issuing an EC-Japan Joint Declaration.

The European reaction was positive, and in a speech at the foreign correspondents’ club of Japan given on 28 February 1991, EC Vice-President Sir Leon Brittan emphasised that,

Europe’s ties with the United States, as well as its separate concerns, were reinforced a few months ago by a Declaration on US-EC relations9 which provides a framework for expanding our dialogue and our relationship. It may well be time that Europe should enter into similar relationship with Japan. This could pay dividends because it would help to build on the many interests
Brittan, like his predecessor Andriessen, represented the favourable attitude of the EC to the declaration. In May 1991, the EC issued a memo regarding relations with Japan, stating that ‘the Community’s objective is to induce Japan to assume the responsibilities of a great economic and increasingly political power for the maintenance and further development of the Western economic system’ (European Commission 1991a). This suggests that the EC had some additional worries about Japan’s non-participation in stabilising the economic system, which was of primary importance for both the EC and Japan.

During the negotiations, a scandal broke out in France and swept across Europe. In May 1991, just before The Hague Declaration was signed, French Prime Minister Edith Cresson at a television press conference immediately shortly after her inauguration, referred to Japan as a ‘plunderer’. She said,

We advocate a united Europe and a union with the United States. If Japan desists from acting as a plunderer, a union with them is also possible... At present, Europe has no answer to the Japanese system, but I truly believe that such an answer will be found (Ogura 2000: 177).

This statement could not go unanswered by the Japanese government (Ogura 2000: 177) and actually hastened Japan’s signing of The Hague Declaration. In this context, it was not surprising that ‘the European Commission regarded the strengthening of its relations with Japan as one of [our] highest priorities, both in the short and in the long term’ (Andriessen 1990).

Despite the scandalous Cresson statement, EC-Japan negotiations continued to evolve. Moreover, on 13 June 1991, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on EU-Japan relations, which stated that ‘economic and political questions are important if a dialogue is to be achieved which concentrates less on respective external trade policies and more on the problems arising from the change in the world’s political balance, the burdens on the environment and climate, the limited nature of resources and the global population explosion’ (European Parliament 1991: 312-313). Two weeks later, on 29 June 1991, the European Council stated that relations with the US and Canada had been developing on the basis of the joint declarations signed in November 1990, which continued to play a crucial role in the prosperity and security of the Western world. The EC, which shared the same aim
of preserving Western prosperity and security, wanted ‘to strengthen its links with Japan on the basis of a similar declaration’ (European Council 1991).

These developments illustrate that the EU-Japan security dialogue continued to develop and intensify because of the necessity of adapting to a new international environment after the Cold War. During the negotiations, the EC was more insistent about the inclusion of economic and trade provisions, while Japan insisted on focusing on the political aspects in efforts to gain something similar to the US-EU Transatlantic Declaration. The Japanese position ultimately prevailed, and the declaration contained no specific economic clauses that could have had unfavourable consequences for Japan.

Several factors contributed to the parties’ signing of the declaration. The first was as many scholars have emphasised, the end of the Cold War and the changes in the international environment. The second was the evident rise of the Asia-Pacific region, which turned both Japanese and European attention more toward Asian affairs. Third, the EC had already begun playing a more prominent role in the international sphere, which was reflected in the ratification of the treaty that established the EU. Fourth, Japan was searching for its new roles in a new international environment. Fifth, EU-Japan relations were undergoing a difficult time due to the ongoing trade imbalances. Ultimately aimed at reducing the focus on economic issues, Japan traditionally favoured a policy that broadened the dialogue to balance its relations with a partner.

The Signing of The Hague Declaration

On the occasion of the official visit of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu to The Hague during the Dutch Presidency of the EC in July 1991, the ‘Joint Declaration on Relations between Japan and the European Community and its Member States’ (The Hague Declaration) was signed. Until ‘An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation’ of 2001, The Hague Declaration served as the fundamental shaping document, containing a statement on the main principles and goals of bilateral cooperation.

Based on shared values, the interdependent nature of their relations, common interest in security, peace and stability in the world, Japan and Europe in The Hague Declaration agreed to ‘intensify their dialogue and to strengthen their cooperation and partnership in order to meet the challenges of the future’ (Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Community and its Member States and Japan 1991; emphasis added). They also agreed to explore together areas of possible cooperation including, where appropriate, common diplomatic action or policy coordination on international issues, which might affect world peace
and stability (Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Community and its Member States and Japan 1991).

Based on EC and Japanese security conceptualisations, The Hague Declaration included provisions related to security in the following spheres:

– international or regional tensions around the world;
– strengthening the UN’s role and that of other international organisations;
– non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the non-proliferation of missile technology and the international transfer of conventional weapons;
– the environment, the conservation of resources and energy, terrorism, international crime, aid development, science and technology;
– inter-regional cooperation, relations between Central and Eastern European and Asian-Pacific countries.

The security dialogue on international and regional tensions commenced with the joint EC-Japan position on the Iranian crisis in 1980. The security dialogue on the environment, energy, science and technology, and development aid had been initiated in the 1970s-1980s, and it can therefore be argued that The Hague Declaration confirmed its existence (see also chapter 1). New areas of cooperation were non-proliferation, disarmament and interregional cooperation. In other words, the security dialogue had been expanding all along.

With regards to the mechanisms of cooperation, the Declaration codified the existing annual meetings at a ministerial level between the Commission and the Japanese government, biannual consultations between the Foreign Ministers of the Community and the Commission Member responsible for external relations and the Japanese Foreign Minister. A new and important step was the establishment of the annual summits between the President of the European Council and the Japanese Prime Minister, on the other.

Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook 1991 noted that the Joint Japan-EC Declaration upheld the philosophy of cooperative relations between the EC and Japan as true global partners who shared the same political values and ideals, including freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and similar economic values and ideals, such as the market principle and the objective of developing the world economy based on a multilateral free trade system (MOFA 1991). Moreover, this position fell in line with their security considerations.

In other words, The Hague Declaration:
– brought codification and the mechanisms of cooperation;
– enlarged the scope of the security dialogue; and
Significance and Implications of The Hague Declaration for the Security Dialogue

The pertinent literature reveals some differences in the assessment of the significance of The Hague Declaration. Abe argued that ‘the actual effect of the Joint Declaration is in some ways open to debate, since it only minimally changed the relationship between Japan and the EC’ (Abe 1999: 118). However, looking at it from a global perspective and specifically in the realm of politics, The Hague Declaration had the following implications. First, it was a landmark that organised the ad hoc meetings between the EC and Japan in a systematic and institutionalised way. Second, it legitimised the introduction of topics onto the agenda other than trade and economic issues. Third, it provided a more concrete foundation for mutual interaction, and it situated trade discussions within a comprehensive framework. Fourth, it reflected the European and Japanese visions on security. Fifth, it made it clear that each partner’s activities would not be restrained or limited to their respective geographic regions; thus, facilitating joint cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the Asia-Pacific region.

Examining the reasons why The Hague Declaration was signed, Gilson (2000: 91-92) asserted that what was ‘interesting in this regard was Japan’s newfound willingness to implement institutional relations with the EC, which contrasted with its earlier reluctance to do so’. Meanwhile, Abe acknowledged that ‘[t]he EC showed little interest in Japan in political terms. Official statements by the Council of Ministers in the 1980s clearly indicated that the EC concentrated on economic matters with Japan, especially trade balance’ (Abe 1999: 133). Abe also noted that:

Before the Joint Declaration... Japan on several occasions expressed its wish to build a political relationship with Europe. As early as 1973, for example, Prime Minister Tanaka proposed establishing a closer relationship through a joint energy program, but it failed to attract support from any European leaders. In 1983 the Nakasone government proposed a permanent forum to discuss strategic and political issues of mutual concern between Europe (through NATO) and Japan, but it was rebuffed by France (Abe 1999: 133).

In other words, while Gilson believed that The Hague Declaration was a product of the willingness of Japan to enlarge the scope of its relations, Abe argues that Japan had already sought changes long before. At
the same time in parallel with resolving trade problems, the European side had made attempts to improve the bilateral relationships (see chapter 1). Moreover, upon closer examination of the European and Japanese positions on agreeing to The Hague Declaration, we can conclude that it was a reciprocal process since by that time, both sides had already realised the need for more coherent and expanded cooperation, especially considering current world developments and the collapse of the bipolar system.

As later developments would demonstrate, although in 1991-1992 the EC’s trade deficit with Japan had deteriorated even further (European Council 1993), the process of expanding the security agenda launched with The Hague Declaration allowed both sides ultimately not to get hung up on this issue. Moreover, proceeding from the analysis of the joint documents, we can say that though the problem remained, the attitude and behaviour of the parties, especially the EC, would change. Hence, the end of the Cold War brought changes in the identities and interests of the parties, which resulted in the signing of The Hague Declaration and in enlarging the scope of the EU-Japan security dialogue by introducing new areas, such as non-proliferation, disarmament, and interregional cooperation.

**Development of the Security Dialogue in the early 1990s**

*Moving Away from Trade Frictions: Encouraging Progress in the Security Dialogue*

The meeting on 6 November 1991 of the European Commission-Japan Task Force stressed its ‘very positive’ atmosphere. Areas were identified where EC-Japan cooperation could be developed, ‘notably, trade and investments, economic study, development assistance, [the] environment, science and technology, means for mutual understanding, competition as well as the political field’ (European Commission 1991b). Later, on 25-26 November 1991 the Ministerial Meeting was held. The important issues discussed at the meeting were means for mutual understanding, identification of areas for political cooperation, the environment, science and technology, and development aid.

After the The Hague Declaration was signed, the European Commission adjusted its evaluation of the EC-Japan dialogue. The EC, in acknowledging serious trade problems with Japan, was convinced that there was much more at stake, looked at from a broader perspective based on political considerations (Andriessen 1991). Moreover, the Commission aimed to follow a policy that moved away from discussions dominated by trade towards a relationship that would be profitable to both sides.
Following a strategy of reducing the tension in the relationships by enhancing the dialogue in areas other than trade and investment, high-level discussions were held on 16-17 January 1992 between the Commission and Japanese authorities on environmental issues in Tokyo (European Commission 1992a). These discussions followed two rounds of *ad hoc* consultation between the two parties in March and June 1991. As both sides confirmed, the discussions took place in ‘a very friendly and constructive atmosphere’ (European Commission 1992b). In chapter 1, we noted that environmental matters were related to the security dialogue based on European and Japanese security policies. In The Hague Declaration, the environment was identified as an area in which partnership needed to be improved. Later, the following three areas of potential cooperation were identified (European Commission 1992a):

1. bilateral cooperation between Japan and the EC, for example, in tropical forest conservation, acid rain and global warming;
2. international environmental activities;
3. information exchanges in areas such as waste management, classification of dangerous chemicals and the use of economic instruments to protect the environment (European Commission 1992b).

Therefore, the identification of the common activities in the environmental area manifested in a deepening and expanding security dialogue between Europe and Japan. Moreover, it also showed that, in spite of the continued trade imbalance, the parties had taken steps towards expanding their agenda. A March 1992 report by the European Commission supports this claim when it mentioned that ‘the Community’s general policy vis-à-vis Japan aims at strengthening the third side of the EC-US-Japan triangle, and, to do so, at moving away from a policy dominated by trade issues towards a relationship profitable to both sides and extended to cooperation’ (European Commission 1992c). The report brought the status of Japan-EC cooperation up to date, and simultaneously permitted a certain amount of progress in the resolution of trade and investment issues (European Commission 1992c).

On 9-10 March 1992, the Annual High-Level Consultation between the European Commission and the Government of Japan took place in Brussels. There, the main topic was the trade imbalance and investment policy (European Commission 1992d). However, the two sides reviewed the encouraging progress made in bilateral cooperation, ‘notably in the fields of science and technology, social affairs, [the] environment, development aid, industrial cooperation and energy’ (European Commission 1992d).
In 1991, Japan’s trade surplus with the EC reached US$ 31.2 billion: Japanese exports to the EC totalled US$ 62.5 billion and EC exports to Japan amounted to US$ 31.3 billion. This 14% increase in the trade imbalance (European Commission 1993b) perturbed the Europeans, and, in May 1992, the European Commission wrote a communiqué to the Council entitled ‘A Consistent and Global Approach’, which reviewed relations between the EC and Japan. Its guidelines noted that significant progress had been made on both the economic and cooperative fronts, although the relationship between the two had yet to reach an equilibrium (European Commission 1992e: 1). The key new components of cooperation were political and security dimensions. The Commission acknowledged that the framework of the more intense dialogue established by The Hague Declaration ‘had already allowed the identification of promising new fields of cooperation... It had also shown a possible convergence of positions on global problems of common interest, such as those of development and the environment...’ (European Commission 1992e: 1). Along with development aid and the environment, activity had also been observed in the areas of science and technology and energy. The established cooperation obviously needed to ease the economic frictions exacerbated by ‘low-level’ political issues, areas where the parties had a mutual understanding from the very beginning. In July 1992, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on relations with Japan, stating that the European Parliament ‘attaches great importance to the stepping up of consultations and political coordination between the EC and Japan on questions of international security...’ (European Parliament 1992). Among other issues, special attention was paid to the area of science and technology ‘that constitutes a key factor in EC-Japan relations’ (European Parliament 1992).

However, along with the positive advances, the European Commission criticised Japan for its economic practices and proposed a range of measures that needed to be taken by Japan (European Commission 1992e). The European Commission’s analysis and conclusions provoked some negative reactions in Tokyo. The Japanese authorities thought that the Commission had not sufficiently considered the positive developments and efforts that had been made for the increased involvement of the Japanese economy globally (Bulletin Quotidien Europe 1992: 1). Furthermore, Tokyo noted that this criticism undermined the principles of The Hague Declaration. Japan responded by issuing the ‘Basic Thinking on the Policy of the Japanese Government to the EC’ (MOFA 1992a). Despite this setback, the EU-Japan security dialogue continued to develop.
Register of Conventional Arms Transfers

In July 1992, the Prime Minister of Japan Kiichi Miyazawa, the President of the European Commission Jacques Delors, and President of the European Council, John Major, ‘reviewed cooperation since last year and agreed that a broad approach, developing all aspects of the EC-Japan relations to the advantage of both sides, was the most productive way forward’ at the EC-Japan summit (2nd EC-Japan Summit 1992). The involved parties also acknowledged the importance of joint activities on establishing a Register of Conventional Arms Transfers within the UN structure in the security dialogue.

The proposal of a register for arms transfers was the first concrete action that Japan and the EC took following the adoption of The Hague Declaration. During an early June 1991 plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament, Japan presented a draft resolution calling for the establishment of a Register for Conventional Arms Transfers that it planned to submit to the UN General Assembly. That same month, the European Council issued a Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms Exports, prioritising the establishment of a UN Register on Conventional Arms Transfers and stating that it would present a draft resolution at the UN General Assembly (European Council 1991: Annex VII). Meanwhile, Japan and the EC had been exchanging views on the contents of such a draft resolution and, during the UK’s EC Presidency, Japan and the UK pursued a formal proposal for the establishment of a Register for the International Arms Trade. There were no fundamental differences between Japan’s and the EC’s informal draft texts. Therefore, they were combined into a single communiqué to present to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly (Gilson 2000: 155).

Japanese and EC representatives held extensive talks with non-aligned countries in order to incorporate their views into the draft text and to ensure that it could be implemented successfully. Japan-EC deliberations were at least as important as the committee meetings, and representatives from both sides were active in obtaining agreement from other (particularly non-aligned) states prior to the adoption of the draft proposal. Arms Register Resolution 46/36L ‘Transparency in Armaments’ was adopted on 9 December 1991, by a 150-0 vote, and went into effect on 1 January 1992 (Gilson 2000: 155).

This concerted action is frequently mentioned by politicians when discussing EC-Japan relations. Moreover, we can argue that cooperation on arms control was within the framework of the EC-Japan security dialogue initiated in the 1970s and that it corresponded to their ‘civilian power’ identities.
Launch of the Security Dialogue in the Crisis Management Area

In July 1993, the leaders met at the third EC-Japan Summit. However, because of the trade imbalance issue, the third summit was dominated by discussions of trade and economic issues, and Prime Minister Majiyazawa conceded that ‘this situation [trade gap between Europe and Japan] was an embarrassment for the Japanese government’ (3rd EC-Japan Summit 1993). In response, the Vice-President of the EC, Sir Leon Brittan, insisted what was important was ‘the recognition of the common problem, and the common perception of the need to press in that direction’ (3rd EC-Japan Summit 1993). Along with the deteriorating trade situation, the EC and Japan ‘consulted and exchanged views on major international issues’, including the situation in Russia, the Newly Independent States (NIS), Central and Eastern Europe, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and the prospects for ensuring the full commitment of North Korea to the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. They also ‘exchanged views on the overall political and security situation in both the Asia-Pacific region and Europe’ (3rd EC-Japan Summit 1993). A similar exchange took place at the second summit in 1992 (2nd EC-Japan Summit 1992). Such systematic exchange of views demonstrated reciprocal positions on a range of problems and facilitated the dialogue between Europe and Japan. Moreover, it was really a security dialogue because the issues that were discussed concerned the current ‘hot’ spots, where Europe and Japan became increasingly involved in joint activities. Thus, in the cases of the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia, the two parties were already engaged in peace-building and peacekeeping operations.

In the early 1990s, the EC and Japan were both involved in activities, which would later be referred to as ‘crisis management’ that does not mean solely military operations. As an analysis of the EU and Japan’s security conceptualisations has revealed, their involvement in crisis management activity has been of civilian nature, i.e., without having to resort to military force.

To summarise, in the early 1990s, the EC-Japan security dialogue saw cooperation on the Register for Conventional Arms Transfer, and the initiation of both discussions and joint activities in the area of crisis management. To keep our focus here on a discourse analysis of the development of the EU-Japan security dialogue, we will discuss crisis management in greater detail in chapter 7.
Europe’s Changing Vision and the Overall Development of the Security Dialogue in the mid-1990s


In March 1995 the European Commission addressed a communication entitled ‘Europe and Japan: The Next Steps’ to the European Council (European Commission 1995a). Unlike the previous ‘A Consistent and Global Approach’ report from 1992, this paper was much more profound and contained concrete proposals for the improvement of the political and security dialogues with Japan. The introduction listed their commonalities, whereby the EU and Japan would:

- recognise themselves as industrialised democracies facing the challenges of world economic interdependence;
- share key interests in a stable, multilateral economic system and the maintenance of global security;
- develop new approaches to foreign and security policies in which links with the US remain strong but not omnipresent;
- strive for constructive relationships with Russia and China and with different parts of Asia;
- face the challenge of remaining competitive in the international market despite the emergence of new competitors;
- struggle independently, each partner in its own way, to develop a political role commensurate with its economic weight (European Commission 1995a: 3).

As we can see, these commonalities stemmed from common threats and challenges to Japan and the EU due to a changing global environment, and from the common interest in playing a more prominent role in international relations. Thus, seeking a deeper level of involvement in its relations with Japan, the Commission proposed the EU’s vision of the development of its political relations with Japan. The Communication stated that ‘in doing so, the Union can actively support and participate in Japan’s greater political involvement in global foreign and security policy’ (European Commission 1995a: 4).

Further analysis of relations with Japan reveals that their focus remained largely economic. This was particularly true in the view of the EU, which saw that unnecessary and unacceptable obstacles hampered access to the Japanese market. The Commission tackled the problem by taking into account the experience of the EU’s member states and others, in particular the US (European Commission 1995a: 5-6). At the same time, it acknowledged that concentrating on one area of cooperation and neglecting the others was not an option, because ‘the EU will not improve its own image in Japan until it is seen to have political
weight to match its position as an economic and technological power' (European Commission 1995a: 7). Hence, the Commission stated,

It is clear from their [Japan and the EU’s] common interest in a stable and multilateral world order that a strengthened Japanese world role could be in the interest of the EU since on many occasions they could support each other in international fora. Even where policy conclusions differ, dialogue will help to increase understanding and perhaps narrow differences (European Commission 1995a: 7; emphasis added).

In other words, the EU expressed a certain zeal for the expansion of its security dialogue with Japan to increase mutual understanding even if ‘policy conclusions differ’. To improve the political dimension of cooperation, the Commission proposed supporting the Japanese bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (European Commission 1995a: 12). However, the European Council rejected this proposal because of a disagreement among the EU member states (European Council 1995). Furthermore, the European Commission proposed implementing concrete measures within separate sectors of activity based on the analysis of the relations with Japan. They considered such issues as science and technology, energy, the environment, and aid development areas, among others (see part 2).

In conclusion, the Communication once again emphasised the importance of a political dialogue, pointing out that ‘a stronger political relationship would also have its effect on bilateral economic relations’ (European Commission 1995a: 19). The Communication was submitted to the European Council in March 1995, and, in May 1995, the Council basically agreed with the Commission’s proposed steps. It emphasised the Commission’s proposal to hold a conference on EU-Japan cooperation, which involved representatives from governments, universities and the private sector, in an effort to raise the level of knowledge regarding Japan among EU representatives and reinforcing cooperation with Japan on all levels (European Council 1995).

The above-mentioned facts demonstrate that the EU emphasised the importance of a dialogue as a prerequisite to improving their mutual understanding and, consequently, the security dialogue in order to meet common challenges.
Shared Commonalities and Common Challenges: Mutual Understanding, Multilateral Nature of the Security Dialogue, the Landmines Issue

The Importance of Mutual Understanding

In early June 1995, shortly after the adoption of the Council Conclusions ‘Europe and Japan: The Next Steps’, Vice-President of the European Commission Sir Brittan gave a speech entitled ‘Making a Success of the EU-Japan partnership’ at the National Press Centre in Tokyo. His speech mentioned the conclusions adopted by the Council, and he emphasised the EU’s ‘determination to work together with Japan as a full, equal and respected partner in pursuit of the common, worldwide interests’ (Brittan 1995; emphasis added). He noted that:

... life has become more unpredictable, the variety of dangers to security and stability in the various regions in the world has increased. A new, creative approach to reducing these risks and preventing the eruption of regional security crises was required. In the EC’s view this could have been a fertile area for the development of joint programmes and actions by Europe and Japan (Brittan 1995).

Brittan’s speech demonstrated the following very important details. First, the EU recognised Japan as ‘a full, equal and respected partner’, which in turn proved that the EU-Japan security dialogue was a true, reciprocal dialogue between equal actors, unlike US-EU or US-Japan security relations. Second, new threats to stability and security obliged the EU and Japan to strengthen and expand their security dialogue, especially because they had such similar attitudes on security. Third, it also revealed a noticeable change in Europe’s perception of Japan. As noted in chapter 1, during the Cold War, Europe was quite hostile towards Japan, specifically regarding its trade and social policies. However, the more Europe maintained its relations with Japan, the more it began to realise it could learn from Japan, a point upon which Brittan admitted that ‘[w]e in Europe have been slow to realise how much we can learn from this great and exciting country...’ (Brittan 1995, emphasis added). Fourth, misunderstandings between the countries with different cultures, traditions and philosophies can be bridged by observing their common interests and shared values such as democracy, rule of law, human rights, and a liberal economy. These factors led to the further development of EU-Japan relations.

In this light, at the end of June 1995, the Prime Minister of Japan Tomiichi Murayama, the President of the European Council, Jacques Chirac, and the President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, met at the fourth EU-Japan Summit where they asserted that EU-Japan
relations were ‘based upon dialogue and cooperation’ and that they had established ‘trustful working relations, which have resulted in a better mutual understanding and led to the resolution of various problems of an economic nature’ (4th EU-Japan Summit 1995).

The EU noted that ‘the political side of the talks was more substantial than at previous summits or ministerials, involving detailed discussions on Japanese and European participation in the Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) initiative to reduce the military capability of North Korea’s nuclear industry’ (European Commission 1995b). The leaders also discussed their respective contributions to removing landmines in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and elsewhere, as well as dealing with Japan’s claim on the Kuril islands (European Commission 1995b).

The President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, noted that the 1995 summit marked the first time that ‘leaders from both sides had agreed [on] a joint communiqué together’ (European Commission 1995b). EU notes also mentioned that ‘Chirac went out of his way to emphasise his deep knowledge of and affection for Japan, discussing Japanese culture and history with the Japanese ministers. He has reportedly been to Japan forty times’ (European Commission 1995b). Definitely, Chirac’s role in this summit was a positive example of cooperation among partners that is not undermined by cultural differences and one of the factors that contributed to the leaders on both sides agreeing to the text of the joint communiqué. Chirac’s favourable attitude towards Japan did not go unnoticed by Japan. His positive stance and knowledge about Japan were acknowledged in the 2002 paper ‘Fundamental Strategy of Japanese Diplomacy in 21st Century: New Era, New Vision, and New Diplomacy’. Moreover, this example illustrates how expressing a desire to learn from Japan works in improving bilateral relations and, consequently, the security dialogue. The importance of mutual understanding cannot be overestimated, especially in international relations. Moreover, it has direct implications for the security dialogue.

In 1996, the Diplomatic Bluebook stated that as Europe moved closer to integration, it was becoming a force to be reckoned with in world affairs. It was thus of increasing importance that Japan and Europe enhance their dialogue and cooperation in addressing various issues – not just global issues, such as UN reform, disarmament, non-proliferation and management of the global economy, but also regional issues which had significant global implications, such as the situation in the former Yugoslavia and the issue of North Korea’s nuclear development (MOFA 1996b). This observed need to strengthen interregional links brings us to the issue of multilateralism and landmines, but also to the launch of
the EU’s participation in KEDO and the initiation of the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM), which are discussed below.

**Multilateralism and the Anti-Personnel Landmines Issue**

It is worth noting that Europe and Japan confirmed that their relations were ‘furthermore imbedded in a multilateral framework, which [took] ever more account of the global roles and responsibilities of both sides’ (4th EU-Japan Summit 1995). This statement is essential for further analysis of the EU-Japan security dialogue. First, it shows that, in the mid-1990s, multilateral cooperation was on the rise due to the growing interdependence of nations worldwide. Second, in addition to the bilateral framework of partnership, the EU and Japan were engaged in cooperation within multilateral structures. As a result, their multilateral cooperation efforts had overlapped with their bilateral agenda or the converse. Therefore, quite often there was no mention of their joint activity within multilateral structures on the bilateral agenda. In other words, EU-Japan relations cannot be entirely ignored in an examination of the multilateral dialogue, e.g., within the UN and other structures such as the WTO, among others.

From this perspective, we can approach the issue of anti-personnel landmines, which was discussed within the UN, where Japan and the EU coordinated their policies in establishing the Arms Register. European states were involved in the war in the former Yugoslavia, where landmines were used extensively, and this brought the issue to light. At the same time, landmine removal was also important for the Japanese negotiators, insomuch as it represented Japan’s inclusion in a debate over contemporary security and preventive diplomacy and demonstrated how Japan could play a security role without having to contradict its ‘civilian power’ identity and without having to deploy SDF personnel to war zones. This is how Japan and the EU were involved in landmine removal in the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia, but, as Gilson notes, ‘despite having developed slowly, through a gradual linkage with the debate on conventional arms, Japan and the EU still [did] not regard the issue of landmines in the same light’ (Gilson 2000: 160). Notwithstanding the EU and Japan’s different policy approaches, however, a dialogue was still taking place on anti-personnel landmines, which is clearly an integral part of the security sphere. In other words, despite the lack of a successful outcome, the issue of landmines had succeeded in expanding the EU-Japan security dialogue. Moreover, in the early 2000s, they would again attempt to coordinate their positions on this issue.

An analysis of the security dialogue in the mid-1990s demonstrates that, because of their shared interests, the EU-Japan dialogue further developed by expanding the scope of activities and areas of performance
such as anti-personnel landmine issues, and secondly, it became increasingly embedded in the multilateral frameworks due to the emergence of new global challenges.

**Security Dialogue in the late 1990s**

**Vanishing Trade Frictions: Role of Mutual Understanding and Security Dialogue**

Interregional Links in the mid-1990s: The Former Yugoslavia, North Korea, and ASEM

In April 1996, the European Commission issued a memo on EU-Japan relations, in which it reasserted that the political dialogue is based on a number of fundamental interests shared by the two sides, such as a stable multilateral system and the maintenance of stability around the world (European Commission 1996a). The main activities included assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as Mongolia (European Commission 1996a), and the following projects:

- participation in the security of each other’s regions, the EU in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Japan as a guest in the OSCE12;
- Japan’s participation in the reconstruction of the Former Yugoslavia13 and the EU’s involvement in the KEDO;
- participation in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which was initiated in Bangkok in March 1996;
- encouragement of the Middle East Peace Process and support for the Palestinian Authorities, in which both Japan and the EU were involved (European Commission 1996b).

It should be emphasised that with the launch of Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) in 1996, the EU had come to consider Japan as not only a vital partner but also as a country that played a ‘critical role in bridging cultural differences and promoting understanding’ between Europe and Asia (Brittan 1997). In Europe, there was an understanding that despite an emerging China, Japan, as a democratic country and one of the largest economies in the world, was a key partner for the EU in Asia and the rest of the world. In this respect, the EU envisaged that both Europe and Japan would become increasingly involved in China. The next chapter will attempt to demonstrate that, despite the growing influence of China in the world in the 2000s, the EU continued to perceive Japan as a major partner.

All in all, the above activities demonstrate the development of the security dialogue between the EU and Japan that continued to expand into new areas, such as cooperation in KEDO and regarding the former Yugoslavia, which were clearly inter-regional issues.
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

On 30 September 1996, the fifth EU-Japan Summit was held with the participation of the Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, the President of the European Council John Bruton, and the President of the European Commission Jacques Santer. Upon its conclusion, they released a joint press statement which, like the previous statement in 1995, contained security dialogue-related issues (5th EU-Japan Summit 1996). ‘[T]he summit was described by the participants as “very successful” according to their statement (European Commission 1996c).

At the Summit’s final press conference, Santer said, ‘[o]ur relations are developing very well. The pleasant and friendly atmosphere of this summit, and our heavy agenda fully confirm it’ (European Commission 1996c). In the Diplomatic Bluebook 1997 the Japanese delegation pointed out the importance of close cooperation between Japan, Europe and the United States, wherein Japan and Europe were particularly aware of the need to further enhance their relations (MOFA 1997a). The Japanese even acknowledged that the autumn 1996 could be called the ‘European season’ of Japanese diplomacy (MOFA 1997a).

In the friendly atmosphere of the summit, the leaders discussed peace and security in Asia and Europe and interrelations between them, as well as building mutual trust. In 1996 the European Commission proposed participating in KEDO and funding it with 15 million ECU (European Currency Unit) per year for 5 years (European Commission 1996b). Thus, the milestones of progress in the EU-Japan security partnership were Japan’s engagement in the settlement of the Yugoslavian crisis and the EU decision to participate in KEDO (see chapter 6).

In the sphere of arms control and non-proliferation, both the EU and Japan welcomed the adoption and signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and affirmed their shared commitment to the goal of the total elimination of anti-personnel landmines (5th EU-Japan Summit 1996). Within environmental issues of the security dialogue, the two supported the necessity of ensuring the success of the Third Session of the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change set up for 1997 in Kyoto (see chapter 4) (5th EU-Japan Summit 1996). What is more, the issue of food security was recognised as an area for enhanced bilateral cooperation. In this regard they were coordinating their activities in the preparation for the World Food Summit (see chapter 6). They also agreed to cooperate within the existing fora on the fight against international organised crime, including drug related crimes (5th EU-Japan Summit 1996). These areas had been mentioned in The Hague Declaration, but up to that moment no arrangements had been made. Therefore, considering the issues discussed at the summit, we can conclude that the security dialogue had been enlarging and that the results of the Euro-Japanese
summit of 1996 were positive. These developments were particularly noticeable given the remaining trade imbalance. Hence, European and Japanese willingness to avoid concentration on trade disputes helped to improve their mutual understanding and to expand the agenda of the security dialogue that now included food security, the fight against international crime, and the participation of the EU in KEDO.

**Full, Equal and Respected Partners in Pursuit of the Common, Worldwide Interests**

In 1997, in preparing for the sixth EU-Japan Summit, the European Commission stated in its memorandum that ‘the EU-Japan Summit taking place in The Hague tomorrow comes at a time when the European Union’s relations with Japan are soundly based’ (European Commission 1997). Furthermore, the Commission also stated that while there were still bilateral differences in trade, some had been settled, and Japan and the EU could turn their economic relations into a broader-based political partnership.

Reviewing political relations with Japan and offering reasons for the increased necessity of this kind of cooperation, the Commission mentioned the maintenance of stability around the world as well as the fact that the end of the Cold War required both parties to start developing new, more complex approaches to foreign and security policies, ones in which US links might play a less dominant role than in the past (European Commission 1997). Although the European Commission regarded these issues as political cooperation, we have established that they were incorporated into the security conceptualisations of the EU and Japan, which means that they belong to the security dialogue.

On 25 June 1997, the sixth EU-Japan Summit took place in The Hague, with the participation of the Prime Minister of Japan Hashimoto, the President of the European Council Kok and the President of the European Commission Santer. The joint press statement was substantial and emphasised the continuing relevance of the previous joint press statements in Paris in 1995 and Tokyo in 1996. The section on political cooperation envisioned a situation in which ‘where feasible, both sides would endeavour to ensure that political cooperation would lead to operational results in terms of policy coordination particularly in areas where they have a close working-level dialogue’ (6th EU-Japan Summit 1997a). They discussed specific political and security situations in their regions and considered the maintenance of a stable and secure political environment as essential for their continued economic development. In the area of inter-regional cooperation, they discussed issues concerning ASEM, ARF, KEDO, SAR (Special Administrative Region of China, Hong Kong), Cambodia, Russia, Central and East European countries Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Middle East peace process, and UN reforms. Both sides also agreed that cooperative activities should be assessed on a regular basis, to monitor needs and progress. Perhaps prompted by the hostage crisis at the Japanese Embassy in Peru that lasted from December 1996 till April 1997, the parties discussed the war on terrorism. Japan and the EU were also positive about their level of cooperation in the field of peaceful uses for nuclear energy, including research and development, and expressed their interest in further developing this cooperation.

At the joint press conference, Kok emphasised that ‘the purpose of the political dialogue is to ensure that the economic weight of the Union and Japan also leads to joint responsibility being taken for political talks and leads as well to talks on certain areas of the world, or for certain topics such as the environment, the aging population, or terrorism’ (6th EU-Japan Summit 1997b). Santer noted that the EU and Japan were ‘no longer just close economic partners, but... [were] building a powerful political alliance to advance [their] common interests on the world stage as well as in Europe and Asia’ (6th EU-Japan Summit 1997b). Hashimoto responded by saying that they had ‘built a comprehensive partnership between Japan and the European Union... and both [of them] wish[ed] to further deepen this relationship’ (Hashimoto 1997). The general atmosphere was summarised in Brittan’s speech: the “bad old days” when all [they] seemed to talk about [was] trade disputes were over’ (Brittan 1997). Echoing the Brittan speech of 1995 about cooperation between the EU and Japan as ‘full, equal and respected partners in pursuit of the common, worldwide interests’, Kok acknowledged that ‘[t]he relationship between Japan and Europe is characterised by the words “dialogue”, “cooperation” and “partnership”’ (Kok 1997).

This recognition of a mutual and equal partnership was essential from the viewpoint of further developing the security dialogue. It also demonstrated a construction of reliable relations between the EU and Japan unlike three decades earlier when Prime Minister of Japan Hayato Ikeda proposed the ‘three pillar’ cooperation between the US, Europe and Japan that was rejected.

From the Discourse Rhetoric to Practice

European Proposals

Although trade wars had vanished and reliable relationships had been established in the late 1990s, the EU side started to contend that EU-Japan relations lacked a solid foundation in political and cooperative actions. On the one hand, it was due to the EU’s structure and the bilateral relations between the EU member states and Japan. On the other hand,
it was a reflection ‘of a certain caution or lack of drive in promoting EU-Japan relations even when their interests coincided’ (Brittan 1998). In order to create a solid foundation, which meant concrete EU-Japan joint activities, the European Commission issued its ‘Working Document on Japan’ in April 1999, which stated that the EU was under the impression that ‘Japan has followed a slightly more assertive policy towards the US and has shown greater willingness to oppose US policies at bilateral, regional and multilateral level. Difficulties in US-Japan relations may influence the tone of Japan’s relations with the EU’ (European Commission 1999a: 5). Moreover, the EU admitted that ‘traditionally it has been the EU which has been [the] “demandeur” in relations with Japan, particularly in the economic sphere’.14 However, in 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU. The Amsterdam Treaty further strengthened the CFSP, and the EU expanded to the East, launched the euro and adopted the ESDP. These events demonstrated the growing influence and power of the EU in world politics. Consequently, Japan’s interest in European affairs had been gradually increasing. Along with these developments, Europe realised that relations with Japan, which remained Europe’s partner in Asia, were not sufficient as the dialogue lacked a concrete joint activity. Moreover, Europe together with Japan intended – implicitly – to counterbalance the existing hegemonic US policies.15

Hence, the Commission proposed working jointly on some practical and visible projects such as human rights and non-proliferation. Moreover, it also proposed cooperating on four main issues, in particular, including:
1. North Korea;
2. China’s evolving political, economic, and security role in the region;
3. the evolution of security structures in the region; and
4. the impact of unilateral and extraterritorial policies on Asia (European Commission 1999a: 20).

In May 1999, just after the Commission’s April issuance of the paper, the, Amsterdam Treaty on European Union was enacted, whereby the EU’s CFSP became more visible with the introduction of the position of High Representative for the CFSP. Moreover, the Cologne and Helsinki European Council decisions of 1999 launched the ESDP.

Japan’s Response
If Japan had not previously been convinced of the viability and efficacy of the EU as a security player, the above modifications in the European structure allowed it to realise the significance of the issue and subsequently made its own assessment of their relations. Thus, Japan agreed with the EU on the development of new concrete joint initiatives to
advance their mutual foreign policy objectives and on the necessity to further expand and deepen the EU-Japan partnership in the new millennium (8th EU-Japan Summit 1999; MOFA 2000b). A more explicit and detailed reply included concrete proposals from Japan during Foreign Minister Yohei Kono’s visit to Europe in January 2000. Japan reiterated that EU-Japan relations were based on three premises. Firstly, Europe and Japan shared common values including a belief in the principles of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights. At the same time, they were both grappling with serious issues facing their social systems, such as ageing populations, social security schemes and unemployment. Secondly, ‘Japan and Europe, as global partners, [have been] inseparably linked regarding security’, both sides have had the will and capacity to engage in mutual assistance in the face of challenges to the security of either side, such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, and as regards the KEDO. Finally, ‘cooperation between Japan and Europe [has been] a natural consequence of [their] deepening economic interdependence resulting from globalisation’ (Kono 2000a).

Japan proposed deepening its relations with the EU in three specific areas:
1. realising shared values while respecting diversity;
2. strengthening of EU-Japanese political cooperation;
3. sharing the benefits of globalisation (Kono 2000a).

In relation to the first area, Foreign Minister Kono explained that Japan and Europe, which had endeavoured to advance the dialogue between them while recognising the diversity between their civilisations and cultures, could cooperate to promote dialogues infused with a spirit of sensitivity and tolerance among all countries and civilisations of the world. Later on, this soft and thoughtful attitude towards other cultures would unite Europe and Japan in their assessment of the roots and causes of terrorism roots worldwide.

The second point concerned the strengthening of political cooperation and covered specific issues such as cooperation on conflict prevention, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as UN reforms. Japan adopted ‘a comprehensive approach embracing political, economic and social measures at every stage, from efforts aimed at preventing conflicts to the building of post-conflict peace’ in the area of conflict prevention (Kono 2000a). In this respect, Japan’s security vision, as announced by Kono, was in line with its doctrines as discussed above. Japan further proposed strengthening cooperation with Europe for the prompt ratification of the CTBT in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as the NPT Review Conference of April 2000. Another urgent task was the problem of dealing with conventional weapons, which had actually been used in regional conflicts. As Kono
pointed out (2000a), ‘in this area, cooperation between Japan and Europe seems very effective’. A joint EU-Japanese project for the regulation of small arms in Cambodia was being discussed as a concrete measure of cooperation between Japan and the EU, and the EU and Japan would later adopt a joint declaration on disarmament.

Finally, in the third area of sharing in the benefits of globalisation, Japan emphasised the importance of aid coordination between Europe and Japan. Japan was considering a development policy that could be used as a conflict prevention tool ‘to eliminate causes of conflicts such as poverty and the widening economic disparities among peoples, and to restore and build peace when conflicts end’ (Kono 2000a). Japan, in this regard, provided assistance to Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, as the analysis in chapter 1 demonstrated, the security dialogue on development aid between the EU and Japan had been observed as far back as the 1980s. Their actual joint activities will be examined in chapter 6.

In order to carry out joint cooperative projects, Kono proposed designating the ten years beginning in 2001 as the ‘Decade of Japan-Europe Co-operation’ (Kono 2000a). Moreover, shortly after returning to Japan, Kono told the Japanese Parliament that:

During my recent visit to Europe, I came to be acutely aware that Europe is becoming an essentially important player in politics and the shaping of society in the 21st century. Japan intends to strengthen cooperation with Europe in the political area (Kono 2000b).

All of this demonstrates that the EU-Japan security dialogue had already been fully explored, and, moreover, the parties were busy searching for more concrete projects that would reduce global tensions and provide increased security for both Japan and the EU.

Joint Decisions: Towards the New Millennium
Mutual European and Japanese endeavours resulted in agreement at the ninth Summit in July 2000 to launch the decade for EU-Japan cooperation in 2001 and introduce a new cooperative framework based on four objectives for a stronger partnership (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000a).

The first objective of a partnership was promoting peace and security. Japan and the EU decided to enhance their political cooperation with an aim toward harmonising their positions, coming up with concerted actions, which could include joint declarations if necessary. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that they issued joint statements on Indonesia, the Middle East Peace Process, and the WTO at this summit.
The areas of cooperation were broad and included, *inter alia*: UN reforms; conflict prevention and resolution; peace building; arms control and disarmament; non-proliferation; the promotion of human rights, democracy and stability; the strengthening of regional dialogues, as well as improving regional and international organisations. As was discussed above, cooperation between the EU and Japan in the areas of conflict prevention and resolution can be conditionally referred to as crisis management operations that will be examined in greater detail in chapter 7.

The second objective was comprised of the strengthening of their economic and trade partnership while taking advantage of the dynamism of globalisation. In this respect, the EU and Japan emphasised the need to promote cooperation in the following areas: development assistance, aid coordination; infectious and parasitic disease control including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000a). These matters had already been on the EU-Japan agenda for a long time, and joint activities in the respective areas are discussed in part 2.

The third objective concerned coping with global and societal challenges. Contemporary societies are facing increased global challenges such as environmental pollution and scarce energy resources which have a great impact on the future of mankind. Japan and Europe are also experiencing problems common to many mature societies, including aging populations. To meet these challenges, Japan and the EU decided to strengthen their dialogue and increase their level of cooperation, for instance in the area of science and technology, the development of which plays a key role in tackling global problems. Areas for cooperation included, the environment; health issues; food safety; energy issues; bioethics; science and technology; transnational organised crime and drugs; aging society; employment; education; gender equality; urban traffic control; clean urban transport; maritime safety; aircraft noise; and satellite navigation (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000a). As one of the keys to effectively coping with global challenges, science and technology have been defined as a realm of security, and therefore EU-Japan joint activities in this area will be examined in chapter 5.

The fourth objective was to bring together people and cultures. Japan and the EU encouraged every form of possible dialogue and exchange between peoples. In particular, Japan and the EU wanted to promote mutual respect and the right to a co-existence among a variety of cultures in order to safeguard cultural diversity and enhance the mutual understanding of life and culture.

Comparing The Hague Declaration of 1991 and the joint conclusions of the Summit of 2000, we see an obvious increase and expansion of the EU-Japan agenda, which was a reflection of their individual agendas as well as an increase in globalisation and interconnectedness. The EU-Japan security dialogue of the 1990s was developed on the basis of The
Hague Declaration while taking into account the course of current world affairs. By 2000, the security dialogue had noticeably expanded to incorporate inter-regional engagement (former Yugoslavia, KEDO), arms control, and the anti-personnel landmines issues. In this way, the EU and Japan entered the new millennium with a range of readjusted and reconsidered policies towards more concrete joint projects that were a reflection of their intentions and of the need to cooperate on a global scale. Takako Ueta (2001: 141) noted, ‘for the last ten years starting from 1990, political and security relations between Japan and Europe have been developing gradually’. However, as Brittan observed, the EU-Japan dialogue faded to the background after the trade disputes had been settled.¹⁶

The previous chapter examined the development of the security dialogue between the European Union and Japan in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. We learned that Japanese and European leaders agreed to enter a new stage of cooperation and declared the next ten years to be the ‘Decade of Japan-Europe Co-operation’ at the EU-Japan Summit of 19 July 2000 (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000a).

This chapter examines the discourse analysis of the development of the security dialogue between the EU and Japan during the period 2001 to 2006. Its main argument is that the EU-Japan security dialogue was undergoing a process of strengthening and deepening in the early years of the 21st century as a result of international developments and modifications in the European and Japanese security conceptualisations. To demonstrate this hypothesis, this chapter is organised in three distinctive parts: the first examines the security conceptualisation into Japan in the period 2001-2006; the second focuses on security conceptualisation in Europe during the same period; the third analyses the EU and Japan’s security dialogue, utilising their security conceptualisations and taking into account various changes in the world.

This third and core part of the chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines the EU-Japan Cooperation Action Plan of 2001, its implications and significance for the development of the EU-Japan security dialogue; the second analyses the influence of the events of 9/11 on the security dialogue and describes disarmament and non-proliferation issues in the security dialogue; the third describes and analyses the China embargo issue and assesses what the implications may be for the EU-Japan security dialogue; the final section discusses the state of the dialogue in the mid-2000s, its problems and prospects, and also offers predictions and prescriptions for its improvement.
3.1 Conceptualisation of Security in Japan in 2001-2006

In December 1998 Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi (1998b) emphasised the importance of ‘human security’ in making the 21st century a ‘human-centred century’ at the conference ‘An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow’ as a follow-up to his speech in Singapore on 4 May 1998 (Obuchi 1998a). He made it quite clear that Japan had incorporated the human security concept into its foreign policy. However, the international situation of the early 21st century influenced not only the further development of human security doctrine, it also had an impact on Japan’s legislation, the Self-Defence Forces structure, and caused a reconsideration of its national defence program.

Concerning the human security aspect, the Diplomatic Bluebook stated that ‘Japan embraces a security policy with three main pillars:

1. firmly maintaining the Japan-US Security Arrangements;
2. moderately building up Japan’s defence capability on an appropriate scale; and
3. pursuing diplomatic efforts to ensure international peace and stability’ (MOFA 2000a).

The same Diplomatic Bluebook noted that, in order to construct a better global society, Japan emphasised human security from the perspective of strengthening its efforts to cope with threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity such as poverty, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational organised crime, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, the outflow of refugees and antipersonnel landmines. This could be seen in the increased number of Japanese development and humanitarian aid projects, and the growing international presence of Japan not only in Asia but also on other continents such as Africa. The strengthened Japanese will to act was further manifested in various Japanese initiatives focused on diverse dimensions of global crisis management and stabilisation such as Japan’s Global Issues Initiatives on Population and AIDS, its initiatives to address the International Digital Divide, proposals to strengthen human security in a globalised world, which, for Japan, refers not only to ‘freedom from fear’ (i.e., of violence, violations of human rights, crime) but also ‘freedom of want’ (i.e., poverty, hunger, disease, environmental degradation). Within the scope of these tasks, Japan also finances NGOs to secure peace and stability in the regions (Hook, Gilson, Hughes and Dobson 2005: 345). These activities can be characterised as civilian crisis management carried out within the human security doctrine adopted in 1998 by Japan’s Cabinet under Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi.

In the legislative area, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Japan further extended the range of its SDF geographical and functional
dispatches. Japan’s National Diet passed the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) on 29 October 2001. The ATSML has enabled the dispatching of SDF units to the Indian Ocean area to provide logistical support to US and multinational coalition forces engaged in the war in Afghanistan. On 26 July 2003, the Diet subsequently passed the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance (LCSMHRA), which authorises the SDF to provide logistical support for US and coalition forces in Iraq (since December 2003). In January 2005, the Japanese government dispatched 950 SDF personnel to Indonesia as part of a global response to the aftermath of the tsunami. Since Japan relies on the Middle East for nearly 90% of its crude oil, the stability in the region from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to it. Therefore, Japan strives to stabilise the region by promoting various cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries sharing common security challenges.

Moreover, given the close relationship between national and international security, Japan adopted its ‘National Defence Program Guidelines, FY2005 and After’ (‘New Program’) in December 2004 (JDA 2004; JDA 2006a: 100). The purpose of Japan’s security policies is to preserve the peace, independence and territorial integrity of Japan, to preserve its freedom and democracy, and to protect the lives and property of its citizens (JDA 2006a: 100). In this regard, Japan has established two objectives:

1. to prevent any threat from reaching Japan’s shores and, in the event that it does, to repel it and minimise the damage;
2. to improve the international security environment in order to reduce potential threats to Japan (JDA 2005b; JDA 2004).

The ‘New Program’ provides Japan with three mechanisms: strengthening and developing of its own efforts; reconfirming US-Japan security arrangements; and cooperating with the international community. As we can see, the mechanisms in the ‘New Program’ are more inclusive and comprehensive than the ‘Basic Defence Force Concept’ of 1996 (a minimum national defence force and reliance on US-Japanese alliances, see also chapter 2). Japan introduced two new elements here to supplement its security arrangements with the US: a reliance on its own efforts and cooperation with the international community.

Japan’s own efforts emphasise the need to develop more proactive diplomacy, which envisages large-scale application of Official Development Aid (ODA) as well as a more efficient SDF. Hence, Japan notes that ‘while maintaining those elements of the “Basic Defense Force Concept” that remain valid’, the country should develop defence forces that are capable of effectively responding to new threats and diverse situations (JDA 2004). Therefore, Japan considers it necessary for
the SDF to be highly responsive, mobile, adaptable, and multi-purpose. In other words, it transforms the defence system from one with a conventional deterrence orientation to one capable of responding to various contingencies inside and outside Japan (JDA 2006b). Japan is in the process of implementing several reforms in this area. First, in March 2006, Japan reorganised the SDF’s structure, which unites the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF (ground, marine and air forces) more efficiently under the single Joint Staff Council. The new structure is more streamlined, effective and conducive to rapid deployment.

The second reformation within the SDF was the transformation of the Defence Agency. On 15 December 2006, the Japanese Diet adopted a law regarding the SDF that transformed the Defence Agency into the Ministry of Defence as of 9 January 2007. This law mandates the reorganisation to facilitate the development of a more effective structure, one capable of enhanced and strengthened responses to emergency situations and of sustaining proactive efforts leading to the peace and stability of the international community (JDA 2005a: 31). It also means that the SDF’s overseas operations have been promoted from secondary to primary missions. Moreover, it mandates that the Ministry of Defence shall supervise the international peacekeeping operations of the SDF and shall make the security dialogue and defence exchanges more essential activities.

Moreover, Japan plans to strengthen its intelligence capabilities and actively incorporate scientific innovations by introducing advanced technologies and promoting cooperation with the US and other nations on this matter. The linking of security with the science and technology sector is nothing new, and, in Japan’s case, this linkage stems from the argument that the development of science and technology represents its core national interest. However, the innovation here is that Japan encourages cooperation in these areas with both the US and Europe.

The transformation of the Self-Defence Forces structure and the transition of the Defence Agency into the Ministry of Defence clearly demonstrate two points: first, Japan has enhanced and strengthened its ability to respond to global emergency situations; second, Japan has acted proactively for the peace and stability of the international community on its own initiative. Moreover, internal alterations of SDF capacities (Joint Staff Council) and external activities (ministerial status) would make SDF activities more coherent and visible. Promotion of international peace activities from secondary to primary missions clarifies Japan’s commitment to engage in international operations to improve the international security environment. Japan has become more proactive in recognising that the destabilisation of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks directly affects
Japan’s own peace and security. Hughes concluded that Japan’s security doctrine ‘indicates that the trajectory of Japan’s military policy is toward becoming a “normal” military power’ (Hughes C.W. 2004: 206).

Japan’s position in international relations has become more active as it has developed a more active policy and original approach towards global crisis management and global stabilisation. Yet, these transformations followed the long-established practice promoted in its comprehensive doctrine and later on in its human security doctrine. In other words, the international situation has forced Japan to make changes in its security conceptualisation, adapt to new conditions, and play a more active role in security matters. At the same time, as this section has illustrated, the ‘civilian’, non-military nature of its policies remain in force. As we will see below, this has influenced the development of the EU-Japan security dialogue, but now we will examine the conceptualisation of security in the EU in the early 21st century.

3.2 Conceptualisation of Security in the EU in 2001-2006

In the early to mid-2000s, the EU saw significant developments in security matters. First, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – launched in December 1999 at the Helsinki European Council – has developed rapidly. Second, in response to the Iraqi crisis and worsening US-European relations in 2001-2002 when US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld attacked ‘old’ Europe, the EU’s external relations commissioner Chris Patten struck back at America’s ‘unilateralist overdrive’ (BBC 2002; Black 2003a). In December 2003 the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy ‘A Secure Europe for a Better World’ in which the need for human security approaches became increasingly clear (European Council 2003b). The strategy represented the unanimous voice of EU member states and was a critical tool in the implementation of the 1999 Helsinki Council, among others, to make the EU a world player.

The December 1999 Helsinki Council decisions meant that politicians agreed to establish new political and military bodies and structures within the Council (European Council 1999b). The ESDP is divided into civilian and military crisis management, and although the scope of their activities overlaps, this represents neither an obstacle nor a subject for further discussion here.

**Military Capabilities**

Following the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki Council Conclusions, the European Council in Nice decided in 2000 to establish permanent
political and military structures regarding military crisis management (European Council 2000). These structures include the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the Political and Security Committee (PSC), and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The EUMC is the highest military body within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the member states, each of which sends permanent military representatives to the EUMC. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU (European Council 2001b: L27/4-L27/6).

The PSC meets at the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping track of the international situation and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the ESDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to any emerging crisis and exercises political control and provides strategic direction (European Council 2001a: L27/1-L27/3). The EUMS is composed of military and civilian experts attached to the Council Secretariat by the member states (European Council 2005a: L132/1-L2721). Its mission is to perform early warning, situation awareness and strategic planning within the framework of crisis management outside of the EU.

At the Cologne Council of 1999, it was pointed out that the development of more effective European military capabilities would be performed on the basis of existing national, bi-national and multinational capabilities (European Council 1999a). This is why member states agreed to implement necessary adaptations and to reinforce European capabilities in the field of intelligence, strategic transport, command and control (European Council 1999a).

In May 2003, the Council confirmed that the EU had full operational capabilities of the Petersberg tasks, which are limited and constrained by the shortcomings of deployment times. This may create high-risk situations in the conducting of concurrent operations (European Council 2004a). The follow-up was the Brussels European Council’s endorsement of the ‘Headline Goal 2010’ (European Council 2004b: 13), which stated that:

the EU’s Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. This includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. As indicated by the European Security Strategy this might also include joint disarmament operations, the support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector
The EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can avoid that a situation deteriorates. The EU must retain the ability to conduct concurrent operations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement (European Council 2004c: 1). The European Council decision covered a variety of operations that we can conditionally refer to as crisis management operations. According to the ‘Headline Goal 2010’, Europe would have its own civilian and military forces capable of conducting a full range of both military and non-military operations globally by 2010. Thus, the EU as a global actor would be able to share the responsibility for global security and support an international order based on effective multilateralism within the UN.

Moreover, the EU established the European Defence Agency (EDA), the goal of which is to contribute to the development of European defence capabilities for crisis-management operations under the European Security and Defence Policy. New military technologies are expensive for one country to develop, and thus, the EU considers dividing the costs and sharing the technology among the member states as a normal and harmonious process. The EDA helps EU member states identify common needs and promote collaboration in the provision of common solutions, which, we believe, automatically leads to the creation of a stronger common European defence industry and improved military capabilities. In other words, the EDA aims to create a single European military complex.

Civilian Capabilities
The Union decided at the Helsinki Council of 1999 to improve and more effectively use resources in civilian crisis management in which the Union and the member states already had considerable experience. This would aid in the launching and conducting of EU-led military operations in response to international crises (European Council 1999: annex IV; emphasis added). These civilian measures in support of the CFSP were supposed to reinforce and extend the EU’s ‘civilian power’ role. The EU may resort to military operations after all civilian crisis management tools have been exhausted and the conflict remains unresolved. This means that the EU is only able to resort to the total range of instruments – diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, economic measures, civilian policing and military crisis management operations – after the enhancement and coordination of military and civilian crisis response tools.
The EU has also developed some important tools at the CFSP level for enhancing political dialogues in contexts of rapidly evolving foreign policy crises, including declarations, demarches, and diplomacy by the President, the EU High Representative, Members of the Commission and EU Special Representatives. The Union is able to draw on the diplomatic resources of member states as well as the network of European Commission Delegations (European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit 2003: 6).

Moreover, the institutional structures established under agreements made by the EC, third countries and regional organisations also provide important channels for political dialogue. Importantly, in the context of crisis management, these agreements establish the fundamental principles or ‘essential elements’ underlying that cooperation (usually referring explicitly to human rights, the rule of law and democracy), and provide mechanisms for addressing disputes between the parties (European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit 2003: 6).

It should be noted that collaboration with NGOs is a key European Commission conflict prevention instrument. Whilst Glenn D. Hook et al. (2005: 345) note the trend of incorporating NGOs into state-level policy-making in Japan, the same tendency is also found in the EU. The co-financing of NGOs that specialise in the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights issues is part of the EU’s strategy. Europe is seeking to strengthen the role of civil society, the defence of human rights and democracy, the protection of endangered cultures and the rights of children. Therefore, the EU emphasises civilian crisis response tools, among which the European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit distinguishes political measures, sanctions and other negative steps, where the concrete measure actually adopted depends on the situation in the country or region (European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit 2003). This refinement is a result of the EU’s accumulated experience, which allows it to save time when a crisis requires a quick decision. Europe is ready to share its experience with Japan to make the world a safer place.11

The above EU developments reveal that they fall within ‘A Secure Europe for a Better World’ concept, which states that ‘[i]n contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means’ (European Council 2003b). In other words, military and non-military crisis management complement one another, and because of the complicated nature of contemporary crises, non-military tools often play an essential role. Moreover, whereas human security refers to freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by violations of human
rights, it also incorporates the prevention of threats to life such as terrorism, arms proliferation, regional conflicts, state failures, and organised crime (European Council 2003b: 3-4).

To summarise, in the first years of the 21st century, the EU established the civilian and military frameworks needed to face the multifaceted nature of new threats. Moreover, in December 2003, the EU adopted the human security concept ‘A Secure Europe for a Better World’ to cope with these threats. It should also be noted that the civilian and military components of a security framework are complementary, because the availability of effective instruments, including military assets, often plays a crucial role at the beginning of a crisis, during its development and/or in the post-conflict phase. This ‘comprehensive approach – part civilian, part military – corresponds to the needs of today’s complex security crises’ (Solana 2006: 2).

On the whole, the significant developments occurred during a transformation period in which the EU was not only acquiring its unprecedented military capabilities, but also a security strategy to inform its use. Thus, acting independently of both NATO and the US, the EU established its own crisis management forces, capable of acting globally, which, it may be argued, corresponds to its long established goal of reaching a position on the world stage equal to that of the US. The EU’s vision of security certainly influenced its relations with other actors, including Japan. We will now examine the issue of the security dialogue between the EU and Japan in the period 2001-2006.

3.3 The European Union-Japan Security Dialogue in 2001-2006


The EU and Japan entered the 21st century with fewer significant problems to hamper future cooperation. In 2000, as mentioned earlier, at the Ninth EU-Japan Summit, the parties agreed to initiate the ‘Decade of Japan-Europe Co-operation’ (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000a). The summit envisioned cooperation based on concrete joint projects and assessment of their realisation/implementation. Gilson notes, ‘Japan and the member states of the European Union expanded their initial areas of ad hoc interaction into a set of relations that today [were] recognised explicitly within the formalised boundaries of the “Japan-EU dialogue”’ (Gilson 2000: 166).

At the 2001 EU-Japan summit, Prime Minister Koizumi represented Japan and Romano Prodi represented the European Commission. It ended up being an important decision-making meeting that added new areas of cooperation to the agenda and solidified the older ones under
‘An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation’ (‘An Action Plan’) (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). In addition, although there was no mention of signing an agreement on terrorism at the 2000 summit, an agreement was quickly finalised and signed in December 2001 (see chapter 7) (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001b).

‘An Action Plan’ established four major objectives for strengthening the EU-Japanese partnership in the 21st century, and promoting action-oriented cooperative relations:
1. promoting peace and security;
2. strengthening the economic and trade partnership;
3. coping with global and societal challenges; and
4. bringing together people and cultures (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).

As an analysis shows, ‘An Action Plan’ and the joint conclusions of the 2000 summit were jointly elaborated upon by the European Commission and the Japanese government. ‘An Action Plan’ is an important document, one that included Japanese and European visions of the further development of relations and, unlike The Hague Declaration, it was drafted in a partnership atmosphere.

Each objective incorporates security issues consistent with the human security and civilian power conceptualisations that the EU and Japan were developing. The economy and trade were essential elements for the functioning of the entire world community, and an economic collapse would certainly lead to instability that might stimulate conflicts or even wars. Global and societal challenges were new threats that arose from different and not necessarily political and military security domains. Globalisation, among others, meant that people travel much more frequently, often seeking jobs in places far from their homelands. This increased the necessity of learning foreign languages, but also demanded something more difficult – understanding someone else’s culture. This is an especially acute problem for politicians and businessmen who meet colleagues all around the world, and without an appreciation of other cultures, difficulties can arise in their communication and, consequently, decision-making.

The Peace and Security Section of ‘An Action Plan’
The four objectives of ‘An Action Plan’ included 21 areas in which the EU and Japan sought to strengthen their relationship. The first goal, ‘Peace and Security’, included:
– United Nations reform;
– arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation;
– human rights, democracy and stability;
– conflict prevention and peace building;
specific regional issues.

These areas represent the classic, traditional security domain. As noted earlier, Japan and Europe have long been coordinating their activities and adopting joint positions, such as during the Iranian crisis in 1979-1981.

The EU and Japan had already been cooperating on five issues in the area of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. First, continued cooperation on the elimination of all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) based on the ‘principle of undiminished security for all’ (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a), which included the promotion of the early passage of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and urging all nations to maintain existing global moratoria on nuclear testing pending the enactment of the CTBT. Second was the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee at the Conference on Disarmament during its 2002 session in order to negotiate the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and, pending its enactment, to sign a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. However, negotiations have been stalled for several years. In 2004, the United States announced that they opposed the treaty on the grounds that it was impossible to effectively verify compliance. Third includes joint efforts aimed at strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Fourth was the promotion of the universal ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and ensuring full compliance (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). And fifth, the EU and Japan’s endeavour to universalise the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral fora. To this end, they seek to strengthen regular consultations to target non-state actors such as terrorists. In this respect, the EU is interested in cooperating more closely with Japan on missile defence.\textsuperscript{12}

Moreover, the EU and Japan have been actively cooperating on combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons through three primary areas. The first was a joint effort following the ‘United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects’ that had been held in July 2001. The second was the implementation of the ‘Weapons for Development’ project, in particular in Cambodia, where the EU and Japan had been attempting to develop joint or closely coordinated parallel projects within the UN and other international organisations. Finally, the third area deals with illicit trade, the uncontrolled spread and accumulation of small arms and light weapons in the Western Balkans. Our analysis shows that these developments are the direct results of Japanese and EU human security and ‘civilian power’ identities, and
their successful cooperation efforts involved in establishing the Register of Conventional Arms Transfer in the early 1990s.

Although Europe and Japan’s positions in the 1990s diverged on the issue of anti-personnel landmines, ‘An Action Plan’ focused on the possibility of closely coordinated parallel efforts in one or several countries, adhering to the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines, and the total abolition of these weapons (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). In addition, the EU and Japan agreed to exchange information on cooperation with Russia in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, specifically on the disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).

In general, the EU-Japan security dialogue on disarmament and non-proliferation showed that the scope of activities in hard security had been significantly expanded compared to the early 1990s. In conflict prevention and peace-building area joint or parallel activities of the EU and Japan had been observed in certain countries and regions such as Cambodia and the Balkans since the early 1990s. Yet, only in 2001 cooperation in this area was clearly articulated in the document. Earlier we defined that these types of operations refer to crisis management (see chapter 7).

*The Economic and Trade Partnership Area of ‘An Action Plan’*

The second goal was the ‘Economic and Trade Partnership’, which listed the following areas:
- encouraging bilateral trade and investment partnership;
- reinforcing cooperation on information and communication technology;
- reinforcing cooperation on multilateral trade and economic issues;
- reinforcing the international monetary and financial system;
- development aid and fight against poverty.

The economy and trade were the only consistent items to appear in EC-Japan dialogue since 1959 and remained the primary issue until 1991. Development aid and poverty issues have been on the security agenda since the 1980s. We will examine concrete joint activities in this area in greater detail in chapter 6.

*The Global and Social Challenges Area of ‘An Action Plan’*

The third goal, ‘Coping with Global and Societal Challenges’, included:
- ageing society and employment;
- gender equality;
- education;
- environment;
- new challenges;
– science and technology;
– energy and transport;
– terrorism, transnational crime, drug trafficking, and judicial cooperation.

This area deals with non-traditional threats that are not included in the traditional, classic discourse on security. Social problems such as an ageing society and employment, gender equality, and education were on the agenda in the 1990s but were still referred to as ‘challenges’ in the ‘An Action Plan’. And so we see that the security dialogue was essentially expanded to include these topics. However, this book will not elaborate further on this matter due to time and space considerations.

The environment is an area where the EU and Japan developed an even closer partnership in an effort to deal with climate change and other global challenges, such as ozone layer depletion, biological diversity and sustainable forest management. Environmental concerns related to security matters were incorporated into the EU-Japan security agenda in the late 1970s with the initiation of a dialogue on environmental matters in 1977 (see chapter 4).

‘An Action Plan’ also included new challenges, which implies cooperation in biotechnology (i.e. cloning, research on human embryonic stem (ES) cells and human genome, etc.) and issues related to safety, including food safety when new technologies in agriculture prompted concerns about possible side effects and mutations in humans. Biotechnology has been of interest to both parties since they established their cooperation in science and technology as early as 1986. Biotechnology, at the turn of the millennium, began to contradict basic societal moral and ethical norms, which stigmatised it as an issue that challenged the world.

The next objective in the area of coping with challenges concerned energy and transport. It remains unclear why transport and energy appear under the same heading. Transport was a new sphere of activities that became more important as a result of the consequences of globalisation. The EU and Japan categorised energy issues under the science and technology field in the early 1990s, when energy – especially nuclear – issues became an area of collaboration. Thus, for the sake of consistency, we categorise energy under science and technology.

The issues of terrorism, transnational crime, and drug trafficking were already mentioned in The Hague Declaration and since then have been mentioned less often in most subsequent joint documents. Meanwhile, judicial cooperation, which focuses on the necessity to coordinate international legislation, especially laws on drug trafficking, etc. within the UN framework, became a new area of dialogue. Judicial cooperation was, on the one hand, a product of the long-
standing EU-Japan discussions and cooperation on the issues of transnational crimes, and on the other hand, it became an urgent matter due to contemporary realities and globalisation trends. After 9/11 the fight against terrorism regained its importance, and the EU and Japan adopted the Joint Declaration on Terrorism in which they agreed to cooperate on the restoration of peace, improvement of the humanitarian situation and reconstruction in Afghanistan, and to actively engage in concerted efforts to assist Pakistan and other countries bordering Afghanistan to prevent terrorism. Moreover, the EU and Japan, along with the US and Saudi Arabia, co-chaired the Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering Group. The issues dealing with terrorism are included under crisis management in chapter 7. From an objective viewpoint, however, the fight against terrorism could have been included under the first objective, ‘Peace and Security’, of ‘An Action Plan’.

The ‘Bringing Together People and Cultures’ Area of ‘An Action Plan’
The last objective, ‘Bringing Together People and Cultures’, covers the mutual understanding between people and cultures and includes:
- academic world;
- young people starting out in life;
- developing civil society links and encouraging inter-regional exchanges.

The detail of this objective fall outside the scope of this research and thus will not be included in this study.

Implications and Significance for the Security Dialogue
There is some overlapping in ‘An Action Plan’. Besides those areas like the fight against terrorism, the issue of education which falls under ‘Coping with Global and Societal Challenges’ could have been included under the ‘Bringing Together People and Cultures’ objective. At the same time, it is difficult to classify some contemporary issues because of their interconnected nature. Thus, for humanity, science and technology forms a key area where new knowledge and new paradigms are developed, closely connected with security.

‘An Action Plan’ as a whole, however, is an ambitious and feasible project that is based on a realistic assessment of the European and Japanese involvement in bilateral and multilateral activities. Moreover, it has confirmed older issues and introduced new ones such as disarmament and non-proliferation, global challenges into the relationship and the security dialogue. Furthermore, it presented goals and measures in order to make EU-Japanese cooperation more effective. Thus, Brussels and Tokyo agreed to make an annual assessment of cooperation projects
and set forth the tasks for the next few years. Moreover, in 2002, Japan and Europe established a steering committee to follow up on ‘An Action Plan’. A monitoring committee had initially been proposed in 1986 by the European Commission. The monitoring would substantiate cooperation in general and allow the parties to improve their dialogue.

‘An Action Plan’ is significant for the EU-Japan security dialogue because of the following: first, there are many areas in the first three objectives of ‘An Action Plan’ that relate to contemporary security discourse. These issues include arms non-proliferation, disarmament, conflict prevention, peace building, the environment, energy, etc. As we have seen earlier, the security dialogue has been advancing sporadically since the 1990s in these areas and, in some cases, since the 1980s. ‘An Action Plan’, however, codified these varied activities in one document and, just as importantly, established goals for the future. Second, the proposed activities show that the scope of security dialogue activities has expanded significantly since the early 1990s. Moreover, it also demonstrates that the security dialogue had been deepened and reinforced. Third, the document adequately addressed the realities of contemporary security challenges that needed to be tackled by non-traditional, i.e., non-military tools. Fourth, ‘An Action Plan’ significantly expanded the areas of cooperation based on new international realities and European and Japanese security conceptualisations. The document noted that ‘our [the EU and Japan] cooperation rests on shared global responsibilities with a view to promoting human security for the benefit of all’ (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a; emphasis added). Fifth, the EU-Japan security dialogue has its own issues to tackle and should not compare itself with the relations the US has with the two parties. Sixth, the global scope of the problems has necessitated the addition of multilateralism to the dialogue. Finally, activities embraced by ‘An Action Plan’ have made the EU-Japan security dialogue more visible, which leads to our examination of the implementation of the plan below.

The Broadened and Deepened Security Dialogue in the early 2000s

9/11 and Security Dialogue: Growing Action-Oriented Cooperation

In December 2001, Japanese and EU leaders agreed at the summit that they had indeed been enhancing ‘cooperation on various issues in each other’s regions with the idea of “mutual support”‘ (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001d). It was already common practice to discuss and exchange opinions on the state of affairs in places like Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, the Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula. For instance, they confirmed their cooperation on reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001d). In 2001, Koizumi stated that he would work ‘to advance the idea of mutual support of each
other’s region and promote multi-phase and action-oriented cooperation in various areas between Japan and the EU’ (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001c). Unlike the joint statements of the 1990s (especially the mid-1990s), when economic issues dominated the agenda, the 2001 EU-Japan communiqué merely mentioned economic cooperation as one of many areas their relationship covered; trade conflicts had definitely been resolved.

After the signing of ‘An Action Plan’, the summits became more substantial with regards to security. There were two reasons for this: first, there were no noticeable disputes; quite the contrary, a friendly atmosphere prevailed at the meetings. Second, the events of 9/11 united the EU and Japan in their efforts to combat threats.

Seven months after the adoption of ‘An Action Plan’ in July 2002 at the Eleventh EU-Japan Summit, the parties acknowledged that ‘An Action Plan’ had already acted as a ‘catalyst for cooperation in many fields’ (11th EU-Japan Summit 2002a). Japanese and EU leaders had had many opportunities to meet face-to-face, including President Prodi’s visit to Japan in April and the G8 Summit in Kananaskis (Canada). Moreover, Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi held frequent telephone conferences with the CFSP’s High Representative Solana and European Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten, which allowed for a ‘timely exchange of information and opinions on the international situation’ (MOFA 2003a: 79). The fact that Prime Minister Rasmussen of Denmark visited Japan to hold the Eleventh Summit immediately after taking office on 1 July in his capacity as the President of the European Council was particularly noteworthy in that ‘it demonstrated a great deal of enthusiasm for reinforcing EU-Japanese relations’ (11th EU-Japan Summit 2002b).

Furthermore, the joint statement of the 2002 summit noted ‘[i]n the wake of 11 September it has become more essential than ever for Japan and the EU…’, ‘to deepen their strategic partnership collaboration in areas of priority international concern’ (11th EU-Japan Summit 2002b; emphasis added). A reference to an EU-Japan ‘strategic partnership’, wording that appeared for the first time in this joint statement, may be nothing more than rhetoric prompted by the terrorist attacks, but progress on the security dialogue was obviously being made in, for instance, their cooperation on Afghanistan’s reconstruction, the initiation of a dialogue between Europol and the Japanese Police, and Japan’s decision to join the Energy Charter Treaty. In the area of non-proliferation, the EU and Japan were already cooperating on disarmament of weapons of mass destruction proposals, as well as preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, especially in Afghanistan (11th EU-Japan Summit 2002b). Thus, the EU and Japan
entered a new stage where expansion and a deepening of cooperation were noticeable.

In May 2003 at the Twelfth EU-Japan Summit, Prime Minister Koizumi, CFSP’s High Representative Solana, European Commission President Prodi, and the President of the European Council and Prime Minister of Greece, Costas Simitis, recognised that bilateral relations, which were ‘already very good, continued to develop well’ (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003a). The leaders also ‘renewed their commitment to foster the development of their strategic partnership’ (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003a). Moreover, they stated that the strategic partnership was based not only on strong economic links – the EU and Japan account for approximately 40% of world GDP and 28% of world trade – but also on a ‘rising tempo of political dialogue and cooperation’ (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003a).

At this Twelfth Summit, Simitis acknowledged that the EU was interested in strengthening its strategic partnership and cooperating with Japan (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003d). In this regard, Japan and EU leaders agreed that they should steadily implement ‘An Action Plan’ to develop their strategic partnership. In doing so, Japan and the EU took steps to reinforce the dialogue and cooperation in both the economic and political spheres, which they believed would allow them to ‘consolidate global stability’ (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003d). At the end of 2002, the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic plunged the world into a panic situation and caused more insecurity. The EU and Japan agreed to promote the exchange of information and cooperation to cope with SARS (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003a), thereby expanding their security agenda.

Prime Minister Koizumi explicitly stated that ‘the strengthening of the strategic partnership between Japan and the EU is of great significance for the stability and prosperity of the world as a whole and [he] would like to deepen [the] dialogue and cooperation in all areas’ (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003c). He also noted that he had become more familiar with Prime Minister Simitis and President Prodi and their personal friendship led to a ‘meaningful summit’ (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003c; emphasis added). It is worth mentioning in passing that personal contacts and friendships play a substantial role in constructing foreign policy and international relations.

In March 2003, the US went to war with Iraq. Although it received mixed reactions in Europe, the overall mood was antiwar and pro-UN, which was also reflected in the EU-Japan 2003 Summit Agenda where the EU and Japan recognised the vital role that the UN needed to play in Iraq and agreed to work together to stabilise the situation in the region as a whole and ‘to ensure a secure environment, including for the provision of humanitarian assistance, in particular urgent medical relief
and the protection of the cultural heritage and museums’ (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003a). In Iraq as in Afghanistan, Japan and the EU expressed their concern about museums and historical treasures, which reflects their ‘civilian’ approach to security. On issues of non-proliferation and disarmament, the EU and Japan were able to cooperate closely on the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC).

At the Thirteenth Summit in 2004, the significant issues, despite Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, the Balkans, and terrorism, remained disarmament and non-proliferation. The EU and Japan issued a ‘Joint Declaration on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation’ that will be examined below. It is also worth noting that a significant result of the 2004 summit concerned human security issues. Europe and Japan reaffirmed the importance of human security, and at the bilateral level they promoted a dialogue between researchers in the field of peace and international security by participating in a series of seminars on European security (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004a). They confirmed their commitment to an effective multilateral approach and to a fair and just rules-based international order with ‘the United Nations at its heart, which is essential in meeting the challenges in international security’ (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004c). Moreover, they also underlined their support for the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes. At their 2006 summit the EU and Japan confirmed the importance of their cooperation in the Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention held in September 2006 (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006b).

The Joint Declaration on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation and Subsequent Modifications in the Security Dialogue

At the 2004 summit Prime Minister Koizumi, the President of the European Commission Prodi and the President of the European Council and Prime Minister of Ireland Bertie Ahern met in Tokyo. They managed to reconfirm the need ‘to advance a robust strategic partnership between Japan and the EU’ (Cabinet of Ministers of Japan 2004). In this regard, they issued several bilateral documents, one of which was the EU-Japanese ‘Joint Declaration on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation’. Europe and Japan recognised that the prevention of the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery as well as related materials and technology to terrorists and other non-state actors creates a new dimension for cooperation. The issue of illicit trafficking of WMD and their transport needed to be tackled. At the same time, both parties recognised the need to take measures to continue disarmament efforts. Moreover, Europe and Japan also acknowledged that efforts needed to be made to improve controls over conventional weapons that cause
damage, injury, and death in many countries and threaten to destabilise
the international community. The declaration sets forth nine concrete
measures that the EU and Japan would adopt to achieve their common
goals of disarmament and non-proliferation.

The first measure, recognising that the EU and Japan were major
partners on the issues of disarmament and non-proliferation, concerned
promoting a close policy dialogue on these issues within the interna-
tional multilateral frameworks (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004b).

The second measure confirmed that Europe and Japan would coop-
erate in this area based on the ‘2001 EU-Japanese Action Plan’ and the
2002 Joint Press Statement, which called for cooperation ‘on the basis
of mutual understanding of each other’s security concerns’ (13th EU-
Japan Summit 2004b). This point reemphasised the necessity to coordi-
nate respective policies regarding their surroundings, which was espe-
cially essential for Japan in the light of the 2003 European Council deci-
sion to reconsider the EU arms embargo on China.

The third measure recognised their commitment to the international
treaty system and promotion of the implementation and strengthening
of the treaties and norms in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004b),

The fourth measure promoted dialogue and cooperation with other
countries on the issues of disarmament and non-proliferation and the
intensification of regional activities towards this end to ‘establish “best
practices” to be followed by other regions and countries’ (13th EU-Japan
Summit 2004b). This arrangement revealed the EU and Japan’s mutual
aim to lead the process of non-proliferation and disarmament world-
wide and in specific regions.

The fifth measure proposed concrete assistance to countries that
wished to fully implement the requirements of the relevant treaties and
to help them to upgrade their technical capacities (13th EU-Japan
Summit 2004b). This provision related specifically to North Korea and
the issue of its nuclear arsenal.

The sixth measure supported international institutions engaged in
the verification and upholding of compliance with international treaties
and agreements on disarmament and non-proliferation (13th EU-Japan
Summit 2004b). This provision demonstrates that the EU and Japan
paid considerable attention to the verification and monitoring of the
world’s military arsenal and control of relevant technology transfer. This
is an important issue especially when we consider that the Khan
Network had been involved in a clandestine international network of
nuclear weapons technology proliferation in Pakistan, Libya, Iran, and
North Korea.15

The seventh measure addressed the ‘critical importance to duly ad-
dress the root causes underlying proliferation problems, while
reaffirming that no cause should be construed as legitimising WMD proliferation’ (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004b). Europe and Japan reaffirmed the importance of political and diplomatic efforts in non-proliferation objectives. This measure demonstrates the soft nature of Japanese and European efforts to prevent escalation in global ‘hot spots’.

The eighth arrangement promotes disarmament and non-proliferation education (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004b), which also illustrates prudence, since the future of the non-proliferation and disarmament issues will be in the hands of a new generation of politicians influenced by their educational backgrounds.

Finally, the ninth item identified seven priority areas in which Japan and the EU had established ‘specific cooperation’:
1. nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;
2. biological and chemical weapons;
3. missiles;
4. export control and other non-proliferation measures;
5. conventional weapons;
6. assistance to countries in need; and
7. non-compliance with disarmament and non-proliferation treaties (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004b).

Each area proposed a variety of activities demonstrating the ever-deepening nature of the security dialogue regarding ‘specific cooperation’ areas.

A year after the signing of this declaration, in 2005, the EU and Japan discussed a range of issues concerning disarmament and non-proliferation despite opposition to the embargo of China. They renewed their commitment to further implement the declaration and to coordinate their activities, particularly in the context of major international conferences and assistance programs in third countries (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005a). The leaders supported an immediate commencement of negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, which was opposed by the US (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005a). They also urged the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and supported the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The declaration showed the EU and Japan’s joint commitment to reinforcing the non-proliferation and disarmament agreements. The document defined precise areas and concrete acts. Hence, the EU- and Japan security dialogue included discourse, interaction, and joint activity. It further demonstrates the expanding scope of the issues discussed, notably the inclusion of various weapon, missile, export control and other non-proliferation measures. One noticeable observation is that joint EU-Japan activity was predominantly undertaken within
multilateral structures, which reduced its visibility. However, we will come back to this visibility issue below.

**Controversies of the early 21st century: The China Embargo and the Security Dialogue**

The European Initiative to Re-Examine the Arms Embargo of China: Japanese Reaction

The EU imposed an arms embargo on China in 1989 after the Tiananmen Square incident. In 2003, it decided to re-consider this issue due to global changes at that time. In December 2003, during the Italian presidency, the European Council delivered a mandate to the European Commission and the involved institutions ‘to re-examine the question of the embargo on the sale of arms to China’ (European Council 2003a: 19). France and Germany were particularly enthusiastic about lifting the embargo, as it would facilitate arms sales to China, thus enabling these two countries ‘to affect the regional balance of power in East Asia, especially regarding the cross-straits relations’ (Wai 2005: 21). In June 2004, during the Irish Presidency, the European Council ‘invite[d] the Council to continue its consideration of the arms embargo in the context of the EU’s overall relations with China’ (European Council 2004b: 17. item77). These plans, however, led to sharp criticism from both Japan and the US. Japan strongly opposed the lifting of the embargo because it would undermine the delicate East Asian security balance.16

On 8 December 2004, at the EU-China summit in The Hague, the Chinese Prime Minister claimed that the embargo represented political discrimination against China and that it was an outdated legacy from the Cold War (Wai 2005: 21). At the same time, on 7 December 2004, the special advisor to the Prime Minister of Japan, Yoriko Kawaguchi, expressed Japan’s opposition to the lifting of the Chinese arms export embargo by the EU at the 12th Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Ministerial Council in Sofia (Bulgaria). This announcement was in line with Japan’s view on that issue (MOFA 2004b), which had earlier reversed yen credit loans to China.17

As a result, in mid-December 2004, during the Dutch presidency, the European Council, in its Conclusions, stated that,

The European Council confirmed that EU-China relations have developed significantly in all aspects in the past years. It is looking forward to further progress in all areas of this relationship as referred to in the EU-China Joint Statement, in particular the ratification of the International Covenant on civil and political rights. In this context the European Council reaffirmed the political
will to continue to work towards lifting the arms embargo. It invited the next Presidency to finalise the well-advanced work in order to allow for a decision. It underlined that the result of any decision should not be an increase of arms exports from EU Member States to China, neither in quantitative nor qualitative terms. In this regard the European Council recalled the importance of the criteria of the Code of Conduct on arms exports, in particular criteria regarding human rights, stability and security in the region and the national security of friendly and allied countries. The European Council also stressed the importance in this context of the early adoption of the revised Code of Conduct and the new instrument on measures pertaining to arms exports to post-embargo countries (‘Toolbox’).\(^{18}\) (European Council 2004d: 19 item57; emphasis added).

In other words, the European Council Conclusions of December 2004 clearly stipulated that there should no changes made to regulations controlling the quantity or quality of arms exports to China. Any future decision on the lifting of the embargo would not alter the security situation of East Asia, which echoed the concerns of Japan and the US on the East Asian security balance.

The EU-Japan Summit of 2005 and the European Parliament Resolution

In 2005, the EU became less insistent about lifting the embargo. In France, Chirac’s unpopular policy and failure to adopt the European Constitution changed the trajectory of policies. Germany’s new Chancellor Angela Merkel, elected in 2005, declared that it was inappropriate to lift the arms embargo given that China’s human rights record had not improved (Williamson 2005).

In May 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi, President of the European Council and Prime Minister of Luxembourg Jean-Claude Juncker, High Representative Javier Solana, and the President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso met at the EU-Japan Summit. They adopted a joint statement, discussing relations with China as ‘Japan reiterated its opposition to the lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China’ (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005a). However, despite the China embargo, both the EU and Japan noted that the dynamic work program underlined ‘the deepening relationship between the enlarged EU and Japan’ (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005a). Besides the issues of North Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, Middle East, counter-terrorism, etc., they also discussed the nuclear issue in Iran. They agreed to try to optimise their joint efforts to obtain objective guarantees of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities. The leaders at the EU-Japan summit
recognised the need to enhance ‘the strategic dialogue on East Asia’s security environment’ (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005a).

In June 2005, the European Council welcomed ‘the launch of a strategic dialogue on Asia with the United States and Japan’ (European Council 2005b: 19 item 67). In July 2005, the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner noted that:

On the China-Japan tensions we have used recent high-level meetings, notably the EU-Japan Summit on 2 May, to discuss at the highest governmental level stability issues in East Asia. In that context, we have agreed to intensify our political dialogue with Japan. We want to do this not least with a view to responding to Japan’s concern over a possible future lifting of the EU’s arms Embargo on China. ... [T]he EU has started a strategic dialogue with the US on East Asia to address the security concerns of our partners, and information missions have been carried out to the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand to explain the EU’s position on this issue (Ferrero-Waldner 2005; emphasis added).

This statement shows the EU’s concerns about not undermining its relations with strategic partners such as the US and Japan. Hence, we can conclude that the security dialogue on the East Asian environment was a direct consequence of the China embargo issue. Meanwhile, the Japan’s Ambassador to the European Union, Takekazu Kawamura, stated:

At the 2005 Japan-EU Summit, the leaders agreed that strategic dialogue between Japan and the EU on security in East Asia should be enhanced. The agreement coincided with the period when the discussion in Europe was centring on the lifting of the arms embargo against China (Kawamura 2006; emphasis added).

In other words, as an official representative of the government of Japan, Kawamura treated the launch of the strategic dialogue not as a consequence of the China embargo issue, but as a coincidental, parallel event. However, I would argue that based on the analysis of the statements, the launch of the strategic dialogue on East Asia was a consequence of the China embargo issue.

Furthermore, the Conclusions of the European Council of June 2005 made no mention of the arms embargo issue:
The European Council welcomes the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EU and China. It reiterates its determination to develop the strategic partnership with China by intensifying the dialogue in all areas, whether of an economic or political nature, and by working towards a rapid solution to its trade dispute. It asks the Council and the Commission to speed up the proceedings on a new framework agreement. It underlines the importance it attaches to the human rights dialogue, the 19th round of which took place on 24 and 25 February in Luxembourg (European Council 2005b: 19 item 65; emphasis added).

Thus, human rights issues replaced the lifting of the arms embargo issue. The UK, which assumed the EU presidency in the second half of 2005, also chose not to raise the arms embargo issue at the December European Council.19

It is worth mentioning that, in July 2005, the European Parliament adopted a ‘Joint Motion for a Resolution on Relations between the EU, China, and Taiwan and Security in the Far East’ (European Parliament 2005) stating that it:

strongly recommended to the Council and the Commission that the arms embargo to remain intact until greater progress was made on human rights issues in China and on cross-Straits relations between China and Taiwan, as well as until the EU makes its code of conduct on arms sales legally binding (European Parliament 2005: item 6).

Therefore, the European Parliament stopped any further examination of this issue by the European Commission. As mentioned above, in 2005, the European Council was also not in favour of a reconsideration of the lifting of the arms embargo. It is interesting to note that, although the Resolution primarily concerned China, in its final provisions the European Parliament urged Russia to return the “Northern territories” that were occupied by the then Soviet Union at the end of World War II and are currently occupied by Russia’ to Japan.20 Moreover, it noted ‘Japan’s understandable wish to revise its constitution drafted in the aftermath of World War II and notes the symbolic importance of retaining a commitment to refraining from aggressive military action’ (European Parliament 2005: item 14). We were unable, however, to find any official sources of the Japanese reaction to the European Parliament statements. The European Parliament’s resolution evoked a ‘no reaction’ and a ‘no surprise’ response from Japan.21
In general, although Japan reiterated its strong opposition to the lifting of EU’s arms embargo on China, it did not resort to harsh measures that could have hampered the overall development of the EU-Japan security dialogue. Moreover, as shown above, at the 2005 summit the EU and Japan discussed disarmament and non-proliferation issues, and more significantly, they launched the ‘strategic dialogue on East Asia’s strategic environment’, which will be examined below.

**Introduction of East Asia Strategic Dialogue in the EU-Japan Security Dialogue**

While Japan strongly opposed lifting the arms embargo, Europeans saw it differently. One top European Commission official noted that, in 1989 after Tiananmen Square, Europe voluntarily decided to impose the arms embargo on China. It was not wise ‘to shut the door’, which once shut is difficult to open again. At the same time, it was not forbidden to sell weapons to such ‘high-risk’ countries as North Korea or Iraq, which are much more dangerous. In his opinion, the EU’s China embargo issue presented an opportunity for the US to take advantage of Europe, especially of France, to prevent selling weapons to China. Even if this point of the EU-US discussion did take place, there were other reasons concerning the security balance in Asia such as Taiwan-China relations, which made lifting the embargo so complicated.

In 2006, neither Austria nor Finland, during their European Council Presidencies, revealed any interest in discussing the arms embargo. By the end of 2006 the European Council had grown quite sceptical about this issue and preferred to avoid discussions. Yet, as the European Parliament representative noted, sooner or later the embargo would be lifted. But even when the EU lifts the embargo, it will be guided by the Code of Conduct which prohibits exporting weapons to countries that violate human rights. Moreover, there is a belief in Europe that the ‘entrepreneurial spirit will beat China’s human rights issue’. Thus, the EU thought about the market as well as about security. Moreover, ‘the EU still views China as a key strategic partner, but is watching its rising influence with concern’ (Lobjakas 2005) and therefore is not going to sell sophisticated, highly technological weapons to China.

The European Council did not mention the China embargo issue in its December 2006 conclusions (European Council 2006). Furthermore, as noted above, Germany, which assumed the EU presidency of the European Council on 1 January 2007, strongly opposed lifting the embargo. Thus, Japan was made to feel that ‘there is no problem’.

Furthermore, we have already learnt that the arms embargo issue initiated the strategic dialogue on East Asia’s security environment which
allowed the EU to better comprehend the security situation in East Asia. In September and December 2005 two meetings (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006b) were held in this regard. The joint statement at the conclusion of the April 2006 EU-Japan summit noted that although Japan reiterated its opposition to the EU’s lifting of the embargo on China, it also welcomed the ‘EU’s interest in East Asia regional cooperation with a view to building an East Asian Community’ (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006b). On this occasion at Keio University in April 2006 the High Commissioner for the CFSP, Javier Solana, admitted:

We in the EU have been criticised by our friends in Japan for our so-called naivety on East Asian security. I am pleased that we have constructed a new network of bilateral strategic dialogues involving not only Japan, but also the US and China. We now know better from those most directly engaged what is going on: what are their concerns, their hopes, their plans and what they want the EU to do as a result (Solana 2006).

This multilateral approach demonstrates that the EU thoroughly considers all of the positions. Europe acknowledged that, although China represents a huge market and countless investment opportunities, Japan shares common values such as human rights, rules of law, and a liberal democracy.29 Thus, it would be correct to claim that Europe, the US and Japan still form a Triad that shares common values. Moreover, as the scholar Ting Wai (2005: 23) noted, no Chinese analyst really believes that the EU would ‘normalize’ its arms sale to China, especially regarding advanced technology. They expect that the EU has a two-handed policy: to lift the embargo and to strengthen the control on arms sale to China. In this way the EU will simply replace ‘tangible’ discrimination with ‘intangible’. Hence, though China wishes the EU to lift the embargo, it does not expect Brussels to stand beside Beijing in case of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Rather the opposite. In a potential crisis across the Strait and Sino-American confrontation, the Chinese calculus maintains that the EU would not alienate from the US (Wai 2005: 23). In other words, China considered that Europe preferred having a market for its lower-class weapons without challenging the existing East Asian security balance. However, it is inevitable that the EU’s arms embargo will find a place back on the agenda sooner or later. Its future will probably hinge on two factors: the position of the US, and the situation in the Middle East. The US would need the support of China in economic terms. Also, in order to pursue its policy in the Middle East, Washington would need Beijing’s backing or at least non-interference. Therefore, the US would reconsider its policy towards
China. Naturally, this realignment will affect the EU-Japan security dialogue.

One last point is worth mentioning here. Japanese policymakers are aware that the modernisation of the Chinese army cannot be blocked simply by maintaining an arms embargo.30 The focus at this point should shift to China-Japan relations but this falls outside the scope of this book. Perhaps we can look at one essential point — technology transfer. China can acquire its technology by allowing European companies to establish research centres there or by participating in multilateral projects (see chapter 5). An example of this is China’s participation in the EU’s ‘Galileo’ space project, which serves as an alternative to the US Global Positioning System (GPS) favoured by the Pentagon. Another example is the establishment of an engineering centre in China by Europe’s Airbus, the chief competitor of America’s Boeing.31 An Airbus representative in Japan stated that ‘Airbus established [an] engineering centre in China... Japan makes a competitor with her own hands’ and added, ‘[t]he EU is not concerned with security but is fascinated [by] China’.32 Technology transfer is a sensitive area, with not only Europe but also Japan transferring technology to China. In this respect, a multilateral collaboration regarding technology utilisation would be highly desirable.33

However, Europe does not want to make China into a threat to European society and stresses the fact that Europe and Japan are inseparably linked with regards to security. Although Europe is indeed fascinated with the Chinese market, it still maintains its own security considerations and abides by its agreements in this respect. Moreover, the realisation is that once a voluntary action is taken, it is difficult to abandon. Thus, the EU did not challenge international rules and principles. It also respects the opinion of Japan and the US and their strong opposition on this matter. In its turn, Japan understood and coolly observed the European ‘fascination’ for China as a ‘momentary boom’34 not only regarding technology transfers but also in its relations with China.

To summarise, one of the important consequences of the China embargo issue for the EU-Japan security dialogue was the inclusion of the East Asian strategic dialogue into the agenda, which facilitates multilateral participation, which is reasonable because security concerns numerous parties besides the EU and Japan.


One general observation should be mentioned immediately: The EU-Japan security dialogue, like all relationships, has its ups and downs. In other words, the arms embargo was an issue that demonstrates how relations mature and balance out, become more interconnected. Moreover, they are strategic and nobody doubts the significance of the
EU-US security dialogue, however difficult it can get at times. EU-Japan relations are also illustrative in this respect, demonstrating that it is reasonable and natural for troubles to occur periodically.

Some findings concerning this issue of the EU’s attempt to lift the arms embargo and its implications for the EU-Japan security dialogue are pertinent here. First, the issue of the China embargo has been a litmus test for EU-Japan relations and demonstrated that although it cooled the security dialogue relationship, it eventually did not lead to a suspension of the dialogue. On the contrary, it kept expanding and deepening. Second, the discussion about the EU’s arms embargo changed Japan’s perception that EU-Japan relations do not affect Japan’s core security interests. In fact, the EU’s arms embargo decision directly affected Japan’s security concerns. Third, the China embargo issue actually helped expand the security dialogue to encompass the area of East Asia between the EU, Japan, the US, and China, and multilateralism continued becoming an increasingly noticeable feature of EU-Japan relationships.

The EU-Japan Security Dialogue: Contemporary Issues and Invisibility

The Aftermath of the China Embargo: More Areas of Dialogue, the EU’s Concerns about Security in East Asia, the EU and Japan’s Strategic Dialogue on Central Asia

The China embargo not only affected the EU-Japan security dialogue, it also caused a reconsideration of Europe’s policy toward East Asia. Ferrero-Waldner statement expresses the reasons for these changes:

*The situation in Asia and in particular in East Asia is a major strategic issue for Europe. Asia is today not only the continent with the largest population but also with the highest economic growth rates and the highest rates of spending for Research and Development. As the Far Eastern countries invest in their future, Asia will with no doubt be the continent at the centre stage of the 21st century. Security in the Far East is a topic of direct concern to European interests. It is part of the overall global responsibility for security and stability that lies at the heart of the EU’s role in foreign policy.*

Moreover, stability in the Far East directly impacts on the prosperity and well-being of our citizens. China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are among the world’s top six economies, if counting the EU as one. They also count among our major trading partners and are key recipients of European foreign investment. Japan for its part is also a major source of investment in Europe, not least in some of the new Member States. In short,
instability in the most dynamic region in the world would have con-
sequences that would be deeply felt in Europe (Ferrero-Waldner 2005; emphasis added).

In other words, Europe views East Asia (China, Japan, and Korea) not only from an economic but also a security perspective. It also demonstrates that the EU is more than just a regional institution, as it is often perceived in East Asia; it is a structure that has worldwide interests and comprehensive policies. Furthermore, considering that Japan is the largest investor in the European economy and its number two trading partner after the US, Europe remains concerned with the situation in East Asia and particularly, we can assume, with Japan’s foreign policy. Europe remains aware of the regions’ security concerns by holding multilateral strategic dialogues on the situation in East Asia with all of the involved parties and also holds the EU-Japanese strategic dialogue on East Asia in this regard. Through these dialogues, as Japan’s Ambassador to the EU Kawamura (2006) noted, ‘the EU has come to better understand the security situation in East Asia’. These strategic dialogues also constitute an indispensable part of the overall EU-Japan security dialogue, which continues to expand.

Thus, at the EU-Japan summit in April 2006, Prime Minister Koizumi, President of the European Council and Federal Chancellor of Austria Wolfgang Schussel, High Representative for the CFSP Solana and President of the European Commission Barroso met to discuss the enlargement of the security agenda of international, multilateral and bilateral issues. Japan appreciated Europe’s efforts to negotiate a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Summit leaders expressed their deep concern over Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, which contradicted the requirements of the relevant IAEA Board of Governors resolutions and the Presidential Statement of the UN Security Council. Summit leaders urged Iran to fully comply with the aforementioned requirements and reaffirmed the importance of the international community’s continued diplomatic efforts. Barroso stated that ‘Japan has also stood behind EU efforts to address the nuclear problem in Iran’ (Barroso 2006). It should be noted that the European ‘civilian’ approach on this matter is very different from the hard stance assumed by the US. The EU is very keen that Japan also shares this position. At the same time, the EU is aware of Japan’s sensitive position regarding its links to the US, and thus maintains a discreet strategy.

The leaders recognise particularly the launch of the strategic dialogue on East Asia’s security environment within the framework of which in September and December 2005 there were held two meetings (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006b). Moreover, they decided to develop a similar dialogue on Central Asia (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006b). In other words,
the EU and Japan recognised Central Asia as a region of mutual interest, and in July 2006 they already held their first meeting (Kawamura 2006). These developments articulate how the EU-Japan security dialogue has been expanding and how positive outcomes in one area lead to launch of cooperation in another area. This strategic dialogue on East Asia – launched as a result of the China embargo issue – has called into being an identical discourse on Central Asia.

The above-mentioned developments show the stable evolution of the EU-Japan security dialogue. However, questions remain. As there is such an active security dialogue between the EU and Japan, why then has it not been more visible? What form will the future development of the dialogue take? The next section will try to address these questions.

The EU-Japan Security Dialogue: Invisible and Not Eye-Catching

The issue of the security dialogue visibility was mentioned in conclusion to chapter 2. This chapter has demonstrated that despite the China embargo, relations between the EU and Japan were not overshadowed and did not worsen. As the former Deputy of the EC Delegation to Japan Michael Reiterer remarked, there is a trend toward a ‘lack of major difficulties’ in the EU-Japan dialogue, which implies that the dialogue does not require as much attention and thus becomes invisible as is commonly the case when there are no problems in a relationship. Moreover, the EU-Japan relations are ‘generally characterised as very good or excellent’ (Reiterer 2006).

In this respect Solana accurately noted that:

The Japanese-US Alliance grabs the headlines. But in terms of practical co-operation on a broad range of issues, the EU-Japan partnership runs it very close. But making this comparison is in itself revealing. Because although Japan and the US share many of the same values, which Japan also shares with the EU, the Japan-US Alliance is focused on security issues (Solana 2006).

Solana certainly meant military security, while the EU-Japan security dialogue is a partnership based on broader, human security considerations. An expert on EU-Japan relations Axel Berkofsky further noted that:

The problem is that EU-Japan relations do not grab the headlines. Even though there might be a lot of activity on a day-to-day basis, it is not being picked up by the international press... it is not visible. There is something, but it is not visible enough.
Echoing the EU’s opinion, the Japanese Representative to the EU acknowledged that:

If you are just trying to find a big, eye-catching project between Japan and the EU, there is none... But it is not the question. The question is whether the EU-Japanese relations have been developing or not. Unfortunately, the media report only when something goes on wrong. But luckily, nowadays there is no particular concern about trade friction [between the EU and Japan]. Instead, Japan and the EU have an exchange of investments... But it is not visible.\(^4\)

Therefore, both the EU and Japan share a similar understanding that their relations are invisible, but it seems that neither is particularly concerned about this issue. However, the issue remains. Although the EU-Japanese relations are developing they lack visibility. It makes the politicians who are not directly involved in the EU-Japanese relations doubt their effectiveness. It is an essential disadvantage for the security dialogue.

Japan observed that

many things are happening in such a way [through exchange of opinions]. When you speak about what are concrete examples of cooperation, these [issues covered by the EU-Japan Joint Statement of 2006 Summit] are all through the strengthening of dialogue, exchange of views that we are finding in various areas. A kind of result, which you may not say that this is ‘a typical example’ of EU-Japanese cooperation, but the results are there in such a way.\(^4\)

It is paradoxical that the ‘lack of problem[s]’ actually creates a problem. In other words, the EU-Japan security dialogue lacks visibility because the parties have no problems among themselves. This is why Reiterer (2006) proposed tackling some of the common foreign policy areas coherently and systematically to make ‘the importance and relevance of the bilateral relationship more visible’. However, he found a problem that Japan has not yet defined a coherent policy in relation to the EU above and beyond its well-established relationships with the individual member states. There remains a certain suspicion of the EU’s actual power to act in a single voice in the world. Therefore, Japanese diplomacy still prefers the bilateral approach to EU member states in its policies towards Europe.

Apart from the visibility problem, there is also the problem of bureaucracy on both sides, which hinders initiatives and ideas. I
discovered this during my internship at the EC Delegation in Tokyo when I understood that there is rarely much strategic vision, enthusiasm and desire to improve anything regarding EU-Japan relations. On the whole, for those who implement concrete tasks, EU-Japan relations remain a kind of everyday routine and are not connected to anything that researchers and scholars would consider significant or of strategic importance. I assume that the same situation exists in the Mission of Japan to the EU in Brussels. My short visit to the Mission left me with the impression that the Japanese are not particularly enthusiastic about their relations with the EU. Obviously, bureaucracy hinders the development of all relations, not exclusively the EU-Japanese ones. Yet, it is a major factor that makes the EU-Japanese dialogue have a ‘reactive’ rather than ‘preventive’, future-oriented perspective. In other words, Japan and the EU have been developing and expanding their dialogue as a reaction to global changes. However, perhaps with the exception of the environment, the dialogue does not anticipate or prevent objectionable changes, which is a great disadvantage.

When personnel produce reports, they tend not to mention the cooperation between the EU and Japan, which makes the security dialogue and general relations even less visible. Thus, neither Japan nor the EU includes their shared activities in their respective reports, although the cooperation is, in fact, taking place. For instance, in its reports, the EU mentions cooperation on Afghanistan with the US, although the EU and Japan are also actively cooperating in Afghanistan.

Thus, invisibility, the ‘lack of a problem’ between the EU and Japan, and bureaucratic inertia hinder the development of the EU-Japan security dialogue that looks less efficient though, in fact, it has deepened and widened.

Further Development of the Dialogue: Issues to Be Addressed

The EU has been attempting for a long time to improve relations with Japan to levels similar to the US-Japan alliance. This objective is described by Reiterer (2006) as ‘a broadening of its [Japanese] foreign policy beyond the important alliance with the US to include the EU will increase the country’s room of manoeuvre. Japanese politics started to recognise the global importance of the EU only recently, and recognition is still not widespread, there is room for improving the relationship’. In any relationship there is always room for improvement. However, with regard to the US and the EU’s roles in Japanese foreign policy, we would like to offer several observations.

The first one is Japan’s vision of the EU’s role. A Japanese diplomat characterised it as follows:
Everybody recognises the US is really capable to do something in the world in terms of stability. Europe is not prepared for any international security role. In that sense Europe is a kind of regional power. It is the same thing for Japan. It has some kind of regional existence... Therefore, they are trying to do what ever they are able to do. In that sense, we [EU and Japan] are interested in any important issue... Terrorism, avian flu...

In other words, Japan does not perceive the EU as a power that will replace the US in military security issues. We agree; it is especially true in East Asia, where the EU has little to offer in military security terms. In that sense, the Japanese observation also proves our analysis that the areas and the subjects of the EU-Japan security dialogue vary depending upon the global situation and the development of the dialogue itself. However, we would argue that the European desire for ‘inclusion’ on a level equal to that of the US in Japanese calculations cannot be made nowadays. Japan has for many years elaborated its own security identity, which assumes the ‘civilian’ and comprehensive nature of its security conceptualisation, and Japan uses it to construct relations with actors other than the US.

Second, the EU’s foreign and security policies are still being elaborated. Moreover, the EU is not built on the same premises as the US. Even if one thought that Europe had military parity with the US, it is clear that Europe would use this power differently. Although institutional improvements on the European side in executing an EU foreign policy could empower its military component, it is obvious that the EU cannot provide Japan with the same security guarantees as the US does. At the same time, the EU recognises the Japanese right to modify its Constitution and that it wants to see Japan become a ‘normal’ power.

Finally, unlike the US, Europe and Japan have similarities, including their ‘civilian power’ conceptualisations, and both of them stress the importance of multilateralism. In this respect, Solana observed,

We Europeans and Japanese think alike on many security issues. We can both be proud of how we work together bilaterally and multilaterally, to tackle common challenges and improve the way our world works. But our starting point in terms of regional security is very different. Too often we forget this. I do not want to be too gloomy. One of the positive benefits of the last few years has been a renewed belief and emphasis on multilateralism. This is a good thing. Our challenge is then to ensure that multilateralism delivers effective solutions. That it is a way of galvanising people and countries into action, not a way to escape responsibilities...
and always move at the pace of the slowest in every case (Solana 2006; emphasis added).

Furthermore, as we have argued, Japan and the EU have their own agendas, and it is not appropriate to compare them to Japan-US arrangements. This was also demonstrated in 2006 at the EU-Japan summit when Barroso (2006) acknowledged, ‘[w]e [Europe and Japan] both look for ways to develop our roles on the world stage, by using our considerable “soft power.”’ Actually, we note that we consider the EU and Japan ‘civilian powers’, which implies that EU-Japan relations exist without a pure military component, unlike the Japan-US alliance.

We would also like to suggest additional measures that may alleviate the problem of invisibility without challenging the US-Japan alliance. We name three areas in this regard: first, the strategic dialogue on East Asia launched in 2005 can be an arrangement that would make the EU-Japan security dialogue more visible. Second is the strategic dialogue on Central Asia in which Japan and the EU have found common interest and are eager to cooperate. Third is missile defence, and the Iran and North Korean issues. Missile defence is especially important to the EU, and although it looks unlikely these days, ‘one day Japan and Europe may create a shield against missiles’.\(^45\) The last but not least important issue is energy security. Japan and the EU are quite dependent on external resources, and both of them are eager to cooperate. Assuming the development of the security dialogue in these concrete cases, we anticipate a further deepening and reinforcing of the security dialogue.

We conclude that in the early years of the 21st century the security dialogue has articulated various issues that are directly linked to security matters and are revealed in how the EU-Japan security dialogue has been enlarging and deepening.\(^46\)
Part Two

Common Interests in the EU-Japan Security Dialogue: Analysis of Joint Activities
The discourse analysis in part one demonstrated that the EU (then the European Community) and Japan established cooperation in the area of the environment in the late 1970s. Moreover, examination of the security conceptualisations of the EU and Japan in the Cold War period revealed that at that time both Europe and Japan were already concerned with environmental issues and included them in their security agendas (see chapter 1).

This chapter will focus on an examination of the EU and Japan joint performance on environmental issues. It will discuss what Japan and Europe have been doing jointly. We argue that there is a EU-Japan security dialogue on environmental issues that has been developing gradually and that is being reinforced and widened. To support this assertion, we will first analyse their initial cooperation efforts on environmental issues. Thus, we will reveal the driving forces and reasons for this cooperation and the significance of The Hague Declaration for the EU-Japan security dialogue on the environment. Moreover, we will trace the participation of both actors at the Rio Summit.

Second, we will analyse the development of their cooperation from the mid-1990s until the middle of the first decade of the 21st century. Here we will discuss the joint activities of Europe and Japan during their preparations for and conduct at the Kyoto Summit. We will also examine EU and Japanese endeavours to have the Kyoto Protocol ratified in a timely manner. We will also examine ‘An Action Plan’ and its significance for the dialogue. Finally, we will describe the current situation with regard to the security dialogue on environmental issues. In conclusion, as environmental cooperation is particularly important for the future of the planet, we will make some predictions with regard to the dialogue.

One more point should be mentioned here. It concerns the resources and literature related to the EU-Japan partnership on environmental issues. This chapter is chiefly based on bilateral documents and respective official sources from both Japanese and European sides. Regarding academic works, Julie Gilson’s monograph *Japan and the European*
Union: A Partnership for Twenty-First Century? mentions that ‘the area of environmental cooperation is of particular importance for the development of Japan-EU relations in the twenty-first century, incorporating as it does elements of both economic and non-economic concerns’ (Gilson 2000: 107). Perhaps there are other scholarly works on this topic, but unfortunately, at the time of writing this book, they were not known to me.

4.1 Comprehensive Agenda in the Early Stage of Cooperation


Japan is vulnerable to natural disasters and has thus been interested in disaster prevention and relief as a part of its security policy in East Asia for a long time. Since the early 1980s, it has identified natural disasters as an element of its comprehensive security policy. In the post-Cold War era, Japan has continued to suffer from floods, landslides, volcanic activity, tidal waves and earthquakes (Hughes 2004: 226). The MOFA identifies environmental destruction as a human security issue, arguing in the Diplomatic Book that ‘global environmental problems have emerged as potential threats to the existence of all humanity’ and that ‘the advancement of environmental diplomacy has increased the number of voices calling for new approaches such as emphasising the life and health of individual human being from the perspective of human security’ (MOFA 2002a: 134).

While for Japan environmental matters have been a component of comprehensive security, in Europe, unlike the case regarding economics, environmental matters were almost entirely absent from considerations (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 89). In the EC, the initial thrust of environmental policies was to remove trade distortions from different national standards and policies, although measures were also introduced with the sole purpose of promoting the conservation of the environment. These activities had been launched in the 1970s, and in the 1980s they became the subject of international and even ‘high’ politics. By and large it was a reaction based on scientific understanding and public awareness of the gravity of transboundary environmental impacts.

Since that time, when Japan had elaborated comprehensive security doctrine and Europe was claimed as a ‘civilian power’ in the 1970s, the environment became one of the first areas of security dialogue between the EC and Japan. Officially, dialogue and cooperation were initiated in 1977 by an exchange of letters (European Commission 1995: 29). Since then they have consulted each other on environmental issues. In the
late 1980s the dialogue on environmental security matters was pursued more actively due to several catastrophes, especially the nuclear disaster which happened in April 1986 in Chernobyl (Ukraine). Furthermore, in 1988 the European Council adopted a Declaration on the Environment that was referring to the Single European Act (SEA), which enunciated the goals of the environmental protection policy and gave coherence to the European Community activities addressing environmental issues. The declaration stated that the EC and member states were determined to play a leading role in taking the actions needed to protect the world’s environment (European Council 1988). Japan was also pursuing an active policy in this area. This resulted in the EC-Japan talks in 1989 on environmental matters along with energy issues to determine the possibilities for cooperation or coordination (European Commission 1989c). A year later, in 1990, high-level consultations at the Director-General level had been initiated (European Commission 1995: 29).

The Hague Declaration of 1991 explicitly identified the environment as an area in which cooperation should be developed. It envisaged joint efforts of the EC and Japan on tackling environmental issues. Immediately after the signing of the declaration in January 1992 there was the first high-level meeting to explore on which environmental issues the cooperation could take place and how this could be achieved. As result, three potential areas for cooperation were identified:

1. bilateral cooperation between Japan and the EC, in areas such as tropical forest conservation, acid rain and global warming;
2. international environmental activities, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) Earth Summit;
3. information exchange in such areas as waste management, classification of dangerous chemicals and the use of economic instruments in the environment (European Commission 1992b).

Thus, in general, The Hague Declaration stipulated three areas in which Japan and Europe could cooperate on the basis of a common interest. The reason why joint projects concerning the environment began much sooner than those in other sectors may be attributed to a number of factors including: first, there has always been a shared interest to preserve the global environment. Acid rain, global warming, and deforestation are global issues that threaten to ruin the global environment. In this view, environmental problems were no longer ‘low politics’ issues since they potentially threaten EU and Japanese economic and political interests. Moreover, no highly sophisticated ‘hard power’ technology was able to solve the problem.

Second, cooperation in this area can be regarded as an issue that stems from the EU and Japanese ‘civilian’ approaches to security. We
are not going to develop this argument further here because it was discussed in the respective chapters of part 1.

Finally, in the early 1990s the environment proved to be an area in which Japan and Europe could cooperate without touching on the conflicts that separated them in the economic area. In this way it was free of conflicts, with an impetus to cooperate. Moreover, potentially their involvements in projects gradually improved the overall relations.

To summarise, since the initiation of the cooperation on the environment in 1977, Japan and the EU had been engaged in the exchange of opinions, and the search for a common agenda resulted in a number of concrete projects in which both of them had been engaged since the early 1990s. These projects concerned global warming, forest conservation, acid rain, waste management, and deforestation. An awareness of the threat of global warming and a civilian approach to security led to the establishment of a dialogue and to a desirability of expanding the bilateral agenda to offset a severe confrontation in trade. The Hague Declaration stipulates three concrete areas, notably cooperation on bilateral and multilateral levels as well as an exchange of opinions on various topics related to the environment such as waste management, acid rain, global warming, deforestation, etc.

Deepening the Security Dialogue at the Multilateral and Bilateral Levels, 1992 Rio Summit and Its Aftermath

Shortly after The Hague Declaration, in January 1992 the first high-level consultations helped identify more specific areas of cooperation. On global issues, such as the environment and development, climate change and biodiversity, the EC and Japan’s positions were often close and, as the Commission observed, ‘it would be of advantage to coordinate them’ (European Commission 1992e: 12-13). They also reached an agreement that high-level meetings on environmental cooperation should take place annually (European Commission 1992b).

Japan and the EU undertook joint activities on problems such as acid rain and emissions of CO₂, and other greenhouse gases, and in programs on the ground such as those concerning tropical forests in Brazil and Sarawak (European Commission 1992e: 13; emphasis in the original). The parties also agreed to exchange information on various issues and to coordinate positions on global issues and participate jointly in specific programs and projects on the ground including: the use of economic and fiscal instruments, waste management, the classification of dangerous chemicals, the regulation of biotechnology and the environmental situation in Central and Eastern Europe (European Commission 1992: 10). Moreover, the actors also agreed to hold a joint workshop on emissions of CO₂, and other greenhouse gases (2nd EC-Japan Summit
1992). The EC recognised the need for deeper levels of cooperation in areas related to the environment (European Commission 1993a).

These experiences paved the way for the bilateral agreement within the UN forum, including cooperation during the UNCED, otherwise known as the Rio Summit of 1992, which was also mentioned in The Hague Declaration. In preparation for UNCED, Japanese and EC officials participated in various forums to discuss plans for the conference. They jointly supported the influential report, which provided contemporary discussion of environmental policy in the UN and the Rio Summit, namely *Our Common Future*. This report was presented to the UN General Assembly in 1987, following the Brundtland Commission’s four-year study (Smith 2005: 76-98), and it was particularly important in introducing the explicit link between environmental issues and economic development, now known as sustainable development.

Along with the above, representatives of both Japan and the EC and its member states took part in the inter-governmental negotiating committee in the UN General Assembly for the preparation of the climate convention and for UNCED itself. At the actual summit, representatives of the EC not only played an important role in the general discussion sessions but also participated in the summit attended by heads of state and government (Gilson 2000: 153). The Rio Summit established the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which later incorporated the Kyoto Protocol. The meeting also resulted in the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, the opening of the Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity, as well as statements on Forests and Desertification. Japan and the EC continued to collaborate on the implementation of these global conventions after the Rio Summit (European Commission 1995: 29).

In the early 1990s the environment was an area where the EU and Japan had been actively engaged in various projects both at the bilateral and multilateral levels, to name a few: tropical forest conservation, acid rain, global warming, biodiversity, waste management, the classification of dangerous chemicals. This agenda shows that the security dialogue on environmental issues was already both expanding and deepening. At the multilateral level, the EU and Japan were actively cooperating in preparation for the Rio Summit of 1992. Moreover, after the summit they continued to collaborate on the implementation of its decisions.

These developments took place despite economic and trade frictions which, at that time, dominated the EU-Japan relationship. Therefore, we can state that the environment in particular and the EU-Japan security dialogue in general had been developing along similar paths with their economic relationship, and having a positive influence on the latter.
4.2 The Kyoto Protocol and the Post-Kyoto Agenda: The Environmental Security Dialogue from the Mid-1990s to the Mid-2000s

Kyoto Protocol and Endeavours to Accelerate Its Ratification

By the mid-1990s, the environment had become ‘one of the foremost topics in the EU-Japan environmental dialogue’ (European Commission 1995: 29). Established at the Rio Summit of 1992, the UNFCCC subsequently required amendments, and the EU and Japan worked jointly on this issue both at the multi- and bilateral levels in connection with their preparation for the next international meeting in Kyoto in December 1997, where the EU and Japan once again cooperated closely (6th EU-Japan Summit 1997a). Thus, the EU and Japan have been the most prominent advocates of the Kyoto Protocol, the goal of which is to lower overall emissions of six greenhouse gases – carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride, HFCs, and PFCs – calculated as an average over the five-year period of 2008-12. The targets range from 8% reductions for the EU to 6% for Japan. Without doubt, the Kyoto summit became a milestone of coherent environmental policy and the recognition of the importance of preserving the ecosystem.

Japan and the EU promoted the signing of the Kyoto Protocol no later than 2002. Thus, they increased the negotiations at the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 6) in November 2000 to address the unresolved issues. However, the COP 6 conference was unable to reach an agreement due to disputes between the EU, on the one hand (which favoured a tougher agreement), and the United States, Canada, Japan and Australia on the other (which wanted a weaker and more flexible agreement). Although the EU and Japanese positions differed on the agreement provisions, this did not hamper their dialogue and reciprocity. Hence, in 2001, the previous meeting (COP6bis) continued, at which the required decisions were finally adopted in Bonn. At COP6bis, the EU and other supporters of the tougher conditions agreed on a compromise, i.e. on increased use of carbon dioxide sinks. Japan and the EU ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002.

Unfortunately, despite Japanese and European efforts to have the Kyoto Protocol enacted in 2002, the international community was slow to act. In 2004, the EU and Japan confirmed their belief that climate change was one of the most serious environmental challenges facing the planet. They supported the UNFCCC and emphasised the important role of the Kyoto Protocol as the only existing global instrument to pursue the ultimate objective of dealing with global warming. By 2004, the Kyoto Protocol had been ratified by 122 countries, and Europe and Japan urged other countries that had not yet ratified it to do so. In this
regard, they welcomed the positive statement by President Putin that Russia would speed up the ratification process (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004b). The Kyoto Protocol went into effect on 16 February 2005.

It is difficult to say exactly which factors and whose efforts finally led to ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. However, one thing was certain: EU and Japanese efforts facilitated the ratification process. Moreover, both European and Japanese diplomats consider it a success for the benefit of all, which returns us to the human security agenda and the importance of coherent policies that, however economically unappealing in the short-term, are very beneficial in the long-term. Moreover, we can also argue that mutual understanding and the positive outcome of their cooperation during and after the Rio Summit influenced EU and Japanese decisions to further their partnership in this area.

**Engagement in Other Multilateral Activity: Sustainable Development and the ARGO Program**

As demonstrated above, after Kyoto, the EU and Japan continued to exchange information on all aspects of climate change. Other areas of discussion included car emissions, chemicals, biological diversity, waste management and recycling policies (European Commission 1999a). Policy coordination here flourished, especially considering the importance of the environment as a security issue both at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

Moreover, as a result of the growing importance of a clean environment and the development of the Kyoto Protocol ratification process, the EU and Japan introduced an environmental dimension into the WTO framework in 2000. In their joint statement on the WTO, they declared that economic development should take place within the context of environmental considerations (EU-Japan Ministerial Meeting 2000). This statement concerned the bilateral EU-Japan security dialogue and their relations with developing countries. They admitted that jointly and individually they would have to pay ‘due regard to non-trade concerns and other factors such as the sustainable use of exhaustible natural resources and environmental aspects’ (EU-Japan Ministerial Meeting 2000; 9th EU-Japan Summit 2000b).

At the same time, in 2000, Japan and the EU reaffirmed the importance of their mutual understanding on environmental issues and their intention to enhance the cooperative relationship through their High Level Consultations on the Environment and on Transport and expert meetings on specific issues. As mentioned above, the high-level consultations on the environment were initiated in 1992 after the signing of The Hague Declaration.
Furthermore, Europe and Japan had been involved in the ARGO program (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000a). ARGO is a multilateral project, which provides real-time ocean temperature and salinity measurements for use in climate and fisheries research. Because ARGO is multilateral, the Japanese and European teams within it do not have high visibility. However, there is no doubt that the results of this research activity will benefit the whole of humanity, which is the major objective of the EU-Japan security dialogue, i.e. the promotion of human security ‘for the benefit of all’ (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a; emphasis added).

In other words, along with pursuing ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU and Japan also initiated cooperation on sustainable development at both bilateral and multilateral levels. Moreover, they jointly participated in the ARGO program, which has both environmental and scientific value.

‘An Action Plan’ from 2001: Codification of Existing Projects

The next comprehensive document after The Hague Declaration of 1991 was ‘An Action Plan’, which acknowledged the need for more coherence within the EU and Japan security dialogue on the environment. The primary goal of the EU-Japan security dialogue on environmental issues was to achieve mutual support between the rules of the multilateral trading system and the objectives of multilateral environmental arrangements, as well as the broader conservation of the environment, including the sustainable use of natural resources (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). They listed four activities that could improve the dialogue.

First, Europe and Japan cooperated on ensuring the preparation and negotiation of the UN ‘Rio+10’ Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) of 2002. Thus, they jointly worked on elaborating a focused and goal-oriented agenda. Moreover, despite their ongoing discussions regarding the level of carbon dioxide emissions, the EU and Japan were major forces in the pursuit of the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and had been seeking ‘the effective participation of all countries’ (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).

Second, ‘An Action Plan’ proposed cooperation to increase effective implementation of all the relevant conventions on environmental issues adopted since the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development, and to address other global environmental issues through high-level consultations (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).

Third, the EU and Japan confirmed their willingness to continue their cooperation with developing countries, agreeing on three measures in this regard: first was to improve cooperation with developing countries within the UN Forum on Forests to establish effective mechanisms for the conservation of forests, as well as the development
and implementation of sustainable forest management practices. The second measure dealt with joint research on desertification with the affected countries, and implementation of effective and durable solutions under the UN Convention to combat desertification. The third concerned examining ways to combat illegal logging, including export control and improved procurement practices (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). These concrete activities manifested that the security dialogue had been deepening and expanding and, moreover, that it had encompassed third parties, i.e. developing countries.

The fourth activity in ‘An Action Plan’ echoed the EU-Japan joint WTO meeting statement in 2000 where they agreed on the need to coordinate sustainable development through trading practices, specifically those with developing countries. Furthermore, through enhanced bilateral efforts, Europe and Japan made plans to ‘explore [the] possibilities of equivalency between their respective approaches designed to encourage more sustainable production and consumption, and promote greater environmental awareness among producers and consumers’ (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). They also agreed to develop a dialogue to promote cooperation on ‘conformity assessment and mutual recognition of environmental standards’ (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). This point implies that the EU and Japan were intending to initiate a project concerning business awareness of environmental problems at a bilateral level. Moreover, present-day environmental regulations differ greatly from country to country and region to region, which causes clashes when environmental decisions need to be made at the international level. Therefore, the EU-Japan dialogue is a significant step toward avoiding disputes and improving coherence, and these undertakings stimulate the dialogue. As the environmental situation continues to deteriorate, we can expect that coherence between the EU and Japanese standards and assessments will provide more credibility for supporting efficient and prompt decisions.

‘An Action Plan’ specified and codified issues which had previously been pursued within the environment security dialogue. Thus, the environmental security agenda embraced a deepening and expanding level of cooperation on global warming initiated at the Rio Summit, to which sustainable development was later added.

After ‘An Action Plan’: Realisation of Projects and Widened Scope of Performance

In 2002, Europe and Japan coordinated their policies during the preparation and conduct of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (11th EU-Japan Summit 2002a). They decided to continue working on realisation of the Johannesburg Plan of
Implementation on Sustainable Development, particularly on such issues as:
- sustainable consumption and production patterns;
- energy for sustainable development;
- action to combat illegal logging and associated trade in forest products;
- reinforcing international environmental governance;
- sustainable management of water resources (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004b).

In Kyoto in March 2003, the Ministerial Conference of the Third World Water Forum adopted the Ministerial Declaration on water utilisation and announced the Portfolio of Water Action (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003b). Moreover, the EU supported the Japanese initiative that led to the UN General Assembly Resolution on the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development. The EU also collaborated with Japan and the international community to ensure a worthwhile contribution to the Decade (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004b).

In 2004, when it became clear that the Kyoto Protocol would be ratified, Europe and Japan decided to cooperate on the post-2012 framework. This framework implies establishment of a global action plan based on an international regime in which all countries participate in order to meet the objectives of the UNFCCC and to ensure the effectiveness of actions taken to address climate change (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004b). Although Japan and the EU were collaborating on the Kyoto Protocol ratification, Japan’s Ambassador to the EU, Kazuo Asakai, recognised that environmental policy was ‘often one of the key subjects of multilateral discussions in fora including the OECD or the WTO’ (Asakai 2004). Therefore, he requested that ‘Europe pay careful consideration to multilateral discussions so that the European measures would not contradict multilateral achievements’ (Asakai 2004). Nevertheless, on the occasion of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, he acknowledged that ‘Japan is determined to make its utmost efforts hand in hand with the EU and other countries, and to work together to meet this [global warming] challenge’ (Asakai 2005).

In 2005, both the EU and Japan agreed that their close cooperation had greatly contributed to ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, which represented ‘a major step forward in addressing global environmental and development challenges’ (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005a). At their 2005 summit, the EU and Japan confirmed their aim ‘to ensure the widest possible participation of countries in the Kyoto Protocol and, in the Post-2012 framework, to achieve an effective, cost-efficient and appropriate international response, in accordance with the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005a).

At the 2006 ministerial meeting in January, the EU and Japan agreed to advance their dialogue on cooperation with regard to the post-Kyoto Protocol framework. Both parties, recognising the importance of energy efficiency and energy security, also confirmed that they would deepen the dialogue on these issues (MOFA 2006b). Later, at the EU-Japan Summit in April 2006, Japan and the EU furthered their dialogue through the EU-Japanese High-Level Meeting on the Environment, where they exchanged views on climate change, sustainable consumption and production, and expressed their willingness to intensify cooperation in these areas. They emphasised the importance of the Plan of Implementation agreed to at the WSSD and the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development, and confirmed their interest in deepening their cooperation in the field of the environment, notably in the areas of natural resources management, including the G8-driven 3R initiative (Reduce, Reuse and Recycle), waste policies, illegal logging and biodiversity (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006a). At the April 2006 EU-Japan Summit, European Commission President Barroso stated, ‘[o]n the environment, climate change is a particularly pervasive threat. At a high-level consultation on the environment earlier this month we agreed jointly to devise concrete measures to act quickly to curb emissions and to work together to engage all emitters in an effective post-Kyoto global regime’ (Barroso 2006).

Europe and Japan emphasised the primary importance of pursuing the Montreal Action Plan towards establishing a post-2012 framework that would include the participation of all major emitters worldwide in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, including the US and major developing countries such as China and India. Japan and the EU intend to explore ways to substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and to cooperate on developing cost-efficient policy approaches, such as energy efficiency standards, sectoral approaches, and Kyoto mechanisms, in particular the future of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006a).

To summarise, the EU-Japanese security dialogue on the environment is developing gradually. Both sides presently cooperate on a range of issues, many of which are connected with the post-2012 or post-Kyoto process and environmental governance issues. It is important to add that they are also working to increase third-country participation in this process on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Japan and Europe had already coordinated their policies on sustainable development at the Johannesburg Summit of 2002. Moreover, they are engaged in projects on sustainable
development. Recent issues concerning clean water, energy, natural resources management, 3R (Reduce, Reuse and Recycle) have been explored, along with waste policies, illegal logging and biodiversity concerns. This demonstrates that the EU-Japan security dialogue is reinforcing and deepening, especially in areas of sustainable development and climate change, which, in turn, covers a variety of issues, such as natural resources and nature management, waste policies, deforestation. The accumulated experience of interactions between Europe and Japan makes cooperation more efficient and more successful, not only concerning environmental issues but in their overall security dialogue.
Part one demonstrated that, since the 1980s, science and technology as well as energy have frequently appeared on the EU-Japan agenda. Moreover, on the basis of our analysis of the European and Japanese security conceptualisations, we could argue that these areas, especially energy, have been incorporated into the security agenda. Japan, particularly, views science and technology as central to national power. Richard J. Samuels (1994) labels this entrenched Japanese mode of thinking and behaviour as ‘techno-nationalism’. Jean-Pierre Lehmann (1992: 132) also emphasises that the strategies of a number of European corporations with regard to Japan have increasingly been influenced by the recognition of its role as a technological powerhouse. In general, Europe thought that ‘Japanese technological know-how was on a par with anything from the industrialised world’ (cited in Ogura 2000: 171). This opinion continued to blossom over time. Some in Japan, however, believe that technology is actually a strong military deterrent (Wan 2001: 196).

We should also especially note that energy had been on the agenda since 1973, after the first oil crisis. However, energy is not just crude oil or gas, but an area of research. For example, Europe and Japan have been engaged in research on thermonuclear fusion since the beginning, which involves both energy and research activities. Thus, we place energy in the broader category of science and technology development issues.

This chapter will focus on an examination of concrete activities in the area of science and technology within the EU-Japan security dialogue since its establishment in the 1980s. It argues that the security dialogue in science and technology has a comprehensive agenda and, moreover, that it tends to enlarge and deepen, especially at the multilateral level. To demonstrate this, this chapter is organised into two parts.

The first part will discuss cooperation between Japan and Europe in science and technology since the launch of the dialogue through to the late 1990s. This will be covered in three sections: the first will examine the signing of the Agreement on Nuclear Safeguards Research and
Development and its implications for the security dialogue. The second will review the engagement of both sides in multilateral institutions and projects. The final section will study the establishment of the EU-Japan Forum, the initiation of academic exchange programs, and Japanese membership in the European Council for Nuclear Research (CERN) project.

The second part of this chapter will analyse the evolution of the security dialogue in the early 21st century. It is divided into three sections. The first reviews ‘An Action Plan’ and its significance for EU-Japan security dialogue in the area of science and technology. The second examines post-2001 activity and Japanese engagement in such projects as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), the Energy Charter Treaty, as well as the EU-Japan agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The third section analyses the present-day status of the dialogue.

5.1 The Launch and Development of the Security Dialogue in the Area of Science and Technology in the 1990s

The Launch of the Security Dialogue in Science and Technology: Signature of the Agreement on Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development

The first discussions regarding science and technology took place in the early 1980s with meetings in Brussels in May 1984 and Tokyo in November 1985. The Commission initiated a third meeting with Japanese Ministers in December 1986. The main issues discussed at the meeting were EC-Japan trade relations. However, science and technology matters were also discussed due to ‘an exchange of letters between Japan and the Community... [that] laid the foundations for scientific and technical cooperation on subjects of mutual interest’ (European Commission 1986b; European Commission 1987). Science and technology have thus been on the agenda since the establishment of ministerial meetings. The key areas for European Commission discussions with Japan involved thermonuclear fusion, biotechnology, new materials, and the exchange of young research workers (European Commission 1986a). The Commission negotiated a cooperation agreement with Japan on thermonuclear fusion research, which was concluded in 1989 (European Commission 1989a; European Commission 1987; European Commission 1988). They also discussed the prospects of cooperation on nuclear safeguards and environmental research (European Commission 1989a). The Commission also expressed interest in cooperation on fuel cells, and refining and trade in petroleum products (European Commission 1988; European Commission 1989b; European Commission 1989a).
In 1990, an ‘Agreement on Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development’ was signed between the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Euratom. The scope of nuclear safeguards within the framework of the Non-Proliferation and Euratom Treaties was taken into consideration, and Japanese laws and regulations were enacted in order ‘to provide the necessary assurances to the international community that nuclear materials used, processed and stored in nuclear facilities are applied for the peaceful development of nuclear energy worldwide’ (European Commission 1990c). In the context of the late 1980s, when the arms race and nuclear balance in the world were the hot topic, the conclusion of this agreement marked an important stage in the EU-Japan security dialogue.

The agreement between the EC and JAERI created a framework of cooperation for the development, testing, and exchange of information on specific safeguard techniques developed at the Joint Research Centre of the EC and at JAERI. The techniques included computerised modelling and simulation of material accountancy systems, optical surveillance and fibre sealing systems and multi-sensor monitoring systems. The European Commission acknowledged that technical cooperation involving advanced technology contributed ‘to the development of credible and technically sound safeguards at an acceptable cost’ (1990c). This assertion implies that the EU-Japanese cooperation also meant to promote both technology and cost-sharing for expensive technical collaborations.

Thus, it was evident that nuclear energy was one of the areas with a lot of potential for mutually beneficial research. Moreover, they, both as consumers and importers of energy, shared an interest in the rational use of energy and the development of renewable resources. In this respect the development and utilisation of new, innovative technologies generated by joint collaborative initiatives was considered an additional area of cooperation. As we discussed in chapter 1, Japan proposed joint energy programs immediately after the 1973 oil crisis, although the EC did not seem very interested at that time, and so this proposal had to wait until the early 1990s, when the international situation had changed sufficiently.

According to the data, the EU-Japan security dialogue in science and technology was launched at the conclusion of the Agreement on Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development. The signing of this agreement had direct implications on security with regard to the peaceful use, and control over the use, of nuclear fuels. Moreover, it created a framework of cooperation for the development, testing, and exchange of information on specific safeguard techniques, and it also envisaged cost sharing of expensive technologies. But we also need to mention other areas in which cooperation had started successfully: biotechnology, new materials, and the exchange of young researchers.
Dialogue within the Multilateral Frameworks: the Human Frontier Science Program, Research on Thermonuclear Fusion, the Program on Intelligent Manufacturing Systems, and the International Science and Technology Centre

The Hague Declaration of 1991 stated that the EC and Japan should reinforce cooperation and, where appropriate, promote joint projects ‘in the field of science and technology with a view on contributing to [the] promotion of scientific knowledge, which is essential for the future prosperity of all mankind’ (Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Community and its Member States and Japan 1991). Cooperation ‘for the future prosperity of all mankind’ would also be included in the basic EU-Japan ‘An Action Plan’ as a concept of cooperation ‘for the benefit of all’. At the same time, Europe and Japan based their cooperation on their common interests in pursuit of their economic growth and security for their citizens.

By early 1992, several joint projects were under way in the field of science and technology with ‘some positive outcome[s]’ (European Commission 1992c). These projects included the exchange of young scientists, the Human Frontier Science Program, Research on Thermonuclear Fusion, and the program on Intelligent Manufacturing System (IMS) (European Commission 1992c). Japan had already proposed several international projects that typically involved joint research in the private sector, governmental and academic laboratories in Europe, Japan and North America (European Commission 1992e: 12).

At the Venice Summit in 1987, Prime Minister Nakasone proposed a Human Frontier Science Program with the aim of promoting international cooperation on basic research, mainly on advanced biological functions, to elucidate the complex mechanisms of living organisms. The economic Summit partners and the Chairman of the European Community welcomed the initiative to encourage international collaboration in basic research.¹

The IMS program covered advanced manufacturing technology and was initially launched by Japan as ‘a truly trans-regional exercise’ (European Commission 1992e: 12). The importance of the IMS was its attempt to establish a model for trans-regional cooperation in an applications-oriented domain. Japan also launched and led a Real World Computing program that covered advanced computing and sought to involve foreign researchers and laboratories. Although the EC was in favour of these programs, it ‘defin[ed] with care the nature and organisation of its participation to ensure balanced advantages’ (European Commission 1992e: 12).

Moreover, Japan and the EC were already cooperating on another project. After the collapse of the USSR, the entire international scientific
community faced the threat of dispersing nuclear technologies and outflow of scientists from the former Soviet Union to potentially dangerous regions. To prevent this, the two took appropriate action; the EC and Japan worked jointly with the US and Russia to establish the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) near Moscow (2nd EC-Japan Summit 1992). Japan contributed US$ 20 million toward the establishment of this centre ‘to prevent the outflow of scientists and technical experts of the former Soviet Union related to weapons of mass destruction’ (MOFA 1992b). The centre was founded in March 1994. Its projects operated with support in the amount of circa US$ 34 million that was pledged in 1995. Cooperation between Japan, the US, the EU and Russia was also evident in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project.

To summarise, at the multilateral level, Japan and Europe were already engaged in the Human Frontier Science Program, the IMS program, the International Science and Technology Centre near Moscow and later the ITER. These facts demonstrate a close relationship between the development of science and technology and the security of mankind.

Establishment of the EU-Japan Forum, Initiation of Academic Exchange Programs, and Japan joins the CERN project

The year 1992 was a key year for the EC-Japan security dialogue in terms of science and technology. The European Parliament strove for ‘a strengthening of cooperation and the promotion of joint projects between the European Community and Japan in the field of science and technology for the benefit of the future prosperity of the whole of mankind’ (European Parliament 1992). Moreover, Parliament explicitly declared that ‘the development of technology and its impact on society have a profound influence on political relations between the EC, Japan and the USA’ (European Parliament 1992). Thus, science and technology not only constituted ‘a key factor in the EC-Japan relations, but it also embodied important and representative aspects of the European and Japanese cultural models, forming an ideal ground for developing awareness and assessing the consequences of such models on their relationship, with a view to specific cooperation measures’ (European Parliament 1992; emphasis added).

For its part, at that time, the EC did not have a formal channel to handle science and technology cooperation with Japan and had to proceed on a case-by-case basis, an approach that clearly had its limitations. Therefore, discussions were also proceeding on the establishment of an EU-Japan dialogue on science and technology that had been proposed by the European Parliament (European Parliament 1992; 2nd EC-Japan
Summit 1992). Thus, the New European Commission Guidelines for Relations with Japan stated that ‘the Community is currently studying, with support from the European Parliament, a Japanese proposal for a forum in which to consider major issues of cooperation in science and technology’ (European Commission 1992e: 12; emphasis in the original). Regular contacts were also maintained in the telecommunications and information technology sectors. Moreover, there were also talks about the promotion of energy related technologies (European Commission 1992c; European Commission 1993a).

In the end, after comparatively brief discussions, Japan and the EU agreed to establish a forum on science and technology in January 1993 at the ministerial meeting. This forum was seen as a body in which policies could be discussed and coordinated, and where ongoing bilateral projects could be reviewed. This decision was confirmed in the summer of 1993 via an exchange of official letters between the Commission and Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (European Commission 1995: 27). The brochure ‘EU-Japan: Global Partnership for the Twenty-First Century’ noted the fact that an EU-Japan science and technology forum had also initiated cooperation in a related field (European Commission 1998-1999: 6). However, pursuant to our analytical framework, it started in 1990.

Europe was already interested in Japanese allocations for science and technology in the early 1990s. Traditionally, science and technology in Japan have been dominated by research for industrial application. By contrast, basic research tends to occur on a much smaller scale. This approach, together with the concept of what is precompetitive, is still being carefully considered in the debate on the redirection of research policy in Europe, where basic research plays a major role. The EU regards this area as an important field of dialogue and cooperation. In its turn, Japan has also revealed a growing interest in basic research. In this regard, as the EC acknowledged, the challenge was ‘to identify the areas where collaboration was in its interests and to ensure that benefits flow in both directions to an adequate extent’ (European Commission 1992e: 11; emphasis in the original).

As a result of these agreements, the first Science and Technology Meeting took place in 1994 at the ministerial level. As an aside, the visit by the Commissioner on Science and Technology Ruberti gave new impetus to the dialogue between the Commission and various Japanese institutions. Moreover, these meetings initiated academic exchange programs between Japan and the EU and also provided a way to review their ongoing bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The Commission established a Science and Technology Fellowship Program in Japan, and Japan established a similar program in Europe. The Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science was also introduced as part of the
Japan-EC dialogue on science and technology (European Commission 1995: 27). In June 1994 the first EU-Japan forum on science and technology was held in Tokyo to discuss specific ways to further science and technology cooperation in the future. The forum compared the research and development systems in Japan and Europe and actively discussed related areas. One of the decisions to come out of the discussions was the convening of a EU-Japanese Human Resources Seminar in December 1994. The second EU-Japan forum on science and technology was held in Ispra (Italy) in July 1996. Discussions focused on the status and future directions of research and development systems and on cooperation on seismic research (anti-seismic structures) and related topics (MOFA 2004a).

Moreover, Japan also made a financial contribution to the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN) for the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) project (4th EU-Japan Summit 1995). The field for the peaceful use of nuclear energy including nuclear research and development at that time was an area where the EU and Japan had pursued cooperation. Moreover, they also intended to expand and develop this cooperation in other nuclear areas (6th EU-Japan Summit 1997a).

As their relationship on science and technology developed, the EU and Japan began to cooperate in information technology, multimedia networks, and global navigation satellite systems (European Commission 1999a). By the end of the 1990s, cooperation had evolved smoothly and discussions began about signing a Science and Technology Agreement that would facilitate the initiation of joint projects (European Commission 1999a). The field of nuclear energy had been most vigorously promoted in these initiatives and projects. Thus, in 1999, Euratom and Japan initiated negotiations to conclude an agreement on cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This agreement was to facilitate long-term cooperative arrangements in the field of peaceful and non-explosive uses of nuclear energy in an orderly and practical manner, taking into account the needs of their respective nuclear energy programs (European Commission 1999a). We will discuss this issue further in the next section.

To summarise, the EU-Japan security dialogue reinforced and expanded through the initiation of the EU-Japan Forum on Science and technology, academic exchange programs, as well as cooperation on the issues of information technology and multimedia networks, global navigation satellite systems, seismic research. Moreover, in the field of energy, Japan had joined the CERN project on nuclear energy use.

‘An Action Plan’: Global Tasks and Agenda

In 2000 the EU and Japan examined the results of their almost decade-long cooperation since the signing of The Hague Declaration and reconsidered their policies and relations. They evaluated the overall dialogue and re-examined the role of science and technology in their relationship. Thus, they explicitly stated that the area of science and technology played a major role in reinforcing the EU-Japan dialogue and cooperation ‘to meet global challenges of the future’ (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000a). If, in the mid-1990s, both considered it a key tool for the improvement of their bilateral dialogue (see above), by the early 21st century, their cooperation in science and technology began taking on a more strategic and securitised character.

In 2000, Japan and the EU held the fourth EU-Japanese Science and Technology Forum in Lisbon where three workshops were held to explore future cooperation on superconductor materials, high-speed communication networks and infectious disease. These initiatives allowed Japan and the EU to expand their cooperation in the field of science and technology.

In 2001, the EU and Japan recognised that the dialogue had achieved an ‘enhanced mutual understanding of policies and systems’ in ‘An Action Plan’ (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a), whereby both sides sought to expand the relationship, and they also discussed the ‘possibility of a framework agreement with a view to facilitating this cooperation’ (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). They divided their cooperation up into five areas: The first field concerned cooperation within multilateral structures where Japan and the EU had been actively involved, especially in relation to understanding the environment and the global ecosystem. The EU and Japan decided to deploy oceanic floats through the ARGO program, and to share the data (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).³ They promoted the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program (IODP)⁴ that, in 2003, started providing information on climate change and geodynamics. They also confirmed cooperation on new satellite-based approaches for the global monitoring of the environment and seismic research on the harmonisation of international seismic parameters, and on the evaluation of seismic risk (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). The initiation of all those new programs shows that security had indeed expanded and deepened.

The second field related to biotechnology. The EU and Japan considered biotechnology research to be a major new field offering great potential through academic and technological exchanges, the organisation of workshops and other activities that encouraged the development of
biotechnology in the private sector. They also cooperated through exchanges involving the industrial sector, capital providers, private laboratories and universities. Moreover, the EU and Japan welcomed private-sector activities and exchanges on bio-venture business among the industrial sector, private laboratories and universities (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). The EU and Japan also initiated numerous activities and workshops in the area of science and technology, especially in the fields of nano- and biotechnology. I had an opportunity to participate at an EU-Japanese Forum on Research, Technology and Innovation Cooperation among Industry, Government and Academia that was held in Kobe on 22 April 2006. Moreover, several scientists from the EU currently work in the Kobe Scientific Centre for Embryonic Stem (ES) Cell Research.\(^5\) Biotechnology research raised new challenges with regard to ethical issues. In this regard, Brussels and Tokyo encouraged a dialogue among intellectuals, scientists, and civil society at large on the entire range of bio-ethics issues (cloning, research on human ES cells, organ transplants, etc.) including safety-related issues. They agreed to exchange information between regulatory authorities on safety-related issues, including the implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.\(^6\)

The third field is related to the Human Frontier Science Program. The EU expressed its ongoing interest and involvement in the Japanese-inspired program, encouraged by the international scientific collaboration in basic research. By 2001, the EU and Japan had already started joint or coordinated research activities in the areas of nuclear fusion and nuclear materials and measurements.

The fourth field concerned specific areas in which, in order to implement all the above programs, the EU and Japan emphasised the importance of the organisation of symposia, workshops, and scientific meetings on:

- the life sciences (including biotechnology, infectious diseases, nanobiotechnology, risk assessment, and in vitro testing);
- materials (such as superconductivity materials, and new plasma engineering and surfacing techniques);
- space (satellite navigation);
- prospective studies, including technology (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).

This list introduces the new area of space and satellite navigation, which was incorporated into the agenda, further evidence that the security dialogue is expanding in the area of science and technology.

Finally, with regard to energy policies, European and Japanese efforts focused at the bilateral level, on an agreement, which provided a framework for stable long-term cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear
energy including nuclear trade, research and development (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). The EU and Japan took further steps to cooperate in activities that may help reduce energy demand. Moreover, they agreed to share information on efforts to increase the diversification of the energy supply, to develop sources of energy, which have less environmental impact than current ones, to encourage the efficient use of energy and to intensify a dialogue with oil- and gas-producing countries (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). Given the historical complexity and importance of energy matters for security (i.e. the oil crises in the 1970s and the more recent Russian-Ukraine gas conflicts), these initiatives suggest a high level of mutual trust, interest and understanding between the EU and Japan.

To conclude, ‘An Action Plan’ concretised the future areas of performance:
– cooperation within multilateral structures;
– biotechnology;
– the Human Frontier Program on basic research;
– the sciences such as the life sciences, materials, space and prospective studies;
– the issues in the energy sector.


In accordance with ‘An Action Plan’, Europe and Japan coordinated policies and cooperated at the 8th International Energy Forum in Osaka held in September 2002 as well as on other arrangements (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003b). They also cooperated within the framework of the International Energy Agency (IEA). Moreover, the EU and Japan held negotiations on Japan’s membership into the Energy Charter Treaty. The Energy Charter Treaty was initially recognised in the early 1990s as an EU-led project, which aimed to connect Eastern and Western Europe in terms of a secure energy supply. The roots of the Energy Charter date back to the early 1990s, to a political initiative launched in Europe when Cold War Russia and many of its neighbours discovered energy resources but needed considerable investments for their development, whilst Western Europe had a strategic interest in diversifying their energy supplies. Thus, there was a need to ensure that an acceptable foundation was established for developing energy cooperation between the states of the Eurasian continent. The fundamental aim of the Energy Charter Treaty was to reinforce the Rule of Law on energy issues by creating mutually agreed-upon ground rules to be observed by all of the involved participants, thus minimising the risks associated
with energy-related investments and trade. After two years of negotiations, Japan joined the Treaty in 2002 (MOFA 2002b; 11th EU-Japan Summit 2002a). It should be noted that the US serves as an observer to the Treaty. In 2004, the EU and Japan worked together on a successful outcome of the International Conference on Renewable Energy, hosted by Germany. Moreover, in January 2004, they drafted the text of the Japan-Euratom agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In December 2003 in Tokyo, the EU organised an Information Day on the ‘Galileo’ project and opportunities for Japanese participation in it. This occasion marked the commencement of an information and consultation exchange between authorities of satellite navigation systems including ‘Galileo’ (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004b).

In 2004, the EU-Japan Subcommittee Meeting recognised that Japan and Europe had been cooperating closely on international science and technology development projects such as the ISTC, CERN, and plans for a space station. There has also been ongoing cooperation on seismic research. Moreover, active exchanges between researchers were implemented in a number of programs (3rd Subcommittee Meeting 2004).

At the 2005 summit, the EU and Japan confirmed that they had made some progress in negotiations on conclusion of the Science and Technology Agreement and the Japan-Euratom Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005b), with the latter being signed in 2006 (MOFA 2006d). With regard to the ITER and international cooperation in the field of nuclear fusion, the EU and Japan welcomed the progress achieved among ITER’s partners, and particularly the constructive meeting between Minister Nakayama and Commissioner Potocnik on 12 April 2005 (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005a). The EU and Japan also decided to promote ‘energy efficiency in Asia, bearing in mind the impact on world supply and on the environment’ (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005a).

At the April 2006 summit, the EU and Japan both thought that energy markets were becoming more integrated and that energy security had emerged as an important element of foreign policy. They recalled that the improvement of energy efficiency and energy conservation contributes to both energy security and the mitigation of climate change. Faced with similar energy and environmental challenges, Japan and Europe focused their ongoing consultations on the security of energy supplies, renewable resources, and the research and development of new energy technologies, including those through multilateral fora such as the IEA and the G8 (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006a).

The statements and activities of Japan and Europe on energy demonstrate that it is being increasingly securitised, especially as a result of the situation in the Middle East, Iraq, and Russia’s tougher energy policy. Thus, the signing of the Japan-Euratom Agreement, initiated in
1999, looks particularly significant and important for the future. Barroso (2006) acknowledged, ‘we [Europe and Japan] need to focus on our citizens’ demand for secure and stable energy supplies. According to the International Energy Agency, energy demand will increase 50% by 2030... Both Japan and the EU are major importers of energy. We are cooperating well in the field of nuclear supplies’.

To summarise, since signing ‘An Action Plan’ in 2001, Japan has joined the Energy Charter Treaty, the EU and Japan have continued cooperating on energy fora and concluded an agreement between Japan and Euratom on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Europe and Japan have also been cooperating on the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC), the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN), and plans for a space station. There has also been ongoing cooperation on seismic research and exchange of scholars.

**The Current State of the Dialogue**

*Energy Security Dialogue*


In May 2006, the Japanese government announced a *New National Energy Strategy*, the main principles of which were:

– to maintain and further develop a state-of-the-art structure of energy demand and supply; and

– to reinforce international cooperation on both energy and the environment.

The ‘state-of-the-art’ supply and demand structure implies the improvement of energy efficiency, the diversification of energy sources, and technological innovation. International cooperation promotes an integrated approach towards energy and the environment through dialogue and cooperation within the IEA’s International Energy Forum (IEF).

Moreover, trade, transport and investment are all important issues for a stable energy supply, and the Energy Charter Treaty addresses all three of these issues. In November 2006, the EC and 51 member states of the Energy Charter Treaty elected the Japanese Ambassador to the EU as Chairperson of the Energy Charter Conference from January 2007 (Kawamura 2006).

Japan is ready to share with Europe its ‘clean coal technology’ and experiences in the importing of liquid natural gas (LNG). At the same time, it is interested to learn about the European experience with regard
to the liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets, introduction of non-fossil fuels, or bio-fuels, such as bio-ethanol and bio diesel fuel. These developments reveal that Japan and Europe are closely involved in the development of energy security cooperation in an effort to ease the threat of energy dependence.

**Science and Technology Agreement and Future Prospects**

Although the Japan-Euratom agreement was concluded in 2006 (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006a), the EU-Japan Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology, initiated in 1999, was signed in November 2009, but has yet enter into force (19th EU-Japan summit 2010).

The EU considers the Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology a key to the development of cooperation. The EU’s official view was articulated by Commission President Barroso (2006), who admitted, ‘[w]e [Europe and Japan] must cooperate more closely on research and technology. Both our economies will rely on knowledge in the future as the basis for wealth creation. Working together we can maximise our achievements and pool resources for more cost-effective approaches.’

Nonetheless, Japan views the Science and Technology Agreement in a different, symbolic light. Because of the loose nature of the coordination within the Japanese ministries, its implementation would have few practical implications. Its significance would be primarily political. However, if other institutions were to become involved and if there was a realisation of the necessity to conclude an agreement from the ‘top-down’, then the Science and Technology Agreement would have a practical meaning.

Hence, the practical value of the agreement would depend upon three factors. First, the case-by-case cooperation framework that now exists is stretched beyond its limits and clearly needs to be revised. We frequently mention the fact that science and technology are driving forces for security and further development. As former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi has noted,

> In the coming century there will be even more scientific and technological development, and it is clear that the use of information and technology will expand rapidly. Science and technology and the use of information technologies will provide the driving force for economic development and improvement in the lifestyle of our people in the future (Obuchi 1999a).

In this light, the second factor is that as the development of science and technology intensifies, Japan will come to realise that a new framework for cooperation with Europe is required. Moreover, there is another
factor that not many people are aware of, but it looms large in our future – a knowledge-based society. Alain-Marc Rieu’s research on Japan and the EU’s involvement in science and technology activities noted that:

Many people and nations in this world are fighting for survival and recognition, for borders and independence as well as established and lost hegemony. Because of their histories, Europe and Japan are reaching beyond these goals. They open a new page in the world history, the transition toward a Knowledge Society. They are designing a future based on advanced Research and Development in all aspects of society, human life, the environment and collective security. One would need to be blind not to see that increased collaborations is the only way to operate such a mutation [mutation of function, status and organisation of knowledge] and achieve these goals [knowledge society] (Rieu 2006: 41-42; emphasis added).

This statement offers an important idea with far-reaching consequences: that Japan and the EU will be prime movers in the world of research and that their mutual involvement will be ‘for the benefit of all’. Besides these three factors, we should also mention the ‘China factor’. Japan is aware that Europe will increasingly collaborate with China because China appears cooperative to the Europeans, and it would thus reconsider its opinions regarding the implementation of the agreement with the EU.

Japan was for a decade the largest provider of ODA in the world. In the early 21st century, it started cutting its assistance budget due to economic difficulties, and the US reassumed its top position. In 2005, the European Commission accounted for more than 8% of the world ODA and Japan’s contribution reached 11%. At the same time, the EU (European Commission and member states) granted US$ 65 billion of ODA, which accounted for 56% of the world ODA. The EU and Japan together accounted for around 67% of world development aid.

The European Commission and Japan have been involved in development policies since the late 1950s. Japan began to provide assistance in 1956 when it joined the Colombo plan, and the EC started to provide aid upon its inception in 1957. Nowadays both are global donors whose assistance has a global scale, but unfortunately despite their contributions the problems in the world have not disappeared.

Chapter 1 demonstrated that in the 1980s the European Community and Japan discussed joint financing of aid development projects. Since then, the necessity to coordinate and cooperate in the aid development area has been repeatedly stated at EU-Japan bilateral summits. Moreover, during the Cold War period Europe and Japan were already corresponding and developing comprehensive ‘civilian’ security conceptualisations in which the development aid component was considered a tool for providing human security ‘for the benefit of all’. They also share an interest in better cooperation in this area, especially since 9/11, inasmuch as poverty is linked to insecurity and thus increased possibilities of terrorism.

This chapter will thus focus on Japan and the EU’s concrete joint activities involving the distribution and management of development aid around the world. In other words, it will demonstrate what development aid activity areas the EU and Japan have been engaged in throughout the years since their earliest cooperation in the 1980s.

The chapter argues that there has been a security dialogue between the EU and Japan in development aid which, despite a lack of visibility, is expanding and diversifying. Moreover, because development aid is
commonly perceived as an economic tool to assist developing countries, we will demonstrate that the EU-Japan development aid dialogue has been securitised, in that it provides security for both Japanese and European societies. It is necessary to note that the word ‘securitisation’ implies the EU and Japan joint activities are aimed at preventing various threats to their societies, e.g., the Persian Gulf War that threatened to escalate and thus affect oil prices and hence the entire world economy and bird flu pandemics that threatened to undermine their economies and societies. We are thus not going to apply the model of securitisation analysis based on the discourse analysis proposed by Barry Buzan et al.\textsuperscript{1} We consider our approach to be rational insomuch as we base it on discourse analysis (see part 1), as a result of which we have established that development aid is part of the security dialogue. Within the framework of this study, this chapter treats development aid as a security issue. Moreover, even apart from the connection between development assistance and crisis management situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia (see chapter 7), this chapter demonstrates the security origins and character of the EU and Japan’s security dialogue on development policies.

To develop these arguments, this chapter is divided into three parts. First, we shall examine the initiation of cooperation between the EU and Japan and the process of securitisation of development aid in the 1980s and early 1990s. In doing so, we shall briefly analyse three projects – assistance to Central and Eastern European countries, the Persian Gulf War, and the former Soviet Union, in which the two actors were involved jointly. Second, we shall trace the security dialogue on development aid during the mid-1990s. This will demonstrate the widening agenda of EU-Japan cooperation in new regions. Finally, we shall study the evolution of EU-Japan cooperation from the late 1990s to 2006 and show how the security dialogue in development aid has been expanding and deepening.

This chapter traces the evolution of the EU-Japan development aid security dialogue since the establishment of their first contacts in the 1980s primarily through an examination of bilateral documents. With regard to scholarly works, the main focus is on the analysis of the EU development aid policy and its implications for Japan and vice versa.\textsuperscript{2} As far as I know, there has been no research done specifically on EU-Japan joint development aid policies and, moreover, specifically in the context of security.
6.1 Development Aid Securitisation, Japan’s ODA in Europe, End of the Persian Gulf War, Assistance to the Former USSR in the Early 1990s

Europe and Japan have longstanding traditions of providing development assistance. From the 1950s through the early 1990s, Europe concentrated more on Africa, while Japan’s ODA principally went to Asian countries. The origin and nature of their development aid had some similarities. Europe and Japan provided aid from the perspective of former colonial powers. After the decolonisation process, European aid was aimed partly at the control and limitation of the flow of people from Africa and other regions to Europe.

After World War Two, Japan did not have colonies. It provided aid and paid reparations through 1976. Since 1977, Japan has provided assistance to improve the quality of life in other Asian countries and, at the same time, to ensure that Japan continues to be perceived as a peaceful country, to pursue its economic interests, and to secure the import and export flows that are crucial for Japan’s survival. As its economic power grew, however, Japan faced increasing US expectations regarding aid. Washington urged Tokyo in the 1960s to support the US war in Vietnam by increasing its economic aid to non-communist countries in Asia, namely Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, and the countries involved in the Mekong River project (Orr Jr. 1988: 744-745 cited in Wan M. 2001: 28). Japanese characterised its growing aid to the region as an indication of support for the US. Moreover, Japan preferred not to use defence spending as its principal form of international contribution. A report to Japan’s Prime Minister by the Foreign Economic Policy Study Group in April 1980 suggested that, to meet international expectations on contributions, Japan need to focus on economics, diplomacy, culture, science, and technology rather than a ‘hasty expansion of direct military cooperation’ (Foreign Economic Policy Study Group of the Policy Research Council 1980: 54). As Susan Pharr noted, in the late 1970s, Japan used the concept of comprehensive security to legitimise the ‘substitution’ of development aid, strategic aid, and debt relief for defence spending (Pharr 1993: 243). Besides increasing the volume of development assistance, Japan offered ‘strategic aid’ to ‘countries bordering on areas of conflict’, such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Thailand, which were strategically important to the West in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Japan’s strategic aid was meant to support US strategic objectives (Inada 1989: 399-414; Yasutomo 1986). Therefore, as we can see, the Japanese approach to security was comprehensive and included economic tools to deal with security issues.
With the end of the Cold War, EU and Japanese development assistance became increasingly based on political and security priorities, which resulted in the prescriptive approach adopted by the EU and Japan on development. Japan’s ODA charters of 1992 and 2003 put security concerns ahead of the issue of extending development assistance. In the EU, the trend to securitise aid became especially obvious with the Cotonou Agreement of 2002 (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 136). However, as the analysis below will demonstrate, the European and Japanese development policies from the earliest stages had been aimed at securing their respective positions in the world.

At a multilateral level, Japanese and European cooperation in development dated back to March 1960, when Japan joined the Development Assistance Group (DAG), and in 1961, when the DAG was reorganised and became the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC), Japan joined it as a founding member. There was some opposition to Japan’s entry from European states, but the US successfully lobbied on Japan’s behalf.

On a bilateral level, cooperation on aid between the EC and Japan began in the 1980s in the form of the joint financing of a number of development projects (European Commission 1985). Aid development issues were also frequently on the agenda of the meetings and high-level consultations of the European Commission and Japanese ministers (European Commission 1986b; European Commission 1987). In 1987, the Commission expressed its wish ‘to extend cooperation with Japan in the development field’ (European Commission 1987). In 1990, they were supposed to hold ‘separate talks on development assistance to discuss concrete possibilities for cooperation or coordination’ (European Commission 1989c).

**Japanese Involvement in Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe Countries**

The end of the Cold War clearly revealed – out from the shadow of the global USSR-US rivalry and from a new perspective – the problems of poverty in developing countries. However, the first joint project between the EU and Japan concerned not Africa or Asia, but Europe. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, development aid was seen as an area in which cooperation was necessary to increase the availability of resources and efficiency of distribution (European Commission 1989a; European Commission 1989b; European Commission 1990a). The emergence of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries as democratised nations was accompanied by serious challenges to economic stability and security for Western Europe because of the lamentable state of their...
economy and political instability. Moreover, the region was fraught with a dramatic migration flow from CEE countries to the West. Therefore, immediate preventive measures were needed. Thus, Japan immediately got involved in the G24 (Group of 24)\(^4\) process to assist the newly democratised CEE countries by providing financial, management, training and technology support. Moreover, Japan initiated its participation as a shareholder\(^5\) in the establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the aim of which was to build market economies and democracies. This demonstrated that the development aid provided by the EU and Japan to the CEE states was connected to their security concerns and was required to secure a stable situation in Europe and, correspondingly, in the world. Japan provided assistance because it was deeply interested in preserving peace in Europe, inasmuch as a significant share of its trade and investments involved European countries. Moreover, the joint collaboration of Europe and Japan on this project illustrates the fact of cooperation and of the security dialogue between them, which aimed to tackle the problem of the integration of CEE countries into the world economy.

The Persian Gulf War in European and Japanese Development Policies

Both Japan and the EC responded immediately to the Persian Gulf War. In 1990, the EC made two offers of emergency aid to refugees totalling US$ 66 million and also pledged US$ 2 billion aid to Jordan, Turkey and Egypt to support their role in maintaining the UN sanctions against Iraq. Acting in parallel, Japan, ‘heavily dependent on Gulf oil and therefore on the willingness to secure the independence and competitive pricing of that oil... increased its pledge for economic assistance from $ 1 to $ 2 billion to the three Middle East countries and separate to another $ 2 billion coverage for the specific defence implications of the Gulf crisis’ (Andriessen 1990). Working in parallel, but coordinating their policies, Europe and Japan contributed to the end of the war. Consultations on development aid between Japan and the EC occurred in both 1991 and 1992 (European Commission 1992c). These examples show how development aid is applied for security needs and how both sides coordinated their activities.

The State of the Bilateral Security Dialogue on Development Assistance

At the bilateral level, as the European Commission acknowledged, ‘until 1991, relations with Japan in the development field hardly existed... [and] were re-launched, however, during President Delors’ visit to Japan in 1991 and by the [signing of] Joint Declaration’ (European Commission 1992e: 13). The EC wanted Japan to make ‘a greater contribution to the
international aid effort, so that a fair sharing of the financial burden was achieved’ (European Commission 1992e: 13). The EC also wanted Japan to devote more of its aid to the least developed countries (LDCs). Moreover, the Commission observed ‘a certain complementarity’ between the EC and Japan aid development policies (European Commission 1992e: 13; emphasis added). Thus, the Community had a strong and well-established presence in Africa, the Middle East and Central and South America, whereas Japan tended to concentrate on Asia (European Commission 1992e: 13). Therefore, they could have benefited from each other’s expertise, including possibly joint operations in South Africa. A series of meetings between the Commission and Japanese authorities addressing this issue began to find common ground between the two side’s policies. Moreover, a considerable degree of agreement had already emerged by 1992 between the EC and Japan that promised to lead to the reinforcement of collaborations in the future and could possibly result in more operational cooperation, possibly including co-financing (European Commission 1992e: 13). Thus, in the early 1990s, the EC reiterated the necessity to more fully share the financial burden and to reinforce coordination with Japan.

In 1992, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on relations with Japan in which it focused on the necessity of integrating the CEE countries’ economies into the world economy (European Parliament 1992). The Japanese contribution to this process, and its expertise were significant and critical, not only for the G-24 process, but for a whole range of other multilateral projects. In other words, the EU and Japan within their security dialogue and despite intense trade conflicts made an attempt to coordinate their distribution of their development aid resources, which was a significant achievement. It also illustrates that the EU and Japan were interested in not overlapping in the pursuit of their respective agendas. In the area of co-financing there had not been any purely bilateral projects, nevertheless, there had been some co-financing within international, multilateral institutions. Moreover, regarding the question of complex, multilayered issues, such as, for example, stabilisation of the situation in CEE countries, the multilateral level was more appropriate for the EU-Japan security dialogue because the projects there met their common security concerns and simultaneously allowed them to avoid talks on trade.

**Assistance to the Former Soviet Union**

The EC and Japan were also working closely to assist the reform efforts of the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union (2nd EC-Japan Summit 1992). After the emergence of the newly democratised CEE countries in 1991, the world witnessed another big challenge
to its order. The collapse of the USSR introduced shifts and instability into the world order. The former republics were experiencing an economic recession, and most of them lacked any experience in conducting foreign policy. More importantly, most of the NIS possessed significant remains of the Soviet Union’s diversified military complex, which were practically uncontrollable. For instance, after the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine – as an independent state – possessed the third largest nuclear weapons arsenal in the world (after the US and Russia), and its army numbered approximately one million troops. These circumstances signalled an urgent need for comprehensive measures, of which development policy aid was one of the most essential tools. Thus, within a month after the collapse of the USSR, in January 1992, the US hosted a conference in Washington on assistance to NIS. It established five working groups on technical assistance, medical supplies, food, energy and shelter, on which coordination assistance among donors had already started. Moreover, the EU, from the first days after the collapse, provided consultation assistance on democratisation and conducting foreign policy. Shortly thereafter, in May 1992, the EC hosted a conference in Lisbon, and in October 1992, Japan hosted a conference in Tokyo on assistance to the NIS. As a result of these three conferences – significantly, in the US, Europe and Japan – it was agreed that aid coordination would be made for each individual country of the former USSR through a consultative group chaired by the World Bank. Consequently, in this way both the EC and Japan coordinated their activities through this multilateral structure. Japan began by providing technical assistance and emergency humanitarian aid to assist trade and economic activities (MOFA 1992b). The EC was also active in the democratisation of the NIS. While these were not purely bilateral measures, it is important to note four points: first, the trilateral coordination was not led or directed by the US but was conducted on a parity basis. Second, aid activities placed in a security context were from the beginning. Third, Japan and Europe coordinated their policy activities as major strategic partners. Fourth, by coordinating their aid policies in order to secure the international environment, the EU and Japan were acting within the framework of their bilateral security dialogue.

To summarise, cooperation in the development aid area began in the 1980s but was re-launched and given new impetus by the visit of EC President Delors and the signing of The Hague Declaration. As demonstrated above, the securitisation of development aid dates from the inception of EU-Japan involvement in joint projects. Thus, common activities undertaken in the development area by Europe and Japan on the integration of the CEE countries into world economy, on the end of the Persian Gulf War, and on assistance to the NIS countries demonstrate that both actors had been guided by security concerns in providing
assistance aid. They had coordinated their policies to avoid overlapping and to maintain efficiency. By early 1995, four bilateral meetings had been held at the Director-General level: in October 1991, July 1992, October 1993, and July 1994. The coordination took place at both multilateral and bilateral levels. Due to the scope of the above cases, the multilateral level was considered a more efficient forum for tackling these problems. Moreover, it should be emphasised that although there had been significant trade disputes between the EU and Japan at that time, these did not impede their ability to act on a global level as partners. These factors show that there was a dialogue in the area of security between the EU and Japan based on their mutual security considerations. The next part will further analyse its development.

6.2 Enlarging the Geography and Scope of Activity in the Mid-1990s: Food Security and Africa

By the mid-1990s, Japan and the EU were exchanging information on concrete humanitarian aid projects (6th EU-Japan Summit 1997a). There were also ongoing discussions on reinforcing their cooperation in the area of development. Within this context, they were anxious about the situation in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where they were willing to improve cooperation on food security policies, human resources development, capacity building and support to education and health policies (6th EU-Japan Summit 1997a). As will be demonstrated below, the African continent and particularly its sub-Saharan region had ceased to be exclusively under ‘European patronage’ and were also areas of Japanese concern. Thus, according to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) estimates, unless significant progress was made, there were going to be an estimated 680 million hungry people in the world by 2010, of them more than 250 million located in sub-Saharan Africa. These estimates, along with the need to renew the global commitment to eliminate hunger and malnutrition, and to achieve sustainable food security for all people, led to the organisation of the World Food Summit of November 1996 within the UN framework. In this context, the EU and Japan coordinated their activities in preparation for the Summit and in a way so that the food security area became an additional issue on their bilateral security agenda (5th EU-Japan Summit 1996). Romano Prodi, former President of the European Commission (1999-2004), chaired the World Food Summit of 1996, in his capacity as the President of the Council of Ministers of Italy, thus revealing that the aid development security dialogue was already extending its geographical scope of action to include not only Europe and the Middle East (the Persian Gulf War), but also Africa.
Moreover, it had also been extended in the sense of targeted tasks. Along with the economic, trade, and military assessments that had been the true motives for granting assistance in previous cases, cooperation on Africa served as an example of the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe based on one simple factor, i.e. the lack of food.

In 1997 the EU and Japan made a supposed ‘breakthrough’, deciding to focus their development assistance on the countries that were pursuing sound economic policies and political reforms within the framework of an integrated approach, which took into account the greatest development, economic and social needs (6th EU-Japan Summit 1997a). This technique was viewed as a necessary step to sustain efficiency. However, this shift in providing assistance to poor countries, through its linkage and subordination to political and economic reforms, was also subsumed within an increasingly insistent security discourse and the emergence of problems of a new type in the world. As Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler observed, EU development policies had an increasingly prescriptive approach, representing the intrusion of political and security priorities into development policies (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 136). Meanwhile, regarding Japan, it is sufficient to refer to the ODA charter, which states that ‘the objectives of Japan’s ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity’ (MOFA 2003b). A close connection of granting development assistance with a set of concrete reforms guarantees to the EU, Japan and other donors that developing countries will pursue policies that are considered beneficial by the donors. On the one hand, it is a guarantee for the donors that developing countries will move in directions appropriate to the donor, and on the other hand, it is both a challenge and guarantee that the developing countries will choose precisely that path. It is a challenge because they cannot choose any other way without losing their assistance, and there is a certain assurance that by choosing the donors’ way, they are guaranteed further assistance. We will discuss a similar problem in the Doha round of WTO below. Whilst Bretherton and Vogler argue that policies have a prescriptive approach, as this chapter demonstrates, they have a more obligatory nature due to Japan and the EU’s security concerns, and there is a more obvious connection between these security concerns and development aid as a tool for providing security.

Despite the ‘breakthrough’ arrangements of 1997, not much was done jointly at a bilateral level due to the Asian crisis and a slowdown in the Japanese economy. However, even under these severe conditions, Japan remained the largest state provider of ODA, despite its 10% cutback in 1998. In 1999, the EU again confirmed that, in the realm of development assistance to third countries, it was important for the EU
and Japan as leading donors to undertake concrete cooperation projects on the ground for the efficient and effective implementation of assistance to partner countries (European Commission 1999a). In this context, the EU welcomed the new Miyazawa initiative, also known as New Initiative to Overcome the Asian Currency Crisis, which was designed to enhance the Asian countries’ access to international markets (8th EU-Japan Summit 1999).

To summarise, in the comparatively short period of the mid-1990s, the EU-Japan development aid security dialogue witnessed the very important and obvious linkage between development policies and the political and security concerns of the donors, not only in their respective individual agendas, but also at the bilateral level. The EU-Japan security agenda was augmented by the food safety issue and related measures. Moreover, it should be noted that in the early 2000s, food safety issues also began to appear on the agenda in another area – science and technology – due to dramatic development of biotechnology and genetically modified food (see chapter 5). Moreover, Japan began getting involved in African development. All these developments indicate a widening of the EU-Japan security dialogue in development aid. The next section will demonstrate the further evolution of the EU-Japan security dialogue on development aid.

6.3 The Multiplied and Multilayered Agenda of Global Challenges in the Late 1990s-Mid-2000s

The MDGs and the EU-Japan Cooperation Plan

At the end of the 1990s, the EU and Japan finally admitted that they were regularly discussing and placing aid development issues on the agenda, but it had still not congealed into ‘concrete projects’ at a bilateral level. To this end, they agreed to cooperate closely to promote development and reduce poverty in the regions that lagged behind economically. In this regard, the EU and Japan emphasised the importance of aid policy dialogues to promote mutual understanding of aid practices and methods and to seek further steps for aid cooperation. To this end, in 2000, Japan was ready to send the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) staff to the European Commission, and both sides were discussing the details of this matter (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000a). There was an obvious need to finally launch ‘concrete projects’ on aid development at a bilateral level because there had been an active and ongoing engagement in multilateral projects. The formation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) also contributed to the facilitation of the decision to launch such a cooperation. Although it is hard to prove the direct influence of MDGs on the EU-Japan security
dialogue in the development area, it is nevertheless reasonable to suppose that there had been some connection between them.

Thus, in September 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted the Millennium Development Goals as a common ground for enhancing development policies within the international community. These goals are:

- eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;
- achieve universal primary education;
- promote gender equality and empower women;
- reduce child mortality;
- improve maternal health;
- combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases;
- ensure environmental sustainability;
- develop a global partnership for development.

Within the scope of goal eight on global partnership for development, it was envisaged to:

- Further develop an open trading and financial system which is rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory, and which includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction, both nationally and internationally;
- Address the least developed countries’ special needs. This includes tariff- and quota-free access for their exports; enhanced debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries; cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction;
- Address the special needs of landlocked and small island developing states;
- Deal comprehensively with developing countries’ debt problems through national and international measures to make debt sustainable in the long term;
- In cooperation with the developing countries, develop decent and productive work for youth;
- In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries;
- In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies – especially information and communications technologies (UN Millennium Project 2006).

Examination of the EU-Japan activities in development aid shows that they have been cooperating on multiple targets, to mention the most significant of them: rule-based, non-discriminatory trade and financial systems, tariff- and quota-free access for the LDCs as well as combating diseases. Thus, in order to cope with these problems by 2015, as set
forth in the ambitious MDGs, what is required is not only a bilateral, but, to a much greater extent, a multilateral approach, which obviously must include EU and Japan involvement, for example, in the Doha round of WTO talks and in attacking diseases. Moreover, along with the MDGs, the EU and Japan elaborated their own agenda, one dictated by world needs and by the experience and necessities that the two had gained from cooperating with each other. This agenda was articulated in ‘An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation’ of 2001.

In 2000, Japan was emphasising the importance of aid coordination between Europe and Japan. Japan has considered development policy as a conflict prevention tool ‘to eliminate causes of conflicts such as poverty and widening economic disparities among peoples, and to restore and build peace when conflicts end’ (Kono 2000). Moreover, a year later, Japan and the EU stated in ‘An Action Plan’,

closer cooperation is a true necessity. As global partners, accounting for a major share of world GDP, and the world’s largest donors of development assistance, we have a special responsibility to the global community. With this in mind, we will intensify our efforts to promote sustainable development and to reduce poverty, while striving to make our assistance more efficient and better directed to those most in need (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).

Moreover, Europe and Japan stated that their overall cooperation rests ‘on shared global responsibilities with a view to promoting human security for the benefit of all’ (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a; emphasis added). In this regard ‘An Action Plan’ contained five concrete steps of aid policy coordination between the EU and Japan (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). The first measure to be undertaken concerned coordination of Japanese and European policies in the preparation, implementation and monitoring of sector-wide approaches, as appropriate, in countries and sectors of mutual concern. Moreover, the EU and Japan decided to promote the exchange of information and cooperation in order ‘to cope with infectious and parasitic diseases, including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, poliomyelitis and malaria’ (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). This activity was the first kind of decision in the area connected with diseases in the EU-Japan security dialogue. It was initiated due to the threat of epidemics, of dangerous and non-treatable diseases and perhaps also by the MDGs on combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases. This inclusion demonstrates that aid activities in the security dialogue expanded to cover more areas. Thus, both sides began to be more actively involved and to cooperate in tackling pandemic problem especially after the outbreak of SARS in China in November 2002 and avian influenza in Korea in
December 2003. Moreover, that same year, the EU and Japan recognised the need to cooperate closely on the improvement of access to medicines in developing countries (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003a).

The second point was to conduct a joint comparison and assessment, when appropriate, of each other’s development policies and programs in order to increase effectiveness and improve monitoring. In this context, they planned to hold consultations at the expert level, organising joint seminars and symposia and dispatching joint assessment missions (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).

The third activity concerned the already initiated practice of the exchange of personnel between the JICA and the relevant institutions within the European Commission, including aid administration in EU member states (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). These exchanges were meant to improve the mutual understanding of policies and procedures between the EU and Japan.

The fourth matter of concern was joint cooperation in multilateral fora to increase the effectiveness of international financial institutions’ support for developing countries, in particular when the fight against poverty was concerned (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). This type of cooperation in multilateral institutions was neither new for the EU nor for Japan, but officially they recognised for the first time the necessity to make their policies coherent in those institutions. It shows their interest in deepening and intensifying the cooperation not only for their own benefit, but also for many other actors, ‘for the benefit of all’, which corresponds to the human security approach of both Japan and the EU.

Lastly, the fifth common point was cooperation on African development. Furthermore, the EU and Japan recognised the significance of each other’s policies in Africa. Since the late 1990s, the issue of Africa had been of special importance in the EU-Japan security dialogue as Japan’s engagement in African development had been growing with EU encouragement. All five concrete steps of ‘An Action Plan’ demonstrate that there has been mutual interest in further developing their dialogue.

In conclusion, ‘An Action Plan’ introduced a new area (combating diseases) and rearticulated support for previously initiated activities (coordination, joint comparison and assessment of projects, exchange of personnel, cooperation on multilateral institutions, African development) in their security dialogue on development assistance. ‘An Action Plan’ is less ambitious and less ambiguous than the MDGs, but owing to its moderation it seems more feasible to implement. The concrete measures on aid development newly introduced in the 2001 Action Plan were a needed step that while expanding the scope of activity – both at bi- and multilateral levels – also deepened it by introducing new
areas for cooperation. In other words, the activity articulated in ‘An Action Plan’ manifests the deepening and expanding scope of the EU and Japanese involvement in joint developmental projects both at the bilateral and multilateral level. As Paul Nielson, the European Commissioner responsible for Development and Humanitarian Aid, observed, ‘Japan is a key player in global development cooperation, and the EU wants very much to have a closer relationship, a closer dialogue with Japan in this field’ (Nielson 2001).

**African Development in the EU-Japan Security Dialogue**

The EU has traditionally been involved in African affairs because the majority of the EU member states were once colonial powers. However, within a decade, the situation with regard to their involvement in African affairs had dramatically changed. Thus, in 1992, the European Commission recognised ‘certain complementarity’ between the European and Japanese aid distributions, specifying that Asia was a traditional focus of Japanese ODA, whilst the EU targeted the ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) region. In 2001, the EU and Japan recognised the significance of each other’s policies in Africa (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). In other words, the EU acknowledged the active involvement of Japan in Africa.

Japanese began to actively pursue African activities in the early 1990s with the initiation of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process. It was well before the current international urge for African development, and it encompassed three basic objectives: to raise awareness of the African development issue; to promote a spirit of ownership of the development process and partnership in the international community; and to extend that partnership, especially through Asian-African cooperation. As a Japanese diplomat observed, ‘we can say that many Asian countries, in particular ASEAN, have been receiving aid for many years. Now these countries start to take off independently themselves. So, the focus will be on other regions... Africa.’ Thus, TICAD I, in which the EU participated, was held in October 1993 (MOFA 1993). In October 1998, Japan held TICAD II, in which the EU also participated. Moreover, it should be mentioned that the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) closely cooperates with Japan on various projects through TICAD. UNIDO implements projects funded by Japan to promote investment and technology promotion from Asian countries to African countries. It runs the Asia-Africa Investment and Technology Promotion Center, also known as the Hippaos Centre, in Malaysia. In 2003, UNIDO and the EU signed an agreement on cooperation entitled ‘Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA),’ which
facilitates the funding by the European Commission of UNIDO programs (United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 2003). This cooperation framework, in which Japan and the EU fund the UN programs, illustrates their mutual involvement in various international projects. Whereas this type of collaboration is not seen at the bilateral level, nevertheless this fact does not diminish their contribution or indicate a lack of cooperation.

In December 2001, the EU and Japan decided to cooperate on Africa on the basis of the guidelines of the Tokyo Agenda for Action adopted at TICAD II held in October 1998 and on the basis of the guidelines of Cotonou Agreement of June 2000 that was based on the discussions at the TICAD ministerial-level meeting of December 2001 and the Africa-EU Ministerial Conference. They intended to strengthen support for efforts by African regional organisations (including the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Southern African Development Community) and African countries to prevent and resolve conflicts in the region. In this context, the EU and Japan intended to closely cooperate to implement the G8 Initiatives for Conflict Prevention issued at Miyazaki in 2000 and Rome in 2001 (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). Needless to say, this concrete coordination of policies is a very important tool for ensuring that aid measures are effective as well as to avoid overlaps and secure or restore peace in Africa.

At the 2006 EU-Japan summit, leaders ‘stressed the importance of continuing and promoting aid policy dialogue between Japan and the EU’ (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006a). The EU recalled the significance of the EU’s new Africa Strategy and welcomed Japan’s role in TICAD. Both the EU and Japan have stated that they wish to cooperate more closely on African development and that they value each other’s efforts in this area.13

Proceeding from the above, we can conclude that Japan became an important partner for the EU in cooperation on African development. Their security dialogue was held at both bilateral and multilateral levels. Valuing each other’s efforts, they worked together towards the realisation of development policies. It also shows a growing mutual engagement and a diversification of the channels of cooperation, e.g. through TICAD, UNIDO, and other frameworks.

### Combating Pandemics

Apart from the development of an African component, the EU-Japan security dialogue has come to include other issues from a human security aspect. Thus, following ‘An Action Plan’ arrangements, in response to the outbreak of SARS at the end of 2002, the EU and Japan agreed to promote an exchange of information and cooperation to cope with this
disease (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003a). The practice shows that rapid initial responses, including at the grassroots level, have been a key to effective containment of avian and pandemic influenza. In this respect, Europe and Japan have continued cooperation to strengthen the global partnership based on, *inter alia*, the results of the Tokyo conference organised by Japan and World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Beijing International Pledging Conference on Avian and Human Influenza. Japan and the EU have fully supported the activities of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. They have also confirmed the importance of international responses such as reinforcing the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network and the voluntary early application of the revised International Health Regulations (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006a). The dialogue on Africa, along with the substantial funding they provide, European-Japanese coordination and cooperation to prevent pandemics take place in multilateral fora, and this widens their mutual involvement in developmental projects. This is reasonable because the spread of communicable diseases recognises no borders. Moreover, EU and Japan joint activity at the multilateral fora shows that they are working to enlarge frameworks for the security of all.

**Restoring Peace and Reconstructing Sri Lanka**

The EU and Japan have also been involved in the reconstruction process in Sri Lanka. With Norway providing mediation, the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) entered into a mutual ceasefire agreement in 2002. The EU and Japan discussed the situation in Sri Lanka and the EU welcomed Japan’s initiative to consolidate peace there. Thus, the EU and Japan, along with Norway and the US, co-chaired the Tokyo Conference on the Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka in June 2003. At the conference, they agreed to provide US$ 4.5 billion aid during the period 2003-2006 on the condition they link donor support with progress in the peace process (Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka 2003). Needless to say, after the December 2004 earthquake and tsunami, the EU and Japan, along with the entire international community, extended humanitarian emergency assistance to Sri Lanka. After the conference the co-chairs frequently met and coordinated policies. Thus, to monitor the situation in Sri Lanka, the co-chairs met in Tokyo on 30 May 2006.14 It should be noted that both the EU and Japan encouraged the involvement of NGOs and civil society organisations to maintain durable peace in Sri Lanka (Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka 2003). To summarise, the joint involvement
of Japan and the EU in the reconstruction of Sri Lanka demonstrates a widening of the security dialogue.

**Doha Development Agenda**

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the EU and Japan began getting involved in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) within the WTO that began in November 2001. Together they agreed with other developed countries to advance a preferential market access initiative to extend and implement tariff-free and quota-free treatment for almost all products originating in the LDCs (EU-Japan Ministerial Meeting 2000; 9th EU-Japan Summit 2000b). In other words, the intent of the Doha round, according to its proponents, was to make trade rules fairer for developing countries. The DDA complied with the MDG’s task on an open trade system and tariff- and quota-free access for the LDC’s exports. However, major clashes and divisions regarding the opening of the markets for food and agricultural products originating from developing countries between, on the one side, the EU, the US and Japan and, on the other, the major developing countries led by the G4 bloc (China, India, Brazil and South Africa) have stalled the talks. Whilst the EU, Japan and the US prefer to extend development aid to developing countries, the latter require fairer and more equal access to the markets of developed countries.

Moreover, in 2000, the EU and Japan adopted a joint statement on the WTO in which they stressed the importance for all countries of a rule-based trading system, as well as the compatibility between trade policy on one hand and sustainable development on the other (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000b). This statement has had far-reaching effects on developing countries that were requested to comply with sustainable development requirements. Likewise, it also indicated the linkage of ODA with political and economic reforms and with the environment. Recently, the EU and Japan have jointly reiterated the importance of achieving progress in the DDA and have called on all WTO members to show flexibility on this issue.15

In 2006, at the bilateral level, Japan and Europe recognised aid effectiveness as an important field for improved donor cooperation and for promoting better implementation of ODA projects and programs in partner countries (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006a). Japan and the EU were exploring ways to cooperate ‘more closely within the OECD-DAC and other multilateral fora to strengthen strategic tools for fighting poverty’ (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006a).

To summarise, the development policies of the EU and Japan are closely connected with trade and economic issues. Under these circumstances it is natural that the EU and Japan cooperate in multilateral
frameworks. Opening domestic markets to agricultural products from developing countries is an issue of a true security nature for both the EU and Japan, especially for the latter. Therefore, on the one hand, they strive to promote free trade without barriers, but, on the other hand, their markets are closed to a large extent to developing states, which can be explained by their desire to secure themselves against the possible vulnerability of their food markets. Hence, the EU-Japan joint actions on the DDA illustrate their shared understanding of this problem and shared views on its resolution. Therefore, one can argue that the EU and Japan security dialogue is deepening in this area.
Chapter 2 established that, since the early 1990s, the EU and Japan have been engaged in crisis management operations. This area has appeared on the bilateral agenda since the very beginning of the political dialogue initiated by The Hague Declaration in 1991 and, since then, has been a regular part of the security dialogue. Moreover, as demonstrated in chapter 2, this activity was not given a specific word. Officially labelling activities connected to crisis management can be traced back to Japan’s Foreign Minister Yohei Kono’s speech in which he proposed reinforcing relations between the EU and Japan in the areas of conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation. Furthermore, their involvement in crisis management activity has mostly been of a civilian nature, i.e. without military force. It has been in line with the EU and Japan’s security conceptualisations.

This chapter will examine the concrete joint projects in which the EU and Japan have been involved in the area of crisis management. Its main argument is that, despite their invisibility, the EU and Japan have been intensively engaged in joint crisis management projects since the end of the Cold War. It also argues that the security dialogue has been widening and strengthening with the addition of new sectors for collaboration in reaction to new challenges and threats, and proceeding from their ‘civilian power’ identities.

This chapter is organised into two distinct parts: first, we examine the EU and Japan’s involvement in concrete conflicts and their resolution in the world. This part is divided into eight subparts, each of which analyses the EU and Japanese collective performance in a certain country or region. The second part deals with an examination of their activities on a global scale regardless of regions, as their collaboration has been aimed at the maintenance of global security. It primarily focuses on EU and Japanese measures regarding counter-terrorism and, secondly, on conflict prevention and peace-building measures.

Dividing the chapter by geography rather than time is reasonable and justified because some of the activities have focused on a specific region
or a country for a long time, e.g. North Korea, the Balkans, while others have occurred worldwide, e.g. the fight against terrorism.

The definition of crisis management should also be mentioned. Since the particular focus of this chapter is to show the EU and Japan’s overall concrete activity, we chose not to articulate and subcategorise crisis management. In the case of the EU, there is a clear differentiation between the civil and military components of crisis management. Japan does not participate in military operations so, in its case, crisis management refers mainly to humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and conflict prevention operations. Therefore, proceeding from the necessity of analysing crisis management involvement in general, we will apply the term crisis management to conflict prevention, peace-building, civilian emergency assistance, rehabilitation, reconstruction, infrastructure development, diplomatic actions and military operations as well as operations in the fight against terrorism. In 2000, Takako Ueta asserted that ‘conflict prevention and non-military crisis management are promising areas on the agenda for political cooperation’ (Ueta 2001: 141). She was referring to non-military crisis management, but as indicated throughout the discussion, here we do not contrast ‘civilian’ or ‘human’ with ‘military’. We want to demonstrate that the EU and Japan rely primarily on civilian instruments.

Finally, concerning the sources, as far as we know there have not been any scholarly works that discuss crisis management activity in the EU-Japan security dialogue. A collective work by Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson (2005: 327-347) analyses security relations between Europe and Japan. Although they write about Japan’s cooperation with the EU, they do not focus explicitly on this. They actually dedicate less than one page to peacekeeping activities in the EU-Japan dialogue (Hook, Gilson, Hughes and Dobson 2005: 333-334). This chapter is based predominantly on an analysis of primary sources such as joint statements, reports, and working papers. It should be emphasised that because the topic is still developing, a lot of the analysis relies on interviews and conversations with practitioners involved in the EU-Japan dialogue.

7.1 Geographical Scope of the Security Dialogue

The EC and Japan’s involvement in crisis management operations dates back to the early 1990s. As was described and analysed in chapters 1 and 2, since that time both sides have been more active in international relations. Moreover, because of the collapse of the bipolar system, an escalation of local and regional conflicts which had been suppressed during the Cold War period appeared as a threat to world security. In this
situation, the EC and Japan, had to become more proactive as their interests and security as major trade actors and economically developed agents were most affected by the emerging threat. Moreover, the end of the Cold War created new opportunities to widen the scope of operations and to move beyond the limits of the economic and trade tools that had been part of the past reality.

During the relative stability of the Cold War, when the only major players were the US and the USSR, Japanese and West European politicians enjoyed a unique period in which they could construct Japan’s and EC’s ‘civilian power’ roles. This historical practice did not disappear with the changing international environment but continued to characterise the ongoing process. With regard to the nature and aims of crisis management activities, certain commonalities can be outlined between the EU and Japan. First, during the Cold War, neither Japan nor the EC had either the legal foundation or the abilities to participate in conflict prevention. Both actors were treated as global economic players with no consideration as to their political potential. Second, 1991 marks the date that the situation started to change. For Japan, it happened during the Persian Gulf War, whilst for Europe, it was the war in Yugoslavia. Third, it was impossible for both the EU and Japan to acquire military power for use in crisis management operations, and it would have damaged their ‘civilian power’ identities as well. Thus, Europe was cooperating closely within the NATO framework to implement the Petersberg tasks, and Japan provided participation in UNPKO under certain conditions. Moreover, Japan later amended its law, to permit them to provide logistical support to the US and multinational coalition forces in the Indian Ocean and Iraq. Furthermore, recent modification of the law governing the SDF grants SDF overseas operations a level of importance equivalent to the protection of Japan, which demonstrates a dramatic change towards taking a more proactive role internationally. For the EU, development of the ESDP and the independent conduct of crisis management activity, both military and non-military, demonstrate that they had created a more independent force. As economic powers, both Japan and the EU possess considerable crisis management capabilities. Japan has military capabilities and is now transitioning to become more efficient in meeting the challenges posed by the new threats. According to the Japanese legislation, the crisis management operations can be of a non-military nature, and in this, Japan can share its experience with Europe. In its turn, the EU is also pursuing changes in its crisis management policy. The EU has a unique approach to crisis management, dividing it between military and civilian duties and elaborating the necessary tools, ones that will be easily adaptable to crisis situations worldwide. Now we will examine their joint involvement in crisis management operations in various regions and countries.
Cambodia: Joint Participation in the De-Mining Project

Following the signing of the Paris Agreements in October 1991, a ceasefire ending the 13-year conflict in Cambodia was realised. The ceasefire was also symbolic because it was a direct reflection of international changes: the Soviet Union could no longer exert its influence on the world, and specifically not during the Cambodian crisis with the Phnom Penh regime (State of Cambodia), which enjoyed the backing of Vietnam and the USSR on one side, while on the other, we find three factions of the coalition (National Government of Cambodia), including the Pol Pot faction (Democratic Kampuchean Party) supported by the Chinese, the Sihanouk faction (FUNCINPEC) and the Son Sann faction (KPNLF) supported by ASEAN and Western countries.

At that time, the top priority for Cambodia, beside the maintenance of peace, was the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. Toward this end, Japan organised the Ministerial Conference on Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Cambodia in June 1992 in Tokyo under the chairmanship of Japan with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as co-chairman. The European Commission also officially participated in the conference. The major agreements that came out of the conference, the Tokyo Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia and the Tokyo Declaration on Cambodian Peace Process, were unanimously adopted. Moreover, US$ 880 million was pledged by participating countries and international organisations, while Japan announced its efforts to provide aid of between US$ 150 million to US$ 200 million. The conference established the International Committee on Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) as a coordinating mechanism for medium- and long-term reconstruction assistance to Cambodia. Japan chaired the ICORC while the EC and Japan welcomed the outcome of the Tokyo conference at the bilateral level (2nd EC-Japan Summit 1992).

In the 1990s, Cambodia repeatedly appeared on the agenda, whenever political instability and civil disorder required assistance from the international community. Japan sent special envoys, and the EU made a démarche to the Royal Government of Cambodia, expressing the deep concerns of the international community. Japan’s endeavours, such as the Four Pillars of a political solution for Cambodian issues, led to national reconciliation and opened the way to free and fair elections in Cambodia (MOFA 1999). Moreover, Japan and the EU dispatched peacekeeping personnel to Cambodia and mutually supported one another’s activities in the other surrounding areas (Abe 1999: 137).

In 2000, a joint EU-Japanese project for the regulation of small arms in Cambodia was discussed as a concrete measure of cooperation between Japan and the EU. Within the framework of the ‘Weapons for...’
Development’ project, they developed joint or closely coordinated parallel projects (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). Japan and the EU have also been jointly conducting a de-mining project.1

The engagement of the EU and Japan in Cambodia is often referred as a successful example of their bilateral cooperation. This participation was in line with EU and Japanese security conceptualisations and signified their mutual interest and participation in one visible post-conflict regulation project. Moreover, the issue of landmines and the harm that mines cause to civilians has been emphasised by both Japan and the EU for a long time, and as chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated, the two have also been engaged in the anti-personnel landmines issue in the multilateral fora, working to eliminate this kind of weapon.

Middle East Peace Process: Persistent Joint Support for a Palestinian State

Apart from Cambodia, the EC and Japan supported the Middle East Process launched at the Madrid Conference in October 1991 and agreed to continue to cooperate in the organisation of the multilateral working groups, which play an important role in the process (2nd EC-Japan Summit 1992). The Middle East is a strategic region for both the EU and Japan, mainly because of their high levels of energy dependency. Japan’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil is strikingly high compared to other countries. Shipments of oil from the Middle East account for 86% of Japan’s supply, while the figures for other nations, including France (28%), the United States (24%), Germany (11%), and Great Britain (6%), are much lower (Japan Echo 2006). In addition to its energy dependency, Europe has long historical relations with the region. This is especially true of the UK and France, which, along with Russia, played major roles in the Middle East from the 19th through the mid-20th century.

The Middle East peace process is complex and perplexing. It involves a vast array of complicating factors: history, religion, culture, geo-strategy, oil deposits, the interests of outsiders and contemporary realities. Due to this intricate background, Europe and Japan cannot assume major roles in the settlement of the conflict. Since energy security is of the utmost importance for them, they tend to be more moderate in assessing the balance of power within the conflict. They clearly value relations with Arab countries, which implies a support for Palestinian statehood.

Japan has participated in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) peacekeeping operation in the Golan Heights since 1996 (MOFA 2006a: 155). This mission provides border assistance control at the Israel-Syria border. Japan granted US$ 200 million in assistance to Palestine in 2000-2002, and it also supported US and
European efforts to re-launch the peace process (European Commission 1999a).

Since November 2005, the EU has provided border assistance control at the Rafah crossing point at the Gaza-Egypt border (Council of the EU 2006). Furthermore, since January 2006, it has been providing support to the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements (Council of the EU 2006).

The EU and Japan made a joint Statement on Middle East Peace Process in 2000. They reaffirmed their support for the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state, and strongly hoped that a viable, independent and democratic Palestinian State would be effectively established in a peaceful manner based on the principles of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 and the Oslo and Madrid agreements. Japan and the EU declared their readiness to consider the recognition of a Palestinian State in accordance with international law. They welcomed the withdrawal of Israeli Forces from Lebanon in accordance with the UNSC Resolution 425. Moreover, they expressed their intention to extend assistance for human resource development and nation-building for the Palestinian people (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000c).

At their 2001 summit, the EU and Japan jointly confirmed their support for efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict built on the general principles of international law, UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and particularly the formula ‘Land for Peace’, as well as the agreements of Madrid and Oslo (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).

The March 2002 Arab Summit held in Beirut adopted a proposal offering a comprehensive peace between the Arab nations and Israel, also called the Arab Peace Initiative. The EU and Japan welcomed this initiative (11th EU-Japan Summit 2002a). In 2003, as important contributors to the Middle East Peace Process, the EU and Japan maintained close consultations on the issue and emphasised the need to immediately implement the Quartet’s Roadmap (European Union at the United Nations 2002) and cooperate on its implementation (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003a). The ‘roadmap’ for peace is a plan proposed by a ‘quartet’ of international entities, the United States, the EU, Russia, and the United Nations, to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by establishing an independent Palestinian state next to Israel in peace. In this light, the EU and Japan welcomed the formal approval by the Palestinian Legislative Council of the new government proposed by the appointed Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas as an important step towards defusing the conflict and returning to the negotiation table. In 2004, the EU and Japan reiterated their commitment to the negotiated
two-state solution agreed to by the Israelis and the Palestinians (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004a).

In 2005, Japan and the EU continued providing necessary assistance to meet the basic human needs of the Palestinian population and emphasised the need to improve the humanitarian and economic situation of the Palestinians, including facilitating access to and movement within the Occupied Territories (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006a).

The above-mentioned facts show that the EU and Japan conduct their activities together in the Middle East Peace Process. Although the EU and Japan do not have concrete joint activities as part of the Middle East peace process, they do repeatedly consult each other and issue joint statements in support of the Palestinian state, which demonstrates their similar stances. While both actors are peripheral to the resolution of the Middle East conflict, the Korean problem is an instance of Japan’s full engagement and of European support for Japanese initiatives.

**North Korea: KEDO, European Support of Japan’s Initiatives, Humanitarian Concerns, and Bridging Asia and Europe**

North Korea has appeared on the bilateral EC-Japan agenda since 1996, when the EC declared its intention to cooperate in the Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) and contribute 15 million ECU a year for five years (in total 75 million ECU) (European Commission 1996b). KEDO has sought to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula by helping supply a light-water nuclear reactor as well as alternative fuel supplies. The EU joined KEDO officially on 19 September 1997, with representatives on KEDO’s Executive Board for a term to coincide with its substantial and sustained support. Since then, North Korea has become a matter of frequent discussion between the EU and Japan. In 2000, Japan and the EU agreed to pursue their policy of engagement with regard to North Korea and to strengthen the inter-regional dialogue within the framework of existing structures (ASEM, ARF) (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000a).

In December 2001, the EU extended its membership in KEDO for another five years. In 2001 the EU and Japan also redoubled their efforts to support the process of reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula by supporting the Republic of Korea’s ‘engagement policy’, and continuing their own support for KEDO. They urged North Korea to comply with and commit itself fully to relevant international norms with regard to nuclear non-proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, and to stop its missile-related activities including deployment. The EU also urged North Korea to respond positively to international concerns especially with regard to humanitarian issues. Moreover, the parties agreed to exchange information on their respective policies towards
North Korea, including on European efforts to improve the human rights situation and to promote a dialogue on economic reform (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).

In 2003, the EU and Japan recognised that the situation on the Korean Peninsula was not ‘just of grave regional concern, but had serious global implications in terms of non-proliferation’ (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003a). The EU welcomed Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s initiative to visit Pyongyang in September 2002 and underlined the importance of Japan’s remaining actively involved in helping to find a peaceful solution to the situation. Furthermore, Europe affirmed the importance of the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration as a means of opening the way to normalising bilateral relations by resolving concerns between Japan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) including the issues of North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens and various security problems. At the same time, Europe had been supporting the efforts to sustain political and economic engagement between the two Koreas, which were at the core of President Roh’s ‘Policy for Peace and Prosperity’.

Japan and Europe had been reiterating that the DPRK must promptly eliminate its nuclear weapons program in a visible, irreversible and verifiable manner. They expressed their support for the idea that the issue be discussed within a multilateral framework and noted that the political dialogue that had recently been held in Beijing between the US, the DPRK and China might have been a step in that direction with the possible participation of other countries concerned. The EU and Japan urged the DPRK to act as a responsible member of the international community and to fully comply with its international commitments in the field of non-proliferation in order to improve the present situation and safeguard peace and security in the Korean Peninsula.

In 2003, Six Party Talks with the participation of South Korea, DPRK, China, Japan, the US, and Russia were launched, which shifted the settlement of the Korean problem from KEDO. Although the EU was not represented in the Six Party Talks, it continued to exchange information on North Korea with Japan (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003b). The EU also underlined its readiness to support international efforts to find a comprehensive solution to the nuclear and other issues with regard to the situation in the Korean Peninsula (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004a).

In 2006, at their summit, the EU confirmed its strong support for efforts intended to lead to the settlement of the abduction issue (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006a). However, the EU had been engaged in the resolution of the Korean problem not merely by providing verbal support for Japanese and international efforts, but also through concrete activity within KEDO as well as through the donation of humanitarian assistance to North Korea. Thus, as of April 2006, the EU had contributed
nearly € 500 million to North Korea for humanitarian assistance and in support of the KEDO project (Barroso 2006).

As the above example demonstrates, the EU has been engaged as a humanitarian actor in the resolution of Korean problem, and the EU-Japanese security dialogue in this area has been focused on cooperation within KEDO and on European support for Japan’s activity regarding North Korea. Furthermore, Glenn Hook, Julie Gilson, et al. propose that the most important role of KEDO, with respect to Europe’s relationship with Japan, has been ‘a vehicle for the promotion of reciprocal concerns regarding human security in East Asia and Europe’ (Hook, Gilson, Hughes and Dobson 2005: 343). Moreover, the participation of the EU in KEDO and subsequent attempts to settle the conflict demonstrate increasing interdependence in security matters between Europe and Asia. In this respect, Japan’s engagement since the mid-1990s in the settlement of the situation in the former Yugoslavia and European involvement in KEDO have symbolised the commonalities and interdependence of the security environments between Europe and Japan.

Former Yugoslavia: Japan’s Support for European Initiatives, the Stability Pact, Japan’s Mediation Role, Bridging Europe and Asia

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Japan has been involved in the resolution of conflicts in the Balkans since the early 1990s. It has viewed the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as a regional conflict in Europe, but also an important international issue because its resolution affected the creation of a new international order in the post-Cold War era. As such, Japan has played a positive role in seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict, by providing humanitarian and refugee assistance and by conducting preventive diplomacy through economic assistance to the surrounding countries. By the mid-1990s the EU and Japan were cooperating closely in the reconstruction of the former Yugoslavia; Japan has been the third largest donor after the EU and the US. Japan participated in the reconstruction steering board and provided personnel to the Office of the UN High Representative.

In the mid-1990s, Japan was especially active in assisting Bosnia and Herzegovina, where coherent local coordination on EU-Japanese aid and cooperation on individual projects was of great importance. It is not clear from the analysis of the documents if there was cooperation in planning the development aid assistance in the former Yugoslavia, but the absence of any commentary on their overlap allows us to assume that the EU and Japan did indeed coordinate their development policies in the former Yugoslavia.
Furthermore, in April and May 1995, Foreign Minister Yohei Kono visited this region and urged the parties to commit themselves to a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Specifically, at the London Peace Implementation Conference, at which Japan was represented by Foreign Minister Kono, Japan became a member of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, newly established for civil implementation (MOFA 1996a: Sectoral Analysis of the International Situation and Japan’s Foreign Policy). Through its involvement in the Yugoslavian crisis, Japan demonstrated how a country could facilitate implementation of a peace agreement using civilian tools and without sending SDF personnel. Japan also sent election observer personnel to Bosnia and Herzegovina in September 1998 for the general and regional elections and, in March-April 2000, for the municipal assembly elections (MOFA 2006a: 155). By 1999, Japan had committed restructuring assistance estimated at US$ 800 million (European Commission 1999a).

**Kosovo Crisis**

In March 1999, another military conflict broke out in Yugoslavia, this time in the Kosovo region. The US-led NATO bombing campaign lasted from 24 March to 11 June 1999. The EU member states, most of them NATO members, were directly involved in the airstrikes. The NATO forces employed American warplanes stationed at the base in Aviano (Italy). The UN had not approved that campaign, which means that *de facto* the airstrikes violated international law.

Japan had to choose between its legalistic approach and pro-UN public opinion or demonstrate its solidarity with the US and other NATO members. In this respect, the Japanese government ‘understood’ the NATO action but did not ‘support’ it. Moreover, during the NATO airstrikes, Japan, as a non-NATO country, tried to play the role of mediator.

In April 1999, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi asked the former high-ranking UN official in charge of Bosnia to meet with Milosevic and to find a political role for Japan in the peace process. Instead, Milosevic requested their assistance in the reconstruction, and Japan could not lend anything other than humanitarian assistance at that time because of its solidarity with NATO. Moreover, Germany asked Japan to represent its diplomatic interests because the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) had been involved in a bombing for the first time since World War Two. The Japanese role in this conflict demonstrates its humanitarian stance and its preference for observing international law.

Moreover, on 18 December 1999, Japanese Foreign Minister Kono visited Kosovo and talked with leaders from both the Albanian and Serbian sides, emphasising the importance of pursuing a dialogue (Kono 2000a). Unfortunately, as in the previous case, this attempt was
not successful. Shortly thereafter, in 2000, Japan emphasised that it was important to adopt a comprehensive approach, one that embraced appropriate political, economic and social measures at every stage, from efforts aimed at preventing conflicts to those that build post-conflict peace. In this connection, Japan and Europe needed to work together to study how they could cooperate in the field of conflict prevention. Regarding the building of peace during post-conflict periods, Japan has extended assistance to Bosnia and has been actively participating in the G8 discussions on Kosovo. Moreover, Japan has announced its own Kosovo-related assistance package, including aid to neighbouring countries. Similarly, European countries have dispatched troops to participate in the multinational force in East Timor. Japan believed that there was ‘a structure emerging between Japan and Europe as global partners for mutually extending assistance in response to conflicts in either region’, where the cooperation had to be continued (Kono 2000a).

In terms of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support in Kosovo, Japan had committed US$ 160 million by the end of 1999. In addition, Japan had pledged US$ 60 million to Macedonia and Albania. Moreover, Japan has been one of the major donors of economic assistance to other Balkan countries. Japan also sent officials to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). To coordinate efforts, the EU and Japan continued to exchange information and strengthened their cooperation on humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the region (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). They also addressed the problems of illicit trade, uncontrolled spread, and excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons in the Western Balkans (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a). Moreover, Japan also participated in various projects on reconstruction and rehabilitation, one of which was a media development project in Kosovo (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003a).

Post-War Settlement

In July 2000, in the aftermath of the end of NATO-led bombing of Yugoslavia, Japan and the EU reaffirmed the importance of the role of the ‘Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’ and efficient donor coordination within the framework of the High-Level Steering Group (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000a). The two parties also cooperated to provide effective and well-coordinated support to the countries in the region, which had to be accompanied by increased efforts to implement domestic reform promoting democracy and market economies.

In April 2004, Japan held a Ministerial Conference of Peace Consolidation and Economic Development of the Western Balkans, which was co-chaired by the EU. Europe and Japan recognised the long-term, close cooperative relations between them in support of the
Western Balkans and of the European perspective for the region (13\textsuperscript{th} EU-Japan Summit 2004). In addition, the Japanese government more fully articulated the concept of human security as it applies in the case of the Balkan conflict. In a speech from April 2004 Foreign Minister Kawaguchi noted,

Japan has extended economic cooperation totalling 1.8 billion US dollars to South Eastern Europe, including the Western Balkans. In providing this assistance, we have placed importance on contributing to ‘peace building’ in the Western Balkan region while reflecting the concept of ‘human security’ (Kawaguchi 2004).

At the 2005 summit, the EU expressed its appreciation for Japan’s engagement and assistance to the region. Bilateral contacts at the level of topical experts were expected to continue, with a view to ensuring complementarity between the assistance programs (14\textsuperscript{th} EU-Japan Summit 2005a).

To promote security, democratisation, and economic development, the EU and Japan continued to cooperate within the framework of the ‘Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’, extending help to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo), Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other parts of the Balkan region (10\textsuperscript{th} EU-Japan Summit 2001a). The pact was created upon the initiative of the EU on 10 June 1999 in Cologne at the European Council meeting that aimed to strengthen peace, democracy, human rights and the economy in the countries of southeastern Europe. Japan actively participated in the Stability Pact from its early stages. The EU highly valued Japanese involvement and partnership in the Stability Pact.\textsuperscript{7}

In 2006 it was announced that the Stability Pact would be succeeded by a more regionally managed cooperation framework in 2007, the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), formed by the countries in the region themselves, while enjoying continued support and advice from the international community.\textsuperscript{8} It suggested that Japan would remain one of the leading players in the Balkans. The people in former Yugoslavia truly valued Japan’s peaceful involvement in the settlement of crisis. They appreciated Japan’s non-military, purely humanitarian involvement and, moreover, praised Yoriko Kawaguchi activities.\textsuperscript{9}

Furthermore, over the past ten years, Japan has participated in the EU-designed ‘Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’ which aims to support democratisation, encourage economic recovery, give humanitarian assistance and provide peace and security in the region. To this end, Japan has extended approximately US$ 10 billion in ODA to south-eastern European countries for various reconstruction and reconciliation
projects. Judging from documents published by Japan’s delegation at the EU, its main priority for doing so was their desire to integrate the region into the international economic system and to promote peace and stability. Towards this end, Japanese aid focused on infrastructural development, private investment, security, and democratisation (Boer 2002).

To conclude, Japan’s involvement in the more than decade-long peace process in the former Yugoslavia as one of the key players definitely shows the interconnected nature of security in the modern era, and, we can also say, loyalty to the comprehensive humanitarian principles of its foreign policy. Although Japan’s attempts at mediation during the bombings in Yugoslavia in 1999 did not succeed, they did demonstrate Japan’s eagerness and readiness to facilitate the peace process in accordance with international law and ‘civilian’, humanitarian involvement. It also seems appropriate to mention what Ambassador Nobuo Matsunaga said in characterising Japan’s involvement in the Balkans:

While the conflict in the former Yugoslavia has become a global issue which the entire international society must approach together in order to solve, it is originally a European regional conflict, and Japan continues to support the primary role of the European initiatives, and from the perspective of cooperating for such initiatives, Japan has contributed to the improvement of the situation as much as possible (Matsunaga 1994).

Indeed, the above facts illustrate that, despite its geographic remoteness, Japan has contributed as much as can possibly be expected to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the war in Yugoslavia.

**East Timor (Timor Leste): Joint Policy towards Independence for Timor Leste**

Colonised by Portugal in the 16th century, East Timor was known as Portuguese Timor for centuries. Indonesia invaded it in 1975 and occupied it until 1999. Following an agreement between Indonesia, Portugal and the US brokered by the UN, a UN-supervised popular referendum was held on 30 August 1999. The East Timorese voted for full independence from Indonesia, but violent clashes, broke out soon afterwards instigated primarily by the Indonesian military and aided by pro-Indonesia Timorese militias. The conflict also had religious roots because, together with the Philippines, East Timor is one of only two predominantly Roman Catholic countries in Asia, and the only Portuguese-speaking sovereign state in Asia. Therefore, East Timor and Indonesia, which is the world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation,
also clashed over religion. This was one of the reasons why the EU and Japan at their 2000 summit recognised that ‘building a nation from scratch in East Timor is a new challenge which the international community has never experienced before’ (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000a).

Japan repeatedly dispatched SDF personnel to East Timor, participating in a total of five different operations, of which two were peacekeeping, two more were connected with monitoring election activities, and the last one was a rescue force (MOFA 2006a: 155). Europe also dispatched troops to the multinational forces operating in East Timor (Kono 2000a).

In the early 2000s, the East Timorese and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) were doing their utmost to rehabilitate and rebuild the nation of East Timor. However, the situation required ongoing international support. In this respect, Japan and the EU extended assistance to back up the efforts of the East Timorese and of UNTAET (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000a).

At the same time, to ease tensions with Indonesia, the EU and Japan adopted a joint statement on Indonesia supporting Indonesia’s efforts to solve its own regional problems and to ensure stability and reconciliation in the country peacefully through dialogue. Moreover, Japan and the EU – as major bilateral donors and economic partners – were clearly showing their support for Indonesia’s own development efforts (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000a). But, at that time, Indonesia was also involved in another conflict in the Aceh province, and the EU and Japan reconfirmed the territorial integrity of Indonesia and welcomed the signing of the ‘Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh,’ which ultimately restored peace in the province (9th EU-Japan Summit 2000a).

In 2001, Japan and the EU supported the creation of ‘an independent, self-sustaining, and viable state in East Timor as an important element of stability in the region’, and in this respect they confirmed their support for East Timorese efforts (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).

The settlement of the conflict in Timor Leste is an example of the EU and Japan’s shared vision regarding the problem. Their joint support for East Timorese independence and a balanced and diplomatic resolution in Indonesia further demonstrates this commitment. The participation of the Japanese SDF and European personnel in the multinational forces, although not on a bilateral level, nonetheless demonstrated that the EU and Japan were involved in concrete projects. One complicating factor, however, is that their cooperation is not always visible.
Africa: Conflict-Prevention Measures

Traditionally, Europe is closely connected to Africa due to its colonial past. Hence, the EU has felt obliged to contribute to the peace and stability of the region. At the same time, Japanese SDF participation in UNPKO in Africa (Mozambique, Angola) (MOFA 2006a: 155) emerged in the early 1990s, but the SDF’s focus eventually shifted to other regions. The reason why Japanese SDF has been absent in Africa more recently is because of the severe climate, which makes it difficult for SDF personnel to execute their missions. However, there are Japanese staff working for the UN and NGOs, for instance at the Unified Mission Analysis Centre of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), where military personnel and civilians join together to analyse information (Kudo 2006: 153).

Japan is the main organiser of TICAD, which focuses on development in Africa and also connects Asian countries to Africa by applying Japan’s successful ODA experiences in Asia to African countries (see chapter 6).

In October 2001, as part of its bilateral efforts in the field of conflict prevention, Japan dispatched a fact-finding mission to investigate the situation on the ground in Sierra Leone and jointly develop a conflict prevention project with the UK (MOFA 2002a: 99). Based on the mission’s findings, the two countries subsequently created a plan to launch a conflict prevention project in Sierra Leone.

Furthermore, the EU and Japan strengthened their support for efforts by African regional organisations (including the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Southern African Development Community) and African countries. In this context, as mentioned above, the EU and Japan cooperated closely to implement the G8 Initiatives for Conflict Prevention issued at Miyazaki in 2000 and Rome in 2001. In March 2005, Japan provided US$ 2.07 million to the African Union (AU) to support ceasefire monitoring in the Darfur region (Sudan) within the framework of Peace Support Operations (PSO) activities. Moreover, Japan extended approximately US$ 2.81 million through the UN Human Security Fund (UNHSF) with the objective of providing training to improve the knowledge of AU troops on topics such as the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (MOFA 2006a: 156). Japan funds grassroots organisations, provides ODA and actively participates in post-war reconstruction, where ODA is an essential tool in this process. Moreover, this engagement is in line with the EU-Japanese ‘An Action Plan’ to finance regional organisations and NGOs as peace-building and conflict-prevention measures. In 2006 there were three major players in Africa: Japan through TICAD, the EU, and the UN.
There are many potential opportunities for more cooperation between the EU and Japan involving crisis management operations in Africa. Japan has been involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa since the early 1990s, but later suspended its participation. We can conclude that Japanese involvement in crisis management operations has been performed through ODA as part of the EU-Japan joint measures on conflict prevention.

**Afghanistan: Restoration of Peace, Joint Efforts in the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration) Process, Reconstruction, and Development**

*Joint Declaration on Terrorism and Afghanistan*

The issue of Afghanistan appeared on the EU-Japan security agenda in December 2001 at the annual summit (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001d). The war in Afghanistan began in October 2001, immediately after the 9/11 attacks. As a consequence, terrorism emerged as a special topic at the December 2001 summit. The EU and Japan signed a ‘Joint Declaration on Terrorism’, which strongly condemned the terrorist attacks and in which they agreed to cooperate actively on the realisation of peace, improved humanitarian conditions and the reconstruction of Afghanistan by supporting UN activities (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001b). They also confirmed their engagement in concerted efforts to assist Pakistan and other countries surrounding Afghanistan. The specific actions included:

- strengthening the policy dialogue and coordination aimed at ensuring the peace and stability of Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries in support of ongoing UN efforts intended to install in Afghanistan a legitimate, broad-based, multi-ethnic government committed to establishing human rights in Afghanistan;
- active cooperation in providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in Afghanistan and in its neighbouring countries;
- assistance for reconstruction in post-war Afghanistan;
- assistance to Pakistan and to other neighbouring countries (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).

Hence, the main visible themes included the strengthening of the policy dialogue and coordination between Japan and the EU, active cooperation in humanitarian assistance and assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Participation and Coordination within the Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group

The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan was held at a ministerial level in Tokyo on 21-22 January 2002. Japan, the US, the EU and Saudi Arabia co-chaired the Conference. These four parties subsequently also co-chaired the Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group. Japan and the EU closely cooperated on the Tokyo Conference, and they held ministerial meetings in December 2001 and January 2002 toward this end (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001d). Their activities were, however, relatively invisible within the Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering Group, due to the multilateral nature of the mechanism.

The EU has had a Special Representative for Afghanistan (EUSRA) since December 2001. The EUSRA is in close contact with key stakeholders in the Afghanistan political process, and together with its international partners it advises the EU on its Afghanistan policy and on the establishment of its priorities for action. The European Commission has had an office in Kabul since May 2002, primarily to implement aid delivery. The European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) is also present in Afghanistan with an office in Kabul that opened in January 2002. For its part, Japan, as a close US ally, was also engaged in the war against terrorism from the very beginning. Koizumi, in this regard, noted that ‘EU-Japan cooperation in relation to the reconstruction of Afghanistan is vital today’ (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001c).

One SDF representative further remarked that ‘cooperation on reconstruction in Afghanistan was a key issue for EU-Japan relations’. In this regard a major problem is the invisibility of their dialogue. For instance, the Defence Policy Bureau of Japan has primarily been focused on the partnership with the US.

EU member states and the European Commission, in cooperation with the Afghanistan government and the donor community, have assumed key coordination roles in crucial areas of assistance, including in security-related areas (e.g. the UK in the area of counter-narcotics measures; Italy has been a key player in judicial reform and training efforts; Germany in police training). The European Commission has been a key partner in fostering rural livelihoods (jointly with the World Bank) and health (jointly with the US). France has had a coordination role with respect to the establishment of Afghanistan’s parliament. Multilateralism is one of the reasons why the EU-Japan security dialogue on Afghanistan goes relatively unnoticed.

The role of the UK should be especially stressed because the UK and Japan have close relations in the area of crisis management. In 2007, 23 EU member states deployed troops via NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The ISAF has been led by the UK
since November 2006. The ISAF Regional Commands were led by the UK (capital area around Kabul), Italy (West), and Germany (North), with the two remaining Regional Commands led by Canada and the US. The ISAF and Japan closely cooperated and coordinated their activities on the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. Moreover, in parallel with the ISAF, the US independently led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). NATO’s International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) has played a critical role in Afghanistan since the first international peacekeepers arrived in 2002. The American presence under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) has another national agenda in Afghanistan. However, the coordination between these operations has suffered from some tensions as to scope, force, structure and mission.

Japan implemented assistance for the promotion of the political process (elections, etc.), the improvement of security (DDR and de-mining activities, etc.), and reconstruction (construction of trunk roads, etc.). From September 2001 to November 2005, Japan’s assistance to Afghanistan totalled approximately US$ 1 billion. By December 2005, DDR activities, led by Japan, had shown significant progress: 63,000 former national army combatants had been disarmed, of whom 61,000 had started the social reintegration process (MOFA 2006a: 113). At the London Conference held at the end of January in 2006, Japan announced its intention to contribute an additional US$ 450 million to assist the successful completion of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) (MOFA 2006c).

The EU also has a longstanding commitment to Afghanistan and its government. It is a key donor (€ 3.7 billion over 5 years) and, working in conjunction with international partners, it plays a major role in stabilisation and reconstruction efforts (EU Council Secretariat 2006).

**Issue of Afghanistan at Bilateral Summits**

The EU and Japan, as substantial contributors to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, reiterated in 2003 their strong commitment to support the efforts of the Afghanistan Transitional Administration (ATA) for the full implementation of the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 (in which they were actively involved) in drafting and ratifying a new constitution, holding free and fair elections, setting up an effective Afghan National Army, promoting the DDR process and fighting the illicit production and trafficking of narcotics (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003a). Both sides also encouraged the establishment of a constitutional framework for effective human rights protection, including the rights of women, children and minorities.

In 2004, Japan and Europe continued assisting the ATA and reaffirmed their commitment to assist future governments in the
reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan. The EU and Japan were especially engaged in assistance to ATA to ensure fair elections in accordance with the principles of the Bonn Agreement (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004a). In 2005, they welcomed substantial progress in the DDR process and encouraged the Afghan government to complete it by June 2006. The EU and Japan decided to continue to coordinate their efforts on the ground by implementing their reconstruction assistance and security sector reform efforts (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005a). In April 2006, the EU and Japan welcomed the adoption of the Afghanistan Compact,18 which provided a solid basis for cooperation between Afghanistan and the international community for the next five years. They shared an aim to continue their cooperation in the field of reconstruction and development, judicial reform and security-sector reform, including DDR and Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006b).

To summarise, the EU and Japan, along with the US and Saudi Arabia, cooperated in the Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group. Both the EU and Japan actively participated in reconstruction activities. Japan was a leading country in the DDR process and provided logistical support to the UK, which served as the head of the ISAF, as well as other EU member states. Moreover, the European Commission was Japan’s key partner in issues related to rural livelihoods and health. The EU and Japan have also pursued active efforts in the DDR process. Moreover, both of them have pledged their support to the ATA and future administrations. We can thus conclude that both the EU and Japan have been jointly engaged in the security dialogue on Afghanistan, notably in DDR, reconstruction and development and, moreover, that they can be expected to continue to facilitate democratic transition in Afghanistan. It should also be mentioned that invisibility and multilateral participation obscures the EU and Japan bilateral security dialogue on Afghanistan. Finally, we should note that the activity in which the EU and Japan have been involved is consistent with their security conceptualisations.

**Iraq: Support of the UN Core Role in the Reconstruction Process**

The invasion of Iraq caused Europe and Japan to reconsider their foreign security policies. Thus, Japan adopted the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance (LCSMHRA), which permitted SDF deployment to provide logistical support for the US and coalition forces in Iraq beginning in December 2003. The EU adopted its European security concept ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ in December 2003 (Black 2003b). Moreover, the ESDP mechanism of the EU entered into force in 2003.
The Iraq issue emerged on the EU-Japan bilateral security agenda immediately after the invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies in March 2003. Thus, at the May 2003 summit, Prime Minister Koizumi stressed the necessity to ‘swiftly reconstruct and bring stability’ to the country, and in so doing to bring peace and stability in the Middle East region as a whole (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003c). Koizumi further emphasised that the UN should play a vital role in this process (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003c). The EU and Japan jointly recognised the vital role that the UN needed to play, utilising its unique capacity and experiences in post-conflict situations. The EU and Japan welcomed the appointment by the UN Secretary-General of a special adviser on Iraq and looked forward to further strengthening the UN’s involvement, initially in the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance. Both sides were determined to work together for the further stability of the region as a whole (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003a). Furthermore, they welcomed the reality that new perspectives were opening up for the Iraqi people who had the chance to shape a new future for their country and to rejoin the international community. They also shared the view that, at this stage, it was necessary to strengthen international solidarity and to ensure a secure environment, including the provision of humanitarian assistance, with medical relief and the protection of the cultural heritage and museums being especially urgent. Both sides expressed their commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq and the need to preserve regional stability. They also underlined the importance of establishing an interim authority, by the Iraqi people themselves, as soon as possible. As we can see, the activities in which the EU and Japan were engaged in Iraq were reminiscent of the Afghanistan agenda.

It is important to note that Japan and the EU reaffirmed their commitment to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq and welcomed UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546, endorsing the formation of an interim government in Iraq and welcoming the end of the occupation and the reassertion of Iraq’s full sovereignty (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004a). Following their resolution to support the UN as an essential player in restoring peace, the EU and Japan welcomed the UN’s important contribution to the political transition and the preparation for elections, and they noted with particular satisfaction the role accorded to the UN through UNSCR 1546. They also emphasised the need for the international community to support the work of the interim Iraqi government with a view toward direct elections being held in accordance with the timetable set out in UNSCR 1546, as well as the importance of maintaining the multilateral effort for rehabilitation and reconstruction, and continuing to work closely together both in donor fora and bilaterally.
In 2004, EU member states and Japan cooperated in the reconstruction of Iraq (13th EU-Japan Summit 2004b). In October 2004, the EU and Japan cooperated in the Tokyo Conference on Iraq (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005b). At the May 2005 summit, the EU and Japan expressed their commitment to enhanced efforts by the international community to provide political and financial support for Iraq’s reconstruction (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005a). As in the case of Afghanistan, the EU and Japan have been coordinating their policies in Iraq.

The Commission has been actively supporting Iraq’s political transition. Its €200 million contribution in 2006 came on top of the €518 million provided between 2003 and 2005 for reconstruction (European Commission 2006). For its part, at the International Conference on Reconstruction in Iraq held in Madrid in October 2003, Japan announced an assistance package worth US$5 billion until 2007. Of this figure, a total of US$1.5 billion was to be disbursed in the form of grants for immediate assistance, and, by May 2005, decisions had been made for the allocation of the entire amount (MOFA 2006a: 105-107).

Given the above, the war in Iraq has clearly affected Japanese and European security visions. In the case of Japan, a law permitting SDF dispatch to and logistical support in Iraq was adopted in 2003. Simultaneously, Europe adopted the human security concept ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’. Moreover, both the EU and Japan jointly support and encourage the UN’s involvement in peace building and reconstruction along with their own efforts. Thus, the EU and Japan jointly operate and coordinate their activities within multilateral institutions with regard to assistance to Iraq.

7.2 Global Scale Activities

The Fight against Terrorism

As the analysis of the joint documents shows, the terrorism issue rarely appeared on the EU-Japan bilateral agenda in the early 1990s. It was mentioned as one of the transnational challenges along with environmental, conservation of resources and energy, international crime and drugs issues in The Hague Declaration. In 1997, the EU-Japan joint press statement mentioned the fight against terrorism as one of the areas they intended to cooperate on (6th EU-Japan Summit 1997a). Terrorism probably appeared on the agenda in 1997 because of the hostage crisis at the Japanese Embassy in Peru, which lasted from December 1996 to April 1997. However, no significant bilateral activity was documented in this area prior to 9/11.

After 9/11, at the December 2001 EU-Japan summit, the leaders signed the ‘Joint Declaration on Terrorism’, which proposed measures
to address the Afghanistan issue and large-scale policy coordination is-
sues (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001b). Terrorism, in earlier references,
was usually mentioned merely as one of the areas for cooperation, but
after 9/11 the fight against terrorism became a pronounced area of co-
operation between the EU and Japan. It is important to note that Japan
and the EU clearly stated that there is ‘no link between any particular
religion and terrorism’, which is very important for the promotion of
tolerance and understanding among diverse peoples and cultures and
not creating enemies (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001b). The EU is known
for its moderate and ‘soft’ approach to conflict resolution. Japan, despite
its strong alliance with the US, also does not support the American
stance on terrorism. As Christopher W. Hughes (2004: 202) acknowl-
edged, ‘many Japanese see terrorism as related to economic insecurity
and state-building thus diverg[ing] from the United States in the impor-
tance attached to military power as an ultimate solution.’ Distancing
themselves from the tough US position on counter-terrorism measures
demonstrates a shared point of view between Europe and Japan. More-
over, cooperation on counter-terrorism measures and international
crime are areas that can ‘touch [the] hearts of people’.

Furthermore, both actors were already working to minimise the im-
 pact of the events of 9/11 on the world economy. The EU-Japan security
dialogue on terrorism can be broken into three key activities:
1. strengthening the consultation mechanism;
2. cooperation;
3. coordination in fighting terrorism as indicated in ‘An Action Plan’.

In ‘An Action Plan’, the EU and Japan documented the concrete steps
that they would jointly undertake. The first step was to further promote
coordinated international action to prevent and combat international ter-
rorism by undertaking the following joint measures:
– enhanced cooperation in all relevant international and regional fora;
– early signing and ratification of relevant counter-terrorism conven-
tions and protocols, and smooth and rapid implementation of rele-
ant UN Security Council Resolutions;
– early finalisation of the UN Comprehensive Convention against
International Terrorism;
– enhancing common efforts to stop the financing of terrorism, in-
cluding freezing of funds and other financial assets of terrorists;
– reinforcement of technical cooperation offered to developing coun-
tries to build their capacity in the field of counter-terrorism.

The second step proposed combating terrorism through:
– early finalisation of the international convention for the suppression
of acts of nuclear terrorism;
– strengthening of non-proliferation regimes controlling weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies that might be employed by terrorists;
– cooperation between the European Police Office (Europol) and Japanese police authorities;
– enhanced control of illegal drugs and active measures to reduce the supply and demand for drugs (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).

This list of tasks clearly covers a broad range of issues, and the majority of them were implemented at the multilateral level. It is worth mentioning that the increased support for multilateral efforts to combat crime and strengthen judicial cooperation was a top priority. The EU and Japan’s joint efforts address the strengthening of international fora and the corresponding international legislation. It also proposed cooperation in the control of drug traffic and of weapons, especially WMD, to prevent terrorist attacks.

In this regard, cooperation was initiated between Europol and the Japanese police to coordinate activities in the above areas. The Europol and Japanese police cooperation has focused on:
– money laundering and other illicit practices;
– illegal drugs (including stimulants, other synthetic drugs and precursors);
– special investigation techniques and technologies for drugs, such as controlled delivery and signature analysis;
– the trafficking in people and the smuggling of migrants;
– new forms of crime such as cyber-crime (illegal disclosure of personal data, hacking, computer-related piracy and fraud, cyber-terrorism) (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).

Cooperation between the Europol and Japanese police covers most issues that are currently challenging societies. We expect that as the cooperation and consultation mechanism develops, Europe and Japan will have an even wider range of tasks to tackle jointly.

In accordance with the documents adopted in December 2002, the EU and Japan held their first meeting at the expert level on international counter-terrorism (12th EU-Japan Summit 2003b). In October 2004, the first meeting between Japan’s Ambassador in charge of Counter-Terrorism and the EU Coordinator on Counter-Terrorism was held in Brussels (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005b). The Second Counter-Terrorism Talks between Japan’s Ambassador in charge of Counter-Terrorism and the EU Coordinator on Counter-Terrorism took place in Tokyo in October 2005 (15th EU-Japan Summit 2006b). At the 2005 EU-Japan summit, the leaders reiterated their urgent appeal to all states to ratify and implement all 12 of the international counter-terrorism
conventions and protocols and to implement relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. They welcomed the growing bilateral contacts between Japan’s Ambassador and the EU Coordinator on Counter-Terrorism. While recognising the importance of counter-terrorism efforts at the global level, they decided to specifically cooperate in Southeast Asia and to actively promote regional cooperation, including through regional Counter-Terrorism centres (14th EU-Japan Summit 2005a). In this respect, the EU has been interested in cooperating to establish centres for police and counter-terrorism training in Japan, for the training of forces from the Asian region.20

To summarise, the issue of terrorism was mentioned as one of the areas for cooperation of the EU-Japan security dialogue in The Hague Declaration. The intention to cooperate in this area was reiterated in 1997, occasioned by the hostage drama in Peru. However, there had not yet been any observable cooperation on terrorism. After 9/11, the EU and Japan became actively involved in the fight against terrorism. In this connection, the EU and Japan issued the Joint Declaration on Terrorism, and they included a wide range of counter-terrorism measures in ‘An Action Plan’ in December 2001. Hence, Europe and Japan exchanged information, cooperated and coordinated their antiterrorism practices. Cooperation was also initiated between Europol and Japan’s Police Agency. The issues covered by the security dialogue in this area range from the strengthening of multilateral collaboration and international law to legislative tools addressing weapons and drug control. We can thus argue that since 9/11, the EU-Japan security dialogue in crisis management has been broadened and deepened with respect to the fight against terrorism.

**Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building Measures**

The EU-Japan ‘Action Plan’ of 2001 also specified concrete initiatives to be launched jointly. Both sides had agreed to cooperate in improving the international community’s institutions and instruments for conflict prevention, and pursued sustained efforts in the UN and regional bodies to promote a spirit of tolerance among and within nations. In this context, noting that 2001 was the ‘United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilisations’, they cooperated in following up on the ‘Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations’ adopted at the 56th session of the UN General Assembly (10th EU-Japan Summit 2001a).

‘An Action Plan’ laid out four steps to be launched immediately by Japan and the EU. Europe and Japan first agreed to undertake urgent measures to assist and support NGOs in both the EU and Japan in order to develop the NGOs’ capacity to play a larger role in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace-building (10th EU-Japan Summit
2001a). As mentioned in chapter 3, the EU and Japan, both separately and jointly, promote the NGOs’ involvement in crisis management.

The second activity proposed an exchange of information on the civilian aspects of crisis management including humanitarian aid, covering both the general instruments used and specific actions undertaken between the EU and Japan. The EU possesses substantial experience in crisis management, especially taking into account the EU’s direct involvement in the war in Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Crisis. This experience can be of interest for Japan, which plays an increasingly active role in the security area.21

The third endeavour concerned strengthening the capacity of international and regional organisations to carry out conflict prevention and to ensure a smooth transition once a conflict is settled, from developing humanitarian assistance to cooperation on rehabilitation development. Needless to say, post-war developments are important. They may even be more important than the war itself, especially given the pattern of short modern wars with drastic and radical consequences, which make it hard to restore normal life. The current situation in Afghanistan, Iraq, former Yugoslavia, and Pakistan indubitably manifests this pattern. Therefore, cooperation between the EU and Japan as leading economic powers with sufficient resources is a necessary and required measure.

Finally, the fourth aspect concerned following up on the Seminar on Education and Protection of Cultural Heritage in South Eastern Europe, which was held in Japan in March 2001. In this context, the EU and Japan examined the possibility of taking effective measures through the United Nations and other international fora to prevent the destruction of important cultural heritage elements, such as the Buddhist statues destroyed in Bamiyan (Afghanistan). Undoubtedly, humankind is rich in culture and history, and annihilation of a historical treasure is not only a loss for a particular country but for the whole of humanity. In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the EU and Japan collaborated on the preservation of their world heritage. Moreover, Japan established a Trust Fund for the Preservation of the World Cultural Heritage in UNESCO in 1989. As of 2004, Japan’s contributions to this fund amounted to US$ 50 million (Permanent Delegation of Japan to UNESCO 2005).

Joint peacekeeping and peace-building initiatives have become an integral part of Japan’s security engagement with its European counterparts.22 Not only has this led to a sustained government-led dialogue, this activity has also emphasised support for the actions of non-governmental actors in this field (Hook et al. 2005: 333). Using NGOs to preserve peace seems to be a distinguishing feature of Japanese and EU security policies. The ‘Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s
Security Capabilities’ advised cooperation with NGOs, and registering them as part of Human Security Volunteer Service for deployment as elements of a larger force (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities 2004: 24). The Japanese government also worked closely with NGOs (Hook et al. 2005: 344-345). On a bilateral level, this activity was proposed in the EU-Japan common agenda to encourage NGOs to develop their capacities to play a larger role in conflict prevention, conflict resolutions and peace-building. To this end, seminars, training initiatives and joint symposia have been held in order to discuss, for instance, post-conflict nation-building in Africa or Afghanistan, the participation of Japanese personnel in map exercises and other measures to develop more effective means of training peacekeepers and more effective instruments of preventive diplomacy and preventive crisis management.

In conclusion, the EU and Japan security dialogue on peace-building and conflict prevention includes firstly, the promotion of the active engagement of NGOs in conflict prevention and other related issues; secondly, strengthening international and regional organisations to carry out conflict prevention activity; thirdly, an exchange of information on the crisis management and especially its civilian aspects; and finally, preservation of historical heritage. Hence, we can conclude that EU and Japanese performance in the area of conflict prevention and peace building has had a ‘civilian’ emphasis. At the same time, it demonstrates the diversified range of instruments that the EU and Japan can jointly employ to prevent conflict. It thus demonstrates that the EU-Japan security dialogue, with its emphasis on civilian tools, has been deepening in the realm of crisis management.
Conclusion

At the centre of our study is an examination of the security dialogue between Japan and the European Union (formerly the European Economic Community) from 1959 until 2006. For the purpose of this research, we established that the security dialogue refers to the discourse and joint activity cooperation between the EU and Japan in the security sphere, where security is treated from the perspective of the European and Japanese security conceptualisations. To finalise our conclusions, we proceed in three sections: First, we summarise the Japanese and the European security conceptualisations; second, we focus on the discourse part of the EU-Japan security dialogue; third, we recapitulate the development of the EU-Japan security dialogue in the security areas.

Japanese and European Union Security Conceptualisations

During the Cold War period, Japan developed two significant concepts that have shaped its involvement in the area of security. These are its ‘merchant nation’ identity and its comprehensive security doctrine, which supplement each other and, while not ruling out military involvement, emphasise non-military tools to maintain a security balance. In the 1990s-2000s, Japan’s security vision did not deviate fundamentally from Japan’s Cold War practices and comprehensive vision of security. Thus, Japan continued to insist that it would make non-military contributions to the international order. Since 1998, Japan has used its human security concept as the guiding principle of its foreign policy.

In other words, Japan has pursued its comprehensive security doctrine that was augmented in 1998 by the introduction of the human security doctrine with its emphasis on non-military tools while dealing with conflict resolution and prevention. Moreover, on the basis of Maull’s and Funabashi’s contributions, we argued that Japan is also identified by the peculiar concept of ‘civilian power’. However, along with the above developments, the adoption of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, Antiterrorism Special Measures Law in 2001, Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction
Assistance in 2003, reformations of the Defence Agency of Japan into the Ministry of Defence, as well as modifications in the SDF structure and granting primary status to overseas operations of the SDF suggest more active Japanese engagement in international military arrangements. As our analysis has shown, changes in the international climate pushed Japan to adapt to new conditions and, consequently, to play a more active role in security matters. At the same time, the ‘civilian’, non-military nature of its policies remains in force and has not been undermined.

In its turn, due to security considerations, Europe underwent a complex process of institutionalisation in its economic, political, and security affairs. Thus, by creating supranational institutions, Europe secured itself from possible future wars and a repetition of its bellicose history. Moreover, due to economic developments within their integrated structures, European states were able to provide security and stability. In the 1970s, in the EC, these processes led to Europe’s emergence as a ‘civilian power’, which emphasises non-military means to secure itself. By the early 1990s, the EU, which had emerged out of the EC, was dealing with economic issues and became a supranational structure. Consistent with this development, in 1999, the EU was able to initiate the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) structure, which, conforming to the doctrine of ‘civilian power Europe’ proposed in the 1970s, has been directed towards coping with modern conflicts and threats via primarily non-military means. In 2003, the adoption of a human security doctrine by the European Council as well as the creation of the EU’s military forces made the EU stance more visible and significant in the world.

Because after the end of the Second World War Japan and Europe fell under the security guarantees of the US, they were able to develop ‘civilian’ identities that facilitated the initiation of cooperation in security areas – so-called ‘low politics’ – which differed from the military areas represented in their respective relations with the US. This is how the established commonality between the EU and Japan became their ‘civilian power’ identity. Here we notice that Japan and Europe have much in common, with their emphasis on solving security problems through primarily economic means while not totally ruling out the military component. Moreover, Japan and the EU’s adoption of a human security concept, in which the former ‘copes with threats’ while the latter pursues ‘freedom from insecurities’, creates an additional commonality in their security conceptualisations. It draws the EU and Japan close together in terms of security visions, which is how they have approached their joint security agenda.
Japan-European Union Joint Security Dialogue and Its Expansion
(Discourse)

This study discovered that, in the early 1970s, Europe and Japan initiated a two-way, mutual and reciprocal communication. The climax of this development was Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to Europe in 1973, which initiated the security dialogue between Europe and Japan based on their respective security visions. The first topic covered by the security dialogue was the environment in 1977. In the early 1980s, the security dialogue proved its importance through coordinated and coherent actions between Europe and Japan in response to the Iranian crisis. This joint stance stimulated various opinions on the desirability of even closer European-Japanese relations. In the later 1980s, despite a mounting trade imbalance and the sometimes hostile posture vis-à-vis Japan, the EC and Japan managed to agree on further development of the security dialogue, which eventually included science and technology, energy and aid development.

Therefore, during the Cold War period, their ‘civilian power’ identities allowed Europe and Japan to initiate a security dialogue and undertake concrete joint projects in such ‘low politics’ areas as the environment, aid development, science and technology, and energy security. Despite increasing economic tensions, trade imbalances, and various harsh criticisms of Japanese trade practices by the EC, they still managed to pursue a policy of mutual engagement in the security dialogue. Moreover, both Japan and Europe carried out the policy of cooperation and engagement in multilateral structures.

The end of the Cold War necessitated modifications to Japanese and European views on security and their security dialogue. The signing of The Hague Declaration of 1991 launched a process of expanding the security agenda by the introduction of new topics such as non-proliferation, disarmament, and inter-regional cooperation. Cooperation and coordination on the Register of Conventional Arms Transfers was the first widely mentioned case of concrete EU-Japan activity. Moreover, at the same time, the EU and Japan initiated a security dialogue on ‘conflict spots’ in the world, such as the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia, which we have classified as the crisis management area.

The EU-Japan security dialogue also developed through the expanding scope of activities and, moreover, became increasingly embedded in multilateral frameworks. Thus, mutual engagement in the former Yugoslavia, North Korea (KEDO), and ASEM demonstrated that the security dialogue between the EU and Japan was expanding and incorporating more areas, much of it on the inter-regional level.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the persistent trade deficits of the 1990s (in 1992 it was 29.6 billion ECU, and by 1998, amounted to 34.1 billion ECU (European Commission 1999a)), the EU and Japan
recognised that their relationship by the late 1990s was one of ‘equal and respected partners’, which was characterised by the words ‘dialogue’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘partnership’. This is very significant because in 1991 Japan was still being perceived as a ‘plunderer’ threatening the security and welfare in Europe. The importance of their mutual image as ‘partners’ ten years later speaks for itself. European and Japanese mutual willingness to avoid concentration on trade disputes probably helped to improve understanding and security dialogue relations, expand the agenda of the security dialogue that included participation of the EU in KEDO, food security, and the fight against international crime. Moreover, the expanded scope of their activities paid further dividends because it helped resolve some of their economic tensions.

By the 2000s, Europe and Japan had acquired substantial experience in interactions and discussions with each other, and unlike in previous decades, their cooperation as equal partners was in good shape. In this regard, ‘An Action Plan for the EU-Japan Cooperation’, signed in 2001, reflected the amicable state of EU-Japan relations, while, at the same time, it also represented an important stage in the elaboration of the EU-Japan security agenda. First, it codified various activities that had been sporadically going on since the 1980-90s and were related to security issues. These issues included arms non-proliferation, disarmament, conflict prevention, peace building, the environment, and energy security. Furthermore, it established goals and measures to be taken in order to make the EU-Japan cooperation more fruitful. Second, the scope of security dialogue activities had been significantly enlarged compared to the early 1990s at the time of the conclusion of The Hague Declaration. Third, the document was consistent with the reality that contemporary security challenges must be addressed by non-traditional (i.e., non-military) tools. Fourth, ‘An Action Plan’ significantly expanded the areas of cooperation based on new international realities and European and Japanese security conceptualisations. Fifth, ‘An Action Plan’ demonstrated that the EU-Japan security dialogue had its own issues to deal with and thus it became unnecessary to compare it with their individual US relations. Sixth, due to the global scope of the problems, an additional aspect of the dialogue became multilateralism. In general, ‘An Action Plan’ has been an ambitious and yet feasible project based on the realisation of the EU and Japan’s engagement in bilateral and multilateral activities.

Moreover, the security dialogue between the EU and Japan includes discourse and interaction as well as joint activities on disarmament and non-proliferation, which for the most part is embedded in multilateral institutions. Moreover, it demonstrates the expanding scope of issues covered, notably those related to weapons, missiles, export control, and other non-proliferation measures.
The issue of the EU’s arms embargo of China, which emerged in 2003, created some tension in the EU-Japan security dialogue but never led to its suspension; quite the contrary, the security dialogue actually continued expanding and deepening. Japan realised that the EU’s security policies and activities could directly influence the East Asian military security balance. Thus, the EU’s decision to reconsider arms exports to China directly affected Japanese security concerns. The embargo issue also led to further expansion of the EU-Japan security dialogue, which now encompasses an East Asian strategic dialogue that proposed the US and China’s participation. The main development in 2006 was the launch of the strategic dialogue on Central Asia. This, of course, demonstrates the ever-expanding and deepening nature of the EU-Japan security dialogue, which implies that positive outcomes in one area inspire cooperation in another.

However, this study showed that besides the positive elements discussed above, there were other factors that hampered the EU-Japan security dialogue. Thus, invisibility, the ‘lack of problems’ between the EU and Japan, as well as their bureaucracies made the EU-Japan security dialogue less efficient and proactive. We believe that the problem of invisibility was a major cause of the pessimistic, if not sceptical, opinions often expressed about the EU-Japan security dialogue.

The developments throughout their history demonstrate that the EU and Japan have their own security agendas based on their own visions of security. This makes it inappropriate to compare the EU-Japan security dialogue with that of US-Europe, or even more, the US-Japan security alliance. Based on the above-mentioned, it seems appropriate to come up with a timeline for the EU-Japan security dialogue, namely:
1. 1973-1991 – a formation period (from initiation of the dialogue to The Hague Declaration);
3. 2001-2006 – a period characterised by a deepening of their relationship.

**Japan-EU Security Dialogue in the Areas (Joint Activities)**

We have also examined the cooperation between the two actors in the areas of common security interests, which are:
1. the environment;
2. science and technology, energy;
3. development aid;
4. crisis management.
1. **The Environment**

Japan and the EU have been cooperating on environmental issues since 1977. A ‘civilian’ approach to security with regard to the threat to the global environment, as well as the necessity to enlarge the bilateral agenda to avoid a severe trade confrontation, were driving forces in the initiation of the dialogue. By the early 1990s, they had initiated concrete projects on deforestation, acid rain, waste management, and biodiversity. The Hague Declaration specified realms, notably cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels as well as exchange of opinions on various topics related to the environment such as waste management, acid rain, global warming, etc.

As multilateral projects such as the Rio and Kyoto Summits on global warming and the Johannesburg Summit on sustainable development emerged, they became automatically embedded into the bilateral EU-Japan security agenda on the environment. Moreover, both Europe and Japan have participated in a broad range of other activities, such as the ARGO program, the exchange of experience on waste management, biodiversity, the 3R project, clean water, energy, and natural resources management.

There has thus been a security dialogue between the EU and Japan on the environment, one which has been developing gradually and which continues to strengthen, and moreover, as environmental problems become more diverse and complex, it has continued to expand. This trend will continue to develop based on the fact that the EU and Japan have been cooperating for such a long time on the environment and have accumulated a certain range of experiences that will allow them to make their dialogue even more successful and efficient in tackling an ever-expanding range of new problems.

2. **Science and Technology, and Energy**

The security dialogue in science and technology was initiated in 1990 with the signing of the Agreement on Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development. Inasmuch as the agreement related to the peaceful use and control of nuclear fuels, the exchange of information on specific safeguard techniques and cost sharing for expensive technologies, the conclusion of this agreement was an important security issue. The European Commission and Japan also commenced a dialogue on new materials, and the exchange of young researchers.

On the multilateral level, Japan and Europe initiated cooperation within the Human Frontier Science Program, the Intelligent Manufacturing System (IMS) program, the International Science and Technology Centre (ISCT) and the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project.
‘An Action Plan’ introduced biotechnology as an area for cooperation in science and technology as well as a mutual concern and challenge from ethical and moral viewpoints. The document also specified four points for joint performance, notably:
1. cooperation within multilateral structures;
2. biotechnology including both research and its ethical and moral aspects;
3. joint efforts on the Human Frontier Program on basic research;
4. life sciences, materials, space and prospective studies.

Under this rubric, space exploration emerged as a new area embraced by the EU-Japan security agenda.

In 2002, Japan joined the Energy Charter Treaty, thus cooperating with the EU on issues of trade, transit and investment to ensure stable energy supplies. In addition to multilateral cooperation, Japan is attentive to the European experience on the liberalisation of electricity and gas markets, and the introduction of bio-fuels. In its turn, Japan is ready to share its experiences in the importation of liquid natural gas and usage of ‘clean coal technology’. These developments show that Japan and Europe are cooperating closely in the development of energy security, to ease the threat of energy dependence. Moreover, the energy issues, which have a major impact on the environment – given the increasing evidence supporting the belief that there is a direct relationship between energy usage and global warming – bind the issues of science and technology, energy and environmental protection together.

External changes, such as globalisation and the advancement of science, have broadened the EU-Japan security dialogue on science and technology, and energy. This dialogue has developed into a comprehensive agenda and continues to expand and deepen, especially at the multilateral level.

3. **Development Aid**

The EU-Japan bilateral security dialogue with regard to development aid has its origins in the 1980s. It was given new impetus by the visit of the President of the European Commission Delors to Japan and the signing of The Hague Political Declaration in 1991. The first project that jointly involved the EU and Japan concerned providing development assistance to the Central and Eastern European countries with the objective of stabilising the situation in Europe. Europe and Japan then became engaged in coordinating their development policies during the Gulf crisis (1990-1991). Simultaneously, right after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Japan and the EU collaborated on providing assistance to the USSR’s former republics to prevent conflicts and, more importantly, to avoid an uncontrollable spread of the USSR’s weapons arsenal.
Although multilateral, these cases demonstrate the securitised nature of development aid in the foreign policies of the EC and Japan.

The EU and Japan eventually became involved in food security projects and in a dialogue on Africa, which produced further expansions of the security dialogue. As the new challenges of globalisation appeared increasingly dominant in human development, the EU and Japan began to face increasingly multilayered and multifaceted development problems that needed to be addressed jointly through development aid. Consequently, ‘An Action Plan’ included concrete measures on development aid, which broadened and deepened the scope of European and Japanese joint activities at both bi- and multilateral levels. Cooperation on the Doha Development Agenda, the prevention of pandemics, Sri Lankan reconstruction and African development have been the dominant issues of the EU-Japan development aid security dialogue and showed that the cooperation has expanded. Because all of the above policies and measures related to human security appear on the EU-Japan joint agenda, we can safely say that development aid is part of the EU-Japan security dialogue. Moreover, the security dialogue on development aid tends to expand and enlarge to encompass new areas.

4. Crisis Management
Europe and Japan conduct joint activities and coordinate their conflict prevention and crisis management tasks regardless of the distance from Europe or Japan. Japan’s engagement in the former Yugoslavia and European involvement in KEDO are used to illustrate their activities that began in the mid-1990s, which further symbolise the commonalities and interdependence of the security environments of both Europe and Japan. By 2006, the complex nature of newer security threats and challenges led to Japan and the EU’s direct participation in major international conflicts worldwide regardless of their geographical locations. The case of Afghanistan demonstrates how the EU and Japan jointly conduct operations via DDR, for example. At the same time, we should state that multilateral engagement in crisis management operations makes the bilateral EU-Japan dialogue barely visible.

Moreover, the security dialogue between the EU and Japan on counter-terrorism, conflict-prevention and peace-building activities is based on their respective security conceptualisations and envisages appropriate policies in these spheres, e.g. financial and humanitarian assistance, etc. They both have very similar mechanisms regarding civil crisis management, in which collaboration with NGOs is essential.

All things considered, given world developments and the emergence of new threats to humankind, the EU and Japan will undoubtedly continue to unite their efforts to curb these threats to provide ‘security for
all’ in their emphasis on human security as a driving force of their cooperation.

Finale

This book provides an advanced discussion of the EU-Japan security dialogue. At the discourse level, both actors pursue a quiet but consistent, diplomacy of mutual engagement which, in turn, fuels the gradual progress in joint activities and stimulates a solid foundation for further common actions.

Successfully realised plans and positive results, as we know, stimulate further cooperation and interactions. Hence, the expansion of the EU-Japan security agenda is occurring for several reasons. First, there is the influence of growing trends in globalisation and the necessity to implement cohesive policies to avoid overlaps and inefficiency. That is why a prominent feature of the EU-Japan security dialogue is multilateralism, which is reasonable and logical due to the interconnected nature of threats and global scope of challenges. Second, the mutual understanding and positive experience of cooperation encourage the parties to extend and deepen their dialogue. Moreover, in the face of more recent problems, and as global interdependence evolves, the security dialogue will continue to expand.

At the same time, though the EU-Japan security dialogue is sound and comprehensive, it is not always visible. For that reason, unless it is properly nurtured, it will continue to remain relatively invisible and thus be unable to adequately build upon the increasingly interconnected interests that in fact bind the partners together. If their efforts were to become more visible within its own parameters, the EU-Japan security dialogue will emerge as a significant international partnership, one that effectively addresses many of the salient issues of the new millennium. Invisibility can be minimised by further developing the dialogue in various spheres such as a strategic dialogue on security in East Asia, a discourse on Central Asia, and missile defence. Finally, there is energy security, which is becoming an increasingly acute issue.

The EU-Japan security dialogue has been gradually strengthening and deepening throughout its development due to international developments and also the consequent modifications in the European and Japanese security conceptualisations. Moreover, it can be characterised as a safety net of ‘civilian powers’ governance in security affairs. It is undoubtedly an important layer of the global security net, which, although not visible, is sound and comprehensive.
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Notes

Introduction

1 In 1998, Japan promoted the concept of human security from the perspective of strengthening efforts to cope with ‘threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity such as poverty, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational organised crime, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, the outflow of refugees...’ For details, see chapter 3 and MOFA (2000), Diplomatic Bluebook 2000, chapter II, section 3. Available online at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2000/II-3-a.html#1; See also: Obuchi, K. (1998a); Obuchi K. (1998b); since 2003, the EU has more explicitly endorsed the human security concept where human security refers to freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by violations of human rights. For details, see chapter 3 and European Council (2003b); Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities (2004).

2 In many sources including official ones (e.g., Delegation of the European Commission to Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, European Parliament, etc.), the ‘EU’ and ‘Europe’ are treated synonymously. This book uses the same approach.

3 For the EU military component, see chapter 4.

4 For interview materials explanation, see the introduction’s ‘Document and Literature Overview’.

5 For details, see: Buzan, B., O. Waever, and J. de Wilde (1998). Buzan et al. suggest that issues connected with war and peace relate to strategic studies and remain a military-focused specialty within the new security studies. They also divide security studies into 5 sectors: Military, Environmental, Economic, Societal, and Political.

6 To avoid constant repetitions, in the book the European Community is also mentioned as the EC or the EEC (European Economic Community). The Japanese names are presented in the Western order, whereby the given name precedes the family name.


8 MOFA (various years), Gaiko Seisho [Diplomatic Bluebook]. Tokyo: Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan]; Japan Defence Agency (various years), Boei no Hakusho [Defence of Japan]. Tokyo: Japan Defence Agency; Japan Institute for International Affairs, Hakusho [White Paper], both Japanese and English versions.


12 Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Community and its Member States and Japan, The Hague, 18 July 1991; 4th EU-Japan Summit (1995); 5th EU-Japan Summit (1996); 6th EU-Japan Summit (1997a); 7th EU-Japan Summit (1998); 10th EU-Japan Summit (2001a), etc.

For the concept of path-dependent development, see Douglas, C. (1990), especially chapter 11.

The concept was quoted for the first time in Duchene, F. (1972) cited in Remacle, E. (2005) 35.

In 2001, MITI was reorganised into METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry).


The group of 24 assisted the newly democraticised countries of Central and Eastern Europe by providing financial, management, training and technology support (see chapter 6).


Ibid.

For a detailed explanation of ‘human security’ and Japan’s foreign policy, see: MOFA (2001a), 183-185.

See also: Obuchi, K. (1999a).

See also: Gilson, J. (2000), 50-52.

For an examination of ‘civilian power’ for Europe, see chapter 1.

The catalyst for the genesis of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was the British-French summit in St-Malo in December 1998. The ESDP was formally launched by the German Presidency in early 1999. The Cologne European Council conclusions (June 1999) serves as its official birth certificate. The ESDP is the EU’s policy that includes the gradual framing of a common defence policy. For more

8 Conversation with Doctor Koji Fukuda, Professor of Waseda University, who advised the Japanese Government and was involved in the negotiations on the conclusion of The Hague Declaration, Tokyo, 19 December 2006.


10 The environment is one of the spheres of the security cooperation.

11 The statement notes: ‘Frankly speaking, it is difficult to say that, with the exception of individual cases like president of France Chirac, the European countries deep down have warm feelings towards Japan, and because of this for Japan comparing its partnership with the USA, the partnership with the EU is hardly to be achieved. Nevertheless, feelings of people go last. From now on, in a new world order for the Japanese diplomacy in each matter a strong cooperation with a partner is important. Most likely in a couple of cases the rational partner we can hope for is Europe...’ Emphasis added. See: Taigai Kankei Task Force [Task Force on Foreign Relations] (2003).

12 In 1992, within the OSCE, Japan was given the special status of ‘Partner for Cooperation’. See: OSCE website. http://www.osce.org/about/19293.html.

13 Japan was the third largest contributor, after the EU and the US, to the reconstruction of former Yugoslavia. Japan also participated in the reconstruction steering board on former Yugoslavia and provided personnel to the Office of the UN High Representative. See: European Commission (1996b).

14 While this Commission’s thesis with regard to the EU-Japan relations in the 1990s is correct, looking back at the Cold War period, Japan had actually been an initiator of bilateral relations (chapter 1). See: European Commission (1999a) 6.

15 The Commission’s document noted that ‘Japan shares the EU’s belief in the multilateral system and can be [a] valuable ally to the EU to counterbalance [the] unilateralist tendencies of the US...’ See: European Commission (1999a), 7.

16 Brittan noted that ‘[t]he EU-Japan cooperation is voluminous, diversified, valuable but not visible. Giving visibility to our activities will help up better to involve the public and to demonstrate that we do respond to real demands’. See: Brittan, L. (1998).


1 See also: Obuchi, K. (1998c).


3 Information and formal documents on these Japanese initiatives can be found on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: www.mofa.go.jp.

4 In 2006, the Self-Defence Force of Japan numbered some 260,000 personnel, 164,000 of which are in the GSDF, 46,000 in the MSDF and 47,000 in the ASDF. It has one of the world’s best navies with 16 submarines, 50 destroyers and other ships, and a robust contingent of antisubmarine aircraft. See: JDA (2006a) 112.

5 Until recently, the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF were run by their respective chiefs of staff in accordance with orders from the Director General of the Defence Agency (Minister of State for Defence). The Chairman of the Joint Staff Council combined all three forces but did not have direct command of the SDF except for one ‘special joint unit’ deployed during a national emergency or disaster with units from two or more SDFs. See: East-Asian Strategic Review (2003), ‘A Study on Joint Operations of the Self-Defence Forces’, p. 302. In March 2006, the Defence Agency and SDF (GSDF, MSDF, ASDF) shifted to a joint-operation strategy, in which the Chief of Staff, Joint
Staff Office, solely assist the Minister of State for Defence on SDF operations matters requiring military expertise. See: JDA (2006a), chapter 3, p. 148.

According to the new law, the Defence Minister has the following functions: 1) Request Prime Minister call a Cabinet meeting for enactment and amendment of laws concerning security and the SDF; 2) Call upon Finance Minister regarding budget requests; 3) Request Prime Minister call a Cabinet meeting for approval of personnel appointment of major positions at the Ministry of Defence. These functions are essential for the decision-making procedure in case of emergency to avoid delays. For instance, until the law was adopted, in the autumn of 2006, when North Korea conducted a nuclear test, it took 9 hours to call an urgent meeting of the Council and Cabinet (Interview, Academy of Defence, November 2006).

‘Civilian power’ does not preclude the use of military force (and the term ‘civilian’ does not mean direct opposition to a ‘military’ component), as long as it is employed explicitly to achieve civilian goals, as understood within the context of the rules and regulations. For detailed explanation on ‘civil power’, see chapter 2, section on Japan’s security conceptualisation in the 1990s.


For the EU, see: Council of European Union (1998).


See: MOFA (2005[d]).

Interview, Japan’s Mission to the European Union, 6 July 2006.

‘Toolbox’ is a revised Code of Conduct and the new instrument on measures pertaining to arms exports to post-embargo countries.

See: European Council (2005c).

It is worth mentioning that, at the 1996 EU-Japan summit, Japan’s Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, President of the European Council John Bruton, President of the European Commission Jacques Santer discussed the situation in Russia and Europe agreed with Japan that ‘full normalization of Japan-Russia relations based on the Tokyo Declaration is important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region’. See: 5th EU-Japan Summit (1996). The Tokyo Declaration was signed together with other documents on 11-12 October 1993 during the meeting of Prime Minister of Japan M. Hosokawa with President of Russian B. Yeltsin. According to the Declaration, Russia recognised the existence of the territorial problem in Japanese-Russian relations and all preceding agreements and other international covenants signed by Japan and the USSR (in other words, the return of two, Shikotan and Habomai, of the four islands). See: Kimura, H. (1996); Latyshev, I. (1994); European Parliament (2005), item 15 a).

This statement is also confirmed by a Japanese expert on EU-Japan relations, December 2006.

Interview, the European Commission Delegation to Japan, 15 June 2005.

Ibid.
4  Comprehensive Endeavours to Preserve the Ecosystem: The EU-Japan Security Dialogue in the Environmental Area

1  For European environmental policy, see: Bretherton C. and J. Vogler (2006) chapter 4.


1. See official website of the program: http://www.hfsp.org/about/AboutHistory.php.

2. The European Organisation for Nuclear Research, commonly known as CERN, is the world’s largest particle physics laboratory, situated west of Geneva, on the border of France and Switzerland. The convention establishing CERN was signed on 29 September 1954. From the original 12 signatories of the CERN convention, membership has grown to the present 20 member states. Japan has ‘observer status’ in CERN.

3. ARGO is a ‘Weather System for the Ocean’ project that provides real-time ocean temperatures and salinity for use in climate and fisheries research. Argo consists of a network of oceanic robotic probes covering the Earth’s oceans, with a total of 3000 probes planned. The probes measure salinity and temperature at depths of 2 km, surfacing once every 10 days to transmit the collected data via satellite.

4. The Integrated Ocean Drilling Program (IODP) is an international marine research program that explores the Earth’s history and structure as recorded in seafloor sediments and rocks, and monitors sub-sea floor environments. The IODP is funded by four entities acting as international partners: the US National Science Foundation (NSF) and Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) are the Lead Agencies; the European Consortium for Ocean Research Drilling (ECORD) is a Contributing Member; and The People’s Republic of China Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is an Associate Member; and the Interim Asian Consortium, represented by the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources (KIGAM) are Associate Members. See OIDP official website: http://www.iodp.org/about/.


6. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is an international agreement, as a supplement to the Convention on Biological Diversity. The Biosafety Protocol makes it clear that products from new technologies must be based on safety principles and allow developing nations to balance public health with economic benefits. It will, for example, let countries ban imports of a genetically modified organism if they feel there is not enough scientific evidence to prove that the product is safe and requires exporters to label shipments containing genetically altered commodities such as corn or cotton. In accordance with the provisions of its Article 37, the Protocol entered into force on 11 September 2003.

7. The International Energy Agency (IEA) is a Paris-based intergovernmental organisation founded by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1974, in the wake of the oil crisis. The IEA is dedicated to preventing disruptions in the supply of oil, as well as acting as an information source on statistics about the international oil market and other energy sectors. It has a secondary role in promoting and developing alternate energy sources, rational energy policies, and multinational energy technology co-operation. The one sector it does not study in detail, except as a contribution to the overall energy balance and economy, is nuclear power, which is covered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The Energy Charter Treaty is an international agreement originally based on integrating the energy sectors of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War into broader European and world markets. The original European Energy Charter was signed in The Hague on 17 December 1991, containing a declaration of principles for international energy including trade, transit and investment, together with the intention of negotiating a binding treaty. The treaty itself was signed in Lisbon in December 1994, together with a protocol on energy efficiency and related environmental aspects. The treaty came into effect in April 1998; an amendment to the trade-related provisions was also agreed that month. See Energy Charter website: http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=7.


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4 Group of 24 was created in July 1989 to coordinate assistance to Central and Eastern Europe. The G24 group consists of 24 nations including the 15 members of the European Union (EU), Japan, the United States and Canada. International organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also take part.
5 Japan’s share is 8.5% of total contributions.
6 In the former Soviet Union, among the 15 republics, Ukraine and Belorussia had experience realising foreign policy. However, it was limited to UN structures. After the end of the Second World War, according to the agreement reached at a series of conferences establishing the UN in 1944-5, Ukraine and Belorussia were granted the UN founding and member states status.
7 Conversation with Lord William Wallace, who was invited to Ukraine with other scholars and politicians to consult on foreign policy in December 1991. Hitotsubashi University, 13 November 2006.
8 See: European Commission (1999a); Kono Y. (2000a); 9th EU-Japan Summit (2000a).
9 Ownership implies responsibility for own development by developing countries.
10 Interview, Delegation of Japan to the EU, July 2006.
13 Interviews with the representatives of the EC Delegation (May-June 2006), Academy of Defence of Japan (January 2006), JICA (March 2006).
15 See: 13th EU-Japan Summit (2004a); 15th EU-Japan Summit (2006a).
7 Japan and EU Involvement in Crisis Management: Joint Activities

1 Interview with Senior Policy Analyst Dr. Axel Berkofsky, European Policy Centre, Brussels, 2006.
2 The Declaration greeted ‘Palestinian people’s intifada and valiant resistance’ and expressed intention to continue ‘to protect the pan-Arab security and fend off the foreign schemes that aim to encroach on Arab territorial integrity’. See: http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/communique02.htm.
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18 The Compact is the result of consultations between Afghanistan, the United Nations and the international community, and represents a framework for cooperation for the next five years, 2006-2011. For more information, see: The London Conference on Afghanistan (2006), Building on Success: The Afghanistan Compact, 31 January-1 February 2006.
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22 The partnership of Japan with its European counterparts takes place within the UN multilateral operations on crisis management. Regarding the bilateral dialogue, in December 2003, the UK and Japan agreed on joint financing and joint fact-finding missions in Sierra Leone. For details, see: MOFA (2002c).
23 See: 10th EU-Japan Summit (2001a).
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The EU-Japan Security Dialogue: Invisible but Comprehensive examines security dialogue between Japan and the EU from the establishment of the official European Community-Japan cooperation in the late 1950s until 2006. While most of scholarly works dealing with Europe-Japan relations focus on economic and trade issues, this book provides a basis for advanced discussion on security matters. It argues that the EU-Japan security dialogue takes place – and what is more, it is expanding. Olena Mykal investigates how international events – particularly the terrorist attacks in New York on 9/11 and the EU’s proposal to lift its arms embargo on China – have strengthened the dialogue over the past decade.

Olena Mykal is Head of Sector of Asian Studies of the Department of Foreign Policy at the National Institute of Strategic Studies of Ukraine and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. She received her PhD from the Waseda University in Japan.